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Summary 
 
Vigorous debates have taken place in many European countries, and between the EU and 
the USA, about regulatory policy regimes covering the assessment and approval of GM 
crops. In such countries the debates have, to a large extent, taken place in public arenas 
and with the active participation of broadcast and print media. In Iran, a very vigorous 
and hotly-contested policy debate concerning legislation covering GM crops took place 
between 2004 and 2009, but it was almost entirely confined within the Government with 
no public debate and minimal media coverage. From early 2006 to late 2008 a protracted 
dispute occurred between different parts of the Iranian regime, which was characterised by 
an apparent stalemate. In 2008-2009, conspicuous policy shifts occurred, which 
culminated in the passage of a Biosafety Law by the Iranian Parliament (or Majlis).  This 
thesis describes, analyses and explains the policy-making process from 2006 to 2009.  It 
explains firstly how and why a stalemate arose in the disputes between ministries and 
departments. It then explains how that impasse was overcome, and how a particular policy 
regime came to be adopted. The chosen analytical framework draws mainly on two bodies 
of literature, namely the regulation of technological risk, and the analysis of public policy-
making. A task-specific analytical framework is developed which uses the concept of the 
‘framing assumptions’, which underpin the particular positions taken by the diverse 
protagonists in the debate, to analyse the characteristics of the seemingly irresolvable 
dispute. The differences between those framing assumptions are used to provide an 
explanation of why the stalemate arose and remained unresolved for several years. The 
explanation of the eventual policy outcome takes account of those framing assumptions, 
but on their own they are not sufficient to explain the eventual policy decisions. To 
provide that explanation, considerations of the unequal division of political power 
between parts of the Iranian regime are required. The Iranian case study, despite some of 
its unique characteristics, can support several general conclusions about the dynamics of 
risk policy making, the conditions under which disputes can arise and those under which 
they may be resolved. 
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 Chapter 1. Introduction  
Assessment and management of technological risks has been a hot topic of debate within 
and between several European countries and between the EU and the USA over the last 
three decades (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005). Several commentators have 
analysed those debates according to their adopted theoretical frameworks and the 
available data (e.g. Murphy and Levidow 2006, Levidow and Carr 2009, Jasanoff 2005, 
Toke 2004, Millstone et al 2004). A feature of those debates, inter alia, especially in the 
context of the EU, was the role of public and different types of media in affecting 
changes in the policy discourses, such as considering new scientific uncertainties, 
acknowledging extra-scientific judgments within regulatory issues, or considering more 
stringent evidence for safety (Levidow and Murphy 2003).  
In the context of developing countries, GM regulation is generally evolving in a different 
way, because those countries are less engaged in the development and application of 
modern biotechnology products. Within this context, biotechnology regulation is mainly 
affected by the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol of Biosafety (CPB) as an amendment 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The aim of the CPB is the regulation 
of trans-boundary movements of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), and its text 
suggests a precautionary approach. Several studies have analysed the experience of the 
countries that joined the CPB in developing their national biosafety laws as a basis for 
their international transactions (e.g. Gupta and Falkner 2006, 2009, Newell 2008). 
However, this literature has not taken into account or analysed the internal debates and 
conflicts in those countries in more detail. A small number of recent publications have 
described the internal processes of developing biosafety laws without providing an 
explanation of the factors underpinning the disputes (e.g. Karembu et al 2010 on the 
experience of biosafety law development in Kenya).  
A very vigorous dispute emerged in Iran over drafting a biosafety law when the Parliament 
(Majlis) of Iran ratified the CPB in August 2003. Different Iranian organisations and 
ministries at that time shared a belief that due to the commitment of Iran to the CPB, and 
in order to manage the trans-boundary movement of LMOs there would be a need to 
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draft and adopt a biosafety law. However, those debates mainly manifested in the efforts 
of the relevant ministries and organisations, chief among them the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA), the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Science (MoS) and the 
Department of Environment (DoE), to take over the location of the office of the 
secretariat for the National Biosafety Committee (NBC). The NBC was a committee 
which was established in 2000 from the Ministers of the ministries mentioned above and 
the head of the DoE, the First Deputy President and three biotechnological experts, and 
was supposed to play the role of general policy making vis-à-vis biosafety.  
After several developments and changes to the location of that office, which I will discuss 
in more detail in the next chapter, the DoE convinced the Cabinet of the necessity of 
locating the office of the secretariat in that organisation. Shortly after its establishment, in 
May 2006 the new office located in the DoE invited other ministries to join the 
negotiations on drafting a biosafety law. According to the available records, the DoE 
planned to finalise the draft in four sessions to be passed to the NBC, then the Cabinet 
and lastly to the Parliament for final approval.1 However, preparing such a draft took 
nearly one year, amidst increasing debates and disagreements between the Governmental 
organisations involved. One year was also spent on the approval of this draft by the NBC 
and the Cabinet. The draft bill was finally sent to Parliament on 5 August 2008 to be 
passed as the national biosafety law of the country. However, the Agricultural Committee 
of the Parliament initiated further sessions to negotiate with the previously disputed 
Governmental organisations to improve the bill. Ironically, the result of that process was 
the generation of an entirely different draft biosafety law which was eventually passed by 
the Parliament in May 2009.  
The case of GM biosafety regulation in Iran suggests an experience of heated policy 
controversies between Governmental organisations and ministries, as well as radical policy 
changes with no public debate, minimal media coverage, and even minimal influence from 
international actors such as multinational corporations, lobbying groups and other 
international organisations. Nevertheless, the ratification of the CPB was a driving force 
in this respect.  
                                                 
1
 Official voice recordings of the coordinating committee sessions, first session on 24 May 2006 (author’s translation).  
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Furthermore, these conflicts are still on-going, as the passage of the law did not resolve 
the disputes. For example, a senior representative in the MoS in May 2010, a year after 
passage of the law, accused the office of the secretariat (which is still located in the DoE) 
of what he called the ‘wrong approach’ to biosafety and being in opposition to the 
provisions of the biosafety law of the country. Referring to a prepared draft of rules and 
instructions for handling, transportation, import and export of GM products, he argued 
that those instructions were absolutely unjustifiable because they presumed the modified 
organisms were like untreatable diseases.2  
Therefore, the case of Iran provides an example of enduring policy controversies as well as 
policy shifts at the level of Governmental organisations without public debate, media 
coverage or the influence of international actors (excepting the CPB) affecting its policy 
agenda. The topic of this dissertation is the analysis of the experience of Iran in 
developing GM biosafety law, and the aim of this research is twofold: analysing policy 
controversies and policy changes together by posing this general question:  
How is it possible to analyse and explain the policy controversies as well as the policy 
changes in the biosafety regulation processes of Iran within which there were neither 
public involvement nor media coverage, nor a considerable international force? 
From the policy point of view, this analysis is very important, as the controversies have 
not been resolved even following the passage of the law by the Parliament, and the 
protagonists in the system are still struggling with their predicament. More theoretically, 
this study could be interesting because it discusses a case of biotechnology and risk 
regulation in an entirely different context from those discussed in the published analytical 
literature (e.g. Murphy and Levidow 2006, Millstone et al 2008, Jasanoff 2005 on 
industrialized countries, or Gupta and Falkner, Keeley 2006, Newell 2008 on developing 
countries).  
However, it is necessary to base my research on a sound theoretical framework in order to 
be able to analyse the case in hand. For this purpose, I will extensively use two broad 
streams of literature as follows: 1) biotechnology risk regulation, and 2) public policy 
                                                 
2
 http://mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?&NewsID=1084353  
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analysis, mainly because both of them are relevant to the current experience of Iran, and 
could offer useful tools and insights for the purpose of this research. Before appraising 
this literature, in the next chapter I will cast more light on the context of the study, i.e. 
Iran, as a country that might not be well known. In the same chapter I will also review the 
international context of biotechnology regulation, including both the experience of more 
advanced countries such the USA and Europe, along with other developing countries 
which have been discussed in the literature in the light of their commitments to the CPB. 
In Chapter 3 I will review the useful tools of the mentioned two streams of literature to 
identify the theoretical standpoints of this research that in turn will help me to develop a 
useful theoretical framework for the purpose of the analysis in Chapter 4. Throughout 
Chapters 5-7, I will discuss the three phases of negotiations for drafting the biosafety law 
in chronological order in order to investigate the factors underpinning both policy 
controversies and policy changes. Finally, I will discuss the findings and implications of 
this research both in terms of its theoretical and empirical contributions in Chapter 8.   
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 Chapter 2. Context of Study   
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overall picture of the context within which the 
intricate policy process of regulating biosafety in Iran has been taking place. This 
background picture, along with the theoretical insights from the next chapter, should 
provide a good basis from which to develop a theoretical framework and research 
methodology.  
As a developing and a less discussed, and perhaps more unknown country, I will provide a 
general picture of the political structure of Iran and the normal process of legislation 
within it. Then I will highlight the institutional character of science, particularly 
biotechnology. Reviewing the international context of GM regulation, including some 
debates across Europe and those between the USA and the EU, as well as the context of 
developing countries will be the topic of the following two sections. Then I will turn to a 
chronological history of biosafety regulation in Iran, which will be helpful in delineating 
the overall processes and different stages of negotiations. This information should 
provide an overall picture of the Iranian context and the biotechnology legislation process 
located in an international context.  
2.2. The Political Structure in Iran 
2.2.1. General Political Structure 
When mentioning Iran, I refer to the Islamic Republic of Iran since the revolution in 
1979. Although Iranian people share a long-standing cultural tradition over a history of 
more than 2500 years, the new political structure of Iran emerged after that revolution 
and mainly under an Islamic ideology. The new governance system is shaped around a 
central principle called “Vellayat Faghih”, denoting the delegation of power from God to 
man through a certain route. On this basis, the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in 
the governance system, responsible for delineation and supervision of the general policies 
of the country according to the Constitution. There are three bodies in connection with 
the Supreme Leader, which are mainly constituted to fulfil the monitoring roles of 
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Supreme Leader: the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians and the Expediency 
Council.  
The Assembly of Experts chooses the Supreme Leader and monitors his activities. The 
members of this assembly are virtuous and learned clerics, chosen every five years in a 
countrywide election. After the first Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, passed 
away in 1989, the Assembly of Experts chose Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the Supreme 
Leader of Iran, who has been in this position ever since.  
The Council of Guardians, as the second body connected to the Supreme Leader, is 
constituted from six clerics chosen by the Supreme Leader and six other members elected 
by the Iranian Parliament (Majlis). This council checks that the legislation of the 
Parliament is in line with Islamic rules and with the Constitution, and in the case of 
contradiction, it returns the law to Parliament for the necessary modifications. This 
council must also approve the general competencies of nominees for either presidential or 
parliamentary elections (both of which are also countrywide elections). The Expediency 
Council, the third body related to the Supreme Leader, is responsible for resolving 
conflicts between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians whenever the Parliament 
insists on its passed laws and the Council of Guardians emphasises mismatches between 
the passed law and the Islamic rules or the Constitution. On those occasions, the 
Expediency Council takes the final decision.  
Along with these three controlling institutions connected to the Supreme Leader, there 
are three important authoritative bodies, which are the Government, the Parliament and 
the Judicial System. The President, as the head of Government, is mainly responsible for 
Government policy-making and implementing the Constitution and executing other rules 
and legislation. The President sends to the Parliament the list of his favoured persons as 
suggested Ministers for every new Governmental period, i.e. every four years. Parliament 
will investigate their general competencies and can refuse to accept them. In this sense, 
Ministers are chosen through an interaction between the Parliament and the President.   
The Parliament is also in command of drafting legislation, approving budgets and 
ratifying international commitments. Iranian people participate in two different and 
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independent elections, each one every four years, though not at the same time, to choose 
the President and Parliament members. The third important power in Iran is the Judiciary 
System, the head of which is chosen by the Supreme Leader. The following picture is 
adapted from Wikipedia and represents the political structure of Iran (Figure 2-1).  
Figure 2- 1 Political structure of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran  
 
Source: Adapted and modified from Wikipedia3 
Figure 2-1 indicates that the population elects the MPs, the President and the Assembly 
of Experts. The Assembly of Experts chooses the Supreme Leader and the Supreme 
Leader has a large influence on selecting other authorities, including the head of the 
Judicial System, the Army, half of the members of the Council of Guardians and the 
Expediency Council. Ministers are chosen in an interaction between the President and the 
Parliament. 
2.2.2. Process of Legislation 
The process of legislation in Iran is somewhat intricate because different bodies in the 
country are involved in it (see Figure 2-2). The highest power is the Supreme Leader who 
can make rules and decisions above other authorities. The Expediency Council is 
composed of the national experts selected by the Supreme Leader and is also responsible 
                                                 
3
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iran_gov_power_structure.svg  
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for devising general policies of the country. The suggested policies of this council, after 
the approval of the Supreme Leader, will come into force (Path 3 in Figure 2-2). .  
The Expediency Council also has another role in legislating. In the case of disagreements 
between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians, in which the Council of Guardians 
rejects a law but the Parliament insists on that law, the Expediency Council is the final 
decision-maker. Thus, its decisions in cases of disagreement would be final, as shown in 
Path 2 in Figure 2-2. However, the normal path of introducing new laws comes through 
the Parliament as the main legislature in the country.  
Figure 2- 2 Legislation process in Iran from three 
different paths, and the position of controversies 
over biosafety 
 
However, the general and ordinary path of legislation is Path 1, while the two others take 
place only occasionally. As we will see in the story of biosafety regulation in this chapter, 
biosafety legislation had nothing to do with Paths 2 or 3, instead moving along the 
dashed line as the input to the Parliament, to come across Path 1 and the main 
controversies emerging in preparing an acceptable draft by the Government and between 
Governmental Ministries and organisations, almost behind closed doors.  
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2.2.3. Government and Politics 
The range of perspectives in Iran vis-à-vis governance and ordering society is very diverse. 
The 30 years of recent history of the country could be divided into four main eras based 
on the perspectives of the ruling Governments. The first period dates from 1982 to 
1990, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the President, followed by the second period, 
encompassing eight years under Ali Akbar Rafsanjani’s Government and then the third 
period, President Khatami’s Presidential term for eight years until 2004. Since then, 
Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad has been the Iranian President.  
Apart from the first eight-year period, during which considerable disagreements arose 
between the President and the Prime Minister of the time, Mr Mir Hussein Mousavi, the 
other Governments experienced a more stable situation in terms of intra-Governmental 
conflicts, as the position of Prime Minister was eliminated from the Constitution in 
1990.  
Although all Iran’s Presidents believe in Islam and the Constitution, their approaches to 
administrating the country and the important issues the Government should consider have 
differed. Consequently, new Presidents normally change most of the administrative 
officials as well as the medium-level managers in the country to be in-line with their own 
perspectives. These substantial periodic changes resemble a paradigmatic pattern in the 
Iranian system: eight years of stability followed by a major political change as the result of 
the changing of President. For the three most recent Presidents of Iran, three dispositions 
could be separated as follows: economic development as the main agenda in President 
Rafsanjani’s time; political development and the importance of liberty and freedom in 
President Khatami’s Government; and developing justice in the period of President 
Ahmadi Nejad.  
There is no structured and organised political party in Iran. Although President Khatami 
began work to institutionalise political parties in the country, substantial disagreements 
within the country and from different influential groups meant those efforts achieved 
little. The upshot of Khatami’s administrative period was a diverse and incoherent 
political perspective referred to as ‘reformist’, holding different views under one flag, 
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along with another broad perspective, but not a party, named ‘conservative’. Intriguingly, 
Dr Ahmadi Nejad won the first round of the ninth Iranian election in 2005 without any 
connection to these semi-parties or groups. However, conservatives almost all supported 
him in the second round of the 2005 election when he won the contest against Ayatollah 
Rafsanjani, the former President. Thereafter, President Ahmadi Nejad has strongly 
rejected the essentiality and importance of political parties for the Iranian political system.  
2.2.4. Cabinet 
The Cabinet of Iran is composed of 21 Ministries as well as 13 Deputy Presidents, 
including a first Deputy President, the head of which would be the chair of the Cabinet in 
the absence of the President. Regarding the case of biosafety regulation in Iran, as I will 
discuss in the chronological history of that process at the end of this chapter, the main 
involved organisations were the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Ministry of Health 
(MoH), the Ministry of Science (MoS) and the Department of Environment (DoE). The 
DoE is not a Ministry, but an organisation in the Government, the head of which is a 
Deputy President and therefore a member of the Cabinet, with a similar political rank to 
other Ministers.  
2.3. Institutionalisation of Science in Iran 
A discussion of the institutionalisation of science in Iran, especially biotechnology, would 
help in giving a clearer picture of the circumstance in which the Governmental 
organisations debated over the biosafety law of the country. For the purpose of this 
section, I will review the institutionalisation of science in ancient Iran, followed by the 
challenges in the institutionalisation of science in modern Iran, which is still emerging, in 
comparison to the most advanced countries, and the specific circumstances of 
biotechnology in this context.  
2.3.1. The State of Science in Ancient Iran 
Iran’s history is replete with stories of outstanding scholars in various scientific fields such 
as mathematics, chemistry, astronomy and medicine. The variety of disciplines was not 
confined to the sciences, but also included philosophy, literature, arts, social sciences, and 
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what was referred to as applied philosophy, including management, at the levels of 
Government and the family, as well as professional engagement in religious thought.  
Iranian scholars historically tried to capture a variety of disciplines, attempting to apply 
them in their social lives, aiming at improving the state of society. Therefore, these 
scholars had social roles along with their personal expertise, as well as practical wisdom, 
which in turn pushed them to become social references and problem solvers for ordinary 
people in terms of family problems, religious orders, children’s training and so on. 
Although scientific activities were mainly conducted by individual researchers driven by 
their personal interests, not in well-established institutes, Iranian people always respected 
their scholars for their considerable impacts on society. To name just two, Khayyam, a 
famous mathematician, astronomer, physician and poet, and al-Khwarismi, a great 
mathematician, astronomer and geographer both played significant roles in developing 
science in ancient Iran (Nasr 2006).   
The position of scholars in the history of Iran’s dynasties was also prominent. It was 
imperative for many kings to have a consultant from among those highly-respected 
scholars, even if just to give them a formal position to pretend that they considered the 
importance of wisdom in administrating society. In retrospect, many intellectuals also 
used the resources that came from the kings, at the cost of providing a physical presence 
in some sessions and ceremonies. Nevertheless, there were some kings who truly based 
their decision-making systems on the opinions of scholars for the sake of improving the 
state of society. Among many Iranian intellectuals, we can cite Ibn Sina, Sheikh Tusi and 
Nizam al Molk as famous scholars who had substantial influences on political decision 
making (Ibid).  
To sum up, Iranian ancient history vis-à-vis science could be characterised, among other 
things, by the prominent role of individual scholars in developing knowledge, including 
science, who had established purposeful linkages with both dynasties and society based on 
their personal capabilities in a time when knowledge production was not institutionalised.  
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2.3.2. Science and University in Modern Iran 
The institutionalisation of scientific activities was the result of borrowing from the 
experiences of the West, and especially Europe, in its successful organisation of science 
and research. In the 16th century, when the institutionalisation and subsequent flourishing 
of the sciences started in the West, the interactions between Iran and some European 
countries began. On this basis, several Europeans travelled to Iran, and some Iranian 
scholars and kings also travelled to Europe. For instance, in the period of Shah4 Abbas II 
from 1642-1666, there were many interactions between Iran and the West, especially 
Great Britain (Fisher 1968).  
However, those interactions did not lead to the imitation of modern institutions of 
science from the West until 1852, when Amir Kabir, the chief Minister of the Qajar 
Dynasty established a new school called Darolfonun5 by inviting Western scholars 
(initially Austrians, followed by Italians, French and Germans) to educate the Iranian 
candidates (Molavi 2005). Decades later, in 1934, this school was transformed into the 
University of Tehran as a formal institution for science education, with fewer concerns 
about technical applications. Thereafter, several other universities were established with 
the spirit of science education, such as the University of Tabriz in 1947, the University of 
Mashad in 1949, and the University of Isfahan in 1950, followed by several other 
universities in Tehran and other cities, all supported by the Government without charging 
students tuition fees. In this respect, the contribution of science to industry remained 
limited, as universities took on the role of education rather than research and application.  
Pursuant to this institutionalising process, universities replaced the previous individual 
knowledge working activities of traditional scholars, while having less impact on the 
production of useful knowledge, and fewer concerns regarding applications of knowledge. 
Moreover, the concept of science as a modern entity which refers to experimental 
inquiries was translated as elm in Farsi. Elm is a historical word indicating ‘knowing’ in 
general without conferring any distinction between natural sciences, social sciences, 
                                                 
4
 ‘Shah’ means king. 
5
 ‘Darolfonun’ means ‘the house of techniques’.  
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medicine and engineering. A result of these institutional evolutions was the inducement of 
a highly positive perspective among the Iranian people of science, and of university as the 
context of learning science. In this respect, engineering is considered as having a special 
status, followed by medicine, basic sciences, and then social sciences.6 Other forms of 
knowledge, such as arts, music and sports, are considered by society as the lowest 
priorities (Mohseni, 2000). Hence, this background makes it more understandable why in 
current Iranian society, having a family full of university-educated children and relatives, 
especially in scientific disciplines (engineering, medicine, basic sciences and then social 
sciences and humanities), is highly respected (Shabanloo 2001, Marjaei 2004).  
The importance of universities in the Iranian system was reflected in the construction of a 
specific Ministry for higher education in 1967, which was named the Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education. This Ministry was supposed to deal with the affairs of 
Government-led universities until 2000, when its name was changed to the Ministry of 
Science, Research and Technology (hereafter referred to as the MoS). However, it still 
mainly deals with education rather than science and technology development in the 
country, partly because of its institutional history. The former name of this Ministry and 
even its current activities are a reflection of the fact that in the context of Iran, universities 
are supposed to be places for teaching and education, or places for learning science, rather 
than places for research and development.  
The speed of establishing new universities accelerated after the Islamic revolution in 
1979, both through increasing the number of Government-led universities and by 
initiating ‘open’ universities working based on charging tuition fees, as well as another 
type of part-time university named ‘Payam Noor’. This post-1979 expansion also 
included increasing the number of disciplines and students in each university, mainly in 
conjunction with increasing the total number of university candidates. As the 
Governmental universities had a limited capacity, many families have been compelled to 
pay the tuition fees of ’open’ and Payam Noor universities for the sake of having educated 
children, with perhaps better jobs and positions in the future. 
                                                 
6
 However, the social sciences are also different; for instance, sociology and philosophy are considered much better than history or 
geography.  
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The prestige and importance of science in the Government went beyond the boundaries 
of the former Ministry of Science and Higher Education when other Ministries started to 
develop their own research laboratories in different scientific and technological fields, 
mainly after the Islamic revolution in 1979, to carry out applied research and to provide 
useful insights for the managers in their decision making.  
To list just a few, the Ministry of Energy has run the Niroo Research Institute (NRI) 
since 1982 to improve decision making and to conduct research. The Building and 
Housing Research Centre (BHRC) is a large organisation in the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban Development which has conducted necessary research into related issues since 
1979. Even the MoS tried to provide a sound foundation for its decision making through 
initiating the National Research Institute for Science Policy (NRISP) in 1980. When 
surfing the web, it is not difficult to find several other Iranian research institutions, which 
are supposed to carry out sophisticated applied and developmental research and help 
Ministries to reach better decisions.  
In short, modern science has been welcomed by Iranian society and is institutionalised 
both in universities that mainly take on the job of teaching, rather than research, and in 
Governmental laboratories and research centres, which are expected to be involved more 
in applied research. However, there is another important type of body involved in 
knowledge and technology production: private companies, the roles and impacts of which 
differ sector by sector. In the next section I will discuss the institutional context of 
biotechnology by considering the sector-specific conditions of private firms.  
2.3.3. Institutional Context of Biotechnology Science 
Large Governmental research centres are the key players in developing biotechnology in 
Iran, while the universities are mainly involved in teaching and education. In addition, 
there is a small private sector in Iran which is not involved in biotech research and 
development activities. This situation has opened up a great opportunity for 
Governmental bodies to lead the research activities to develop biotechnological science 
and technology within the country. In the absence of a significant private sector and the 
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lack of sufficient research facilities within universities, these research institutes shape the 
core of Iranian biotechnology research and knowledge.  
Table 2- 1 Characteristics of Agro-Medical 
Biotechnology in Iran 
Indicators By the date: October 2008 
Number of Researchers (PhD & MSc) 1750 
Total Number of International Research Papers  700 
Total Number of International Patents  5 
Total Number of National Patents  80 
Total Number of Centres Doing Research About Biotechnology 93 
Source: National Biotechnology Development Plan, revised 20097 
Table 2-1 summarises some characteristics of biotechnology in Iran. Regarding the 
number of researchers (1750), considering that the population of Iran is more than 70 
million, the number of researchers in biotech per million population is nearly 27, while 
the average of the total number of researchers in Iran in 2001 was 405 (SCRC 2005). 
Some recent sources suggest that this number is near 1000 for 20118. This means that the 
number of researchers per million population in biotechnology in 2008 in comparison to 
the total average of researchers in 2011 is less than 3 % (27 out of 1000). This is even 
fewer than the number of researchers in some other high-tech fields in Iran, such as nano-
technology, for which the available data show nearly 6700 registered researchers in 2009.9 
Overall, those figures would suggest that the number of researchers in high-tech fields 
(and especially bio-tech and nano-tech) are conspicuously low.  
In terms of the number of international papers, although it is not clear from the table 
whether journals or both journals and conferences are included, a comparison with the 
total numbers of international journal papers is illuminating. There were 700 publications 
in biotechnology-related fields in Iran between 2001 and 2008, in comparison to the 
total number of international papers in Iran over the same period which is nearly 57000, 
yielding a proportion of less than 1.25%.10 This figure for the total papers published in 
nano-technology is fewer than 1400, which is about double for the figure for 
                                                 
7
 Adapted from the national biotechnology development plan drafted in 2004 and revised in 2009. The former version was published 
in 2006 and the new one is not yet published. I was able to access a copy of an unofficial version of this new document. 
8
 http://www.jahannews.com/vdcc14qs02bqe18.ala2.html (Head of secretariat of the High Council of Cultural Revolution) 
9
 http://www.nano.ir/sub_forsight.php?page=main_policy&subPage=9 (Secretariat of the Iranian nano-technology initiative council) 
10
 http://www.hamshahri.org/print-86563.aspx (this page reported the number of publications from 2001 and by summing the 
numbers for each year, total numbers would be around 57000) 
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biotechnology papers.11 Considering the number of patents, while the sum of the patents 
in biotech (agro-med) up to 2008 was 80, the total number of patents in 2008 alone in 
Iran was near 10000.12 That means that the aggregate number of patents in biotech up to 
2008 is 0.8% of the number of total patents of 2008 alone. No patent data are available 
for nano-technology in Iran.  
These measures indicate that biotechnology is not well established in the country and is 
still in the early stages of development in comparison to other fields. Nevertheless, 
although biotechnology is not yet well developed, it has been considered as a high priority 
for development in different long-term plans for the country, such as the National Vision 
2025, which was stipulated by the Supreme Leader in 2005.13  
Table 2- 2 Share of the private sector in 
biotechnology development 
Indicators By the date October 2008 
Share in production of 
equipment and products 
Near 55 % 
Role in research activities Negligible 
Source: National Biotechnology Development Plan, revised 200914 
Scrutinising the role of private firms in biotechnology (Table 2-2) reveals that these 
companies are only involved in producing facilities and some products, without 
undertaking considerable research. Put differently, they are not involved in developing 
biotechnology. These figures suggest that the main research activities are concentrated in 
the Governmental research centres, which is the topic of the next section.  
2.3.4. Large Governmental research centres 
In the absence of private firms, different Ministries have undertaken the job of research 
and development in biotechnology. The MoA established the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Research Institute of Iran (ABRII) in 2000 through consolidating all related research 
activities in this Ministry. A variety of GM rice had been developed in this research centre 
                                                 
11
 See footnote 9 
12
 http://www.jamejamonline.ir/newstext.aspx?newsnum=100903549658  
13
 The text of the National Vision 2025 is available at http://www.dolat.ir/PDF/20years.pdf, albeit in Farsi.  
14
 See Footnote 7  
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by 2005.15 The Pasteur Institute (PI) of Iran is a major research centre of the MoH, 
which formerly was a national centre of human infectious diseases research, working on 
diagnosis and vaccine production from 1920. The Biotechnology Research Centre (BRC) 
of the Pasteur Institute of Iran was established in 1993, with the goal of initiating 
biotechnology-related research and is currently the largest department of the Pasteur 
Institute. The National Institute for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (NIGEB) 
was established in 1989 as a part of the MoS’s mission to develop scientific knowledge in 
the field of biotechnology. ABRII conducts agricultural biotechnology research activities 
(green biotechnology), PI concentrates on pharmaceuticals (red biotechnology), while 
NIGEB works on both types of biotechnological research (red and green).  
These institutions were historically interested in biosafety because of their developing 
roles and responsibilities. As the historical account of biosafety at the end of this chapter 
will show, the scientists or responsible bodies in these institutions have been involved in 
biosafety since 2001 when Iran signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB). 
However, their engagement in the process of drafting the biosafety law started in April 
2006, when the DoE invited the MoS, MoH and MoA to send senior representatives to 
join together and start the negotiations, known as the Coordinating Committee (CC) 
discussions, for drafting the biosafety bill. In response, these Ministries referred to their 
research centres as the capable institutions and the above three biotechnological centres 
selected three biotechnologists to represent their opinions in the CC sessions.  
Before providing a detailed picture of the historical evolution of biosafety regulation in 
Iran, it is worth looking at the broader international context within which regulation of 
GMOs takes place. On the one hand, there is a context in which more technologically 
advanced countries like the USA and the members of the EU are characterised by a 
diversity of approaches to the regulation of GMOs, while on the other hand, less 
technologically advanced countries have developed Biosafety legislation under the 
influence of the CPB as the most important international treaty affecting their domestic 
biotechnology regimes. I will discuss both contexts in the following sections.  
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 More detail of this event will come in the chronological history of biosafety at the end of this chapter 
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2.4. Debates across the EU and the USA on Agricultural Biotechnology 
Regulation of technological risk has been high on the agendas of most of the advanced 
countries because of their rapid technological development (Jasanoff 1986). In this sense, 
biotechnology is a case of a new technology that was noticed by policy makers in the 
1990s as a technology that might need special attention and regulation. The debates 
within those countries were mostly shaped around the experiences of risk assessment 
rather than provision of a comprehensive GM law. I will discuss the models developed for 
risk regulation in the next chapter, while in this part I will concentrate on the experiences 
of those jurisdictions and the disputes among them.  
The EU chose to develop a unified approach vis-à-vis biotechnology regulation to 
establish a harmonised system across the member states. The Directive 90/220 stated 
that each country should set its regulations for avoiding adverse effects (EEC 1990). The 
EU regulatory model continued to be a national level regulatory system until 1997 and 
based on a precautionary principle treating GMOs under separate processes, and without 
any requirement for labelling (Tiberghien 2009).  
But this regulatory regime could not continue to survive under the extreme pressure from 
public and media calling for a more stringent system. In 1997, directive 97/35 was 
introduced as Annex III of directive 90/220 that made the labelling of novel foods 
compulsory (Carson and Lee 2005). Public disputes erupted in 1999 with serious 
moratorium on GMOs in 2000 (Kleinman et al 2009).   
Levidow and Murphy (2003) discuss the trend that managed in the EU as a result of 
public involvement in the regulatory debates as:  
- Considering more and new scientific uncertainties highlighted in public-scientific 
debates 
- Acknowledgement of extra-scientific judgements within regulatory issues and 
expert advice by regulatory bodies 
- More stringency of the criteria for evidence of safety, especially concerning 
environmental norms and the causal pathways of potential harm.  
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In the UK, the public exerted tremendous pressure on the Government against the 
approval of GM crops, while on the other hand, industry did its best to convince the 
public and the Government that there was no basis for concern about such products. The 
Government on the one hand tended to develop and promote R&D activities and on the 
other hand had to meet the concerns of the public (Levidow and Carr 2000a). Among 
the debates in the context of the UK, the problem of defining what counts as an adverse 
effect was one of the most serious issues, in that the public requested scientists and 
regulators to consider a broader definition of risks to include a wider range of possible 
adverse effects and to take into account more evidence in their assessments (Levidow 
1999).   
France also experienced a high level of public engagement in the issues over biotechnology 
regulation and risk assessment. One of the results of public involvement was the criticism 
of the regulatory advisors and the broadening of scientific disciplines other than 
molecular biology. The French Government tried to open up the discourse to include 
experts and non-expert lay public representatives (Roy and Joly 2000).  Subsequent 
developments and the related ups and downs mainly came from changing political systems 
in this country.  
Although the German Government faced a high degree of opposition from the public in 
developing and marketing the GM crops, it did not consider participatory approaches like 
the UK or France. Instead, the Government emphasised the necessity of prioritising 
scientific advice over politics, which in turn generated a gap between the Government and 
the public. In reaction, consumers boycotted GM products, which in turn produced a 
blockage for commercialising those products (Dreyer and Gill 2000).  
In the context of the USA, the disputes revolved around the concept of novelty to 
determine what genetic combinations should be classified as novel and what novel effects 
need regulatory controls (Levidow and Carr 2000b). However, the USA did not face the 
same amount of public dispute as Europe did. The disputes in the USA were mainly 
portrayed as scientific disputes (Jasanoff 1992). This is what Jasanoff describes as the 
“product view” in the USA, in comparison to the “product and process” views popular in 
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the UK. While the former is concerned with GM products and whether or not they 
should be considered substantially novel, the latter is concerned with the possible risks of 
both GM products and the processes involved in developing GM crops (Jasanoff 1995).  
Levidow and Murphy summarise the principal assumptions of the USA’s system as: “four 
key ‘principles’ or assumptions: 
- the products of recombinant DNA technology will not differ fundamentally from 
unmodified organisms or from conventional products; 
- existing laws are adequate to regulate the products of this technology; 
- products, not processes, should be regulated, and regulation should be risk-based; 
- regulation should be directed toward the intended end use for products, and 
should be conducted on a case-by-case basis.” (Levidow and Murphy 2002 p. 3) 
The differences between those broad official assumptions in the USA and the 
precautionary approach in the EU have been counted as important factors in shaping the 
transatlantic controversies (Millstone et al 2004). In this sense, even the concept of 
“substantial equivalence” (OECD 1993) could not overcome the differences. This 
concept was largely accepted in the assumptions of the USA’s system, and was then 
adopted in 1997 by the EU in its Novel Food Regulation 258/97, which in turn 
increased the hope for a convergence in transatlantic GM regulation.  
Nevertheless, the European people did not accept the idea of substantial equivalence as a 
sufficient measure of safety. As a reaction, the public seriously opposed USA exports of 
GM soya in 1997 (Levidow and Carr 2000b). In response to these disputes, the Genetic 
Engineering Alliance asked for a “five year freeze” on all commercial use or patenting of 
these products in the European context (GEA 1999).  
The concept of substantial equivalence was also criticised by various scholars, including 
Millstone et al (1999). This concept was originally introduced by OECD as a type of 
pre-market assessment of GM products, suggesting that when GM crops or foods are 
similar in their chemical analyses, nutritional content and allergenic properties, then no 
further safety assessment would be required. The OECD document set it as: “if a new 
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food or food component is found to be substantially equivalent to an existing food or 
food component, it can be treated in the same manner with respect to safety. No 
additional safety concerns would be expected. Where substantial equivalence is more 
difficult to establish because the food or food component is either less well-known or 
totally new, then the identified differences, or the new characteristics, should be the focus 
of further safety considerations (OECD, 1993: 13). 
Such criticism in turn caused a quick response by the OECD (Kearns and Mayers 1999). 
Debates continued until the EU finally downgraded the concept in 2001, stating that 
“this proposal does not include a notification (simplified) procedure as laid down in 
Regulation EC No 258/97 on novel foods and novel food ingredients for genetically 
modified foods which are substantially equivalent to existing foods.” (CEC 2001) The 
earlier European Directive 90/220 was replaced by 2001/18, which widened the scope 
of required risk assessments to extend from direct and short-term effects to also include 
long-term and indirect effects. On the other side of the Atlantic, the USA had more 
tentative changes than the EU, though it modified the view that GM products do not 
present unique safety concerns (Levidow and Murphy 2002).  
Overall, there were several disputes and controversies on both sides of the Atlantic over 
the regulation of GM crops, especially after 1999 when Europe stopped approving GM 
products but the USA continued to commercialise new GM products, which in turn 
increased the regulatory gap between those jurisdictions to the point that the USA took a 
case to the World Trade Organization (Murphy and Levidow 2006).16  
Among the structural characteristics of the debates, we can note the conspicuous eminent 
role of the public in the context of Europe as well as the active participation of private 
corporations on both sides of the Atlantic. Murphy and Levidow argue that three 
dialogues broadly shaped the conflicts between those jurisdictions, namely the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue promoting trade liberalisation in a harmonised way, the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue emphasising the right of the consumer to know about 
                                                 
16
 An extended analysis of the EU-US conflicts can be found in Murphy and Levidow’s (2006) book titled Governing the 
transatlantic conflict over agricultural biotechnology: contending coalitions, trade liberalisation and standard setting. The authors 
also consider transatlantic cooperation as well as the intra-jurisdictional conflicts associated with the transatlantic conflicts to 
provide a richer explanation of how the two played a role in shaping the transatlantic conflicts.  
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products and to choose among them, and the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue 
demanding prior proof of safety for GM products (ibid).  
I will discuss the useful theoretical insights of the literature on biotechnology regulation 
in the context of advanced countries in the next two chapters, but it is important to note 
that the disputes were not around developing a biosafety law, but approving and 
commercialising certain GM products based on the procedures of risk assessment and risk 
management. Further, those disputes emerged in an entirely dissimilar context in 
comparison to the context of Iran, which is different because there was no public dispute, 
minimal media coverage and less international pressure (ultimately the commitment of 
Iran to the CPB), as well as the absence of a considerable private profit-seeking sector.  
2.5. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) is an international treaty aimed to regulate 
the trans-boundary movements of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). This protocol 
was added to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on 29 January 2000 as an 
environmental treaty to protect biological diversity from the potential risks of LMOs 
resulting from modern biotechnology. The protocol came into force on 11 September 
2003. The protocol is written according to a precautionary approach and developed a 
process of information exchange between countries to facilitate the trans-boundary 
movement of these products through providing information in advance about the 
characteristics of the products to be imported.17 Iran signed the text of the protocol in 
2001 and the Parliament of Iran ratified it in August 2003.  
Article 2 of the protocol, Acts 1 and 2 emphasised:18  
1. Each Party shall take necessary and appropriate legal, administrative and other 
measures to implement its obligations under this Protocol. 
2. The Parties shall ensure that the development, handling, transport, use, transfer 
and release of any living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner that 
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 More complete information about this protocol is available on its website at http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/background/  
18
 http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/article.shtml?a=cpb-02  
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prevents or reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also into account risks 
to human health. 
Act 1 of this article requires member states to take necessary measures to implement their 
obligations, chief among them, as suggested in Act 2, is protecting the environment by 
reducing risks to biodiversity. Nevertheless, it does not set or require particular criteria for 
risk assessments and risk management, nor does it specify some universal rules or 
procedures for risk assessment. The protocol empowers states to restrict imports of 
LMOs based on their internal regulatory measures, and importer countries can ask for 
further evidences from exporter agent (company or country) to inform assessments of the 
risk of LMOs according to their internal biosafety regime. As a result, although members 
of CPB need to set their internal rules and regulations by considering the requirements of 
protecting environment and biodiversity, they are not obliged to follow a particular way.  
Therefore, several countries started to enact their internal biosafety laws in order to 
ensure that they monitor and control the possible, and mainly environmental, adverse 
effects of LMOs. One of the main concerns of many commentators and scholars was to 
understand and even estimate the extent to which the CPB could contribute to 
harmonizing the regulatory regimes of member states, given the fact that the protocol 
provides little specific legislative or regulatory guidance apart from permitting not more 
than the adoption of a precautionary approach.   
Subsequently, various scholars started to analyse the impacts of this protocol on the 
member countries to discuss whether or not the CPB imposed regulatory limitations that 
in turn may lead to regulatory convergence or whether it opened considerable 
opportunities for regulatory divergence. In a conceptual paper, Jaffe (2005) criticised the 
CPB for its insufficiency in providing clear guidance for the member countries, which in 
his view would lead to a diversity of national rules and regulations. Millstone and Van 
Zwanenberg (2003) argued that the hope for convergent regulatory procedures for 
agricultural biotechnology might not be realised because of the local nature of regulation 
in different countries and the uncertain and equivocal character of science. They discuss 
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further the degree of autonomy developing countries could exercise in light of accepting 
the CPB and the WTO.  
Gupta and Falkner (2006) discussed the variety of avenues the CPB had opened for its 
member countries in biosafety regulation, and the different ways that Mexico, China and 
South Africa have been using these possibilities in practice. However, they claimed that 
studying the cases of those three countries would raise the hope for a more convergent 
regulatory regime across member states. As a general pattern, Gupta and Falkner argued 
that although Mexico, China and South Africa had set up ambitious plans for developing 
biotechnology, ratifying the CPB had contributed to changing their policy discourses to 
adopt a more precautionary approach than had previously been the case. They even tried 
to generalise the conclusion of their study by forecasting a similar trend in other members 
of the CPB in the future.  
Newell (2008) also analysed how China and India had moved toward more precautionary 
approaches because of their commitments to the CPB.  He analyses the different ways 
those two countries translated their commitments to the CPB into their national policies 
amidst increasing pressure from multinational firms forcing them to make less restrictive 
rules and regulations. Falkner (2006) also argues that China has witnessed a great 
transformation in its environmental policies from a strongly promotional to a more 
precautionary approach because of its involvement in the CPB. Nevertheless, changes are 
continuing in this country.  
In addition, there are a few studies about the CPB that tried to analyse other aspects of 
this international treaty.  For instance, Morris (2008) highlights a problem with the CPB 
in its lack of alignment with some local agreements amongst African countries. From this 
perspective, Morris discussed how possible differences could jeopardise the success of the 
CPB in those African countries.  
In short, the mainstream literature about the CPB is mainly concerned with the impacts of 
this protocol on the regulations of the member states with less consideration of their 
internal policy making experiences or possible conflicts and disputes that might 
contribute to those policy consequences. The CPB was also a starting point for regulation 
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of biosafety in Iran and I will review a chronological history of its evolution in Iran in the 
following section. However, the final biosafety law of Iran was enacted with minimal 
attention to the provisions of this protocol, and consequently it may provides a counter-
example to those studies that suggest that the CPB may be an international source of 
convergence amongst regulatory regime (eg Gupta and Falkner 2006). It seems that for a 
better understanding the policy outcome in Iran, internal policy processes should be taken 
into account, which is the main concern of this research. This thesis analyses that 
controversial policy process, the changes of the policy outputs at different stages and the 
factors that might contribute understanding those developments.  
2.6. A chronological history of biosafety policy making in Iran 
The history of biosafety in Iran can be divided into two main parts: before and after 
2006, when the formal negotiations for drafting the bill started. The first period includes 
the early, mostly individual Ministerial and organisational activities, and the consequent 
evolution and challenges over the location of the office of the secretariat of the National 
Biosafety Committee (NBC). The task of preparing the draft of the bill did not formally 
start during this period. I will elaborate on this process in the following paragraphs. In 
2006, the second period started when the DoE, as the latest location of the office of the 
secretariat, invited other involved Ministries to take part in the sessions for negotiating 
and finalising a draft bill for the biosafety law. In this period there were no structural 
changes such as changes in the location of the office of the secretariat for the NBC or the 
organisations involved in the NBC committee and the process of negotiations.  
2.6.1. A Brief History of the first period of Biosafety policy making before 2006 
It seems that the first activities vis-à-vis biosafety started in 1999 (i.e. during President 
Khatami’s Government) when a five-page biosafety draft text was suggested by the DoE 
to the Cabinet.19 At that time, the aim of the DoE was to take an initiative from Cabinet 
in relation to biosafety. However, it faced serious opposition from the MoA, MoH and 
MoS as well as from their biotech research institutions. In 2000, following a new decision 
by the President, the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) was established, composed of 
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 Interview with the senior representative of the MoS on 5th of July 2008.  
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the MoH, MoS, MoA and the Ministry of Trade (MoT), as well as the DoE and three 
biotechnological experts chosen by the President. The aim was to provide a basis for the 
future needs of the county vis-à-vis biotechnology regulations. During that time, the NBC 
decided to locate the office of its secretariat in the MoS, and more specifically in the 
National Institute of Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (NIGEB). Subsequently, 
Iran signed the CPB in 2001.  
During that time, the secretariat in the MoS did not invite other organisations for 
negotiations over the draft law, but worked on a proposal almost by itself. However, this 
office could not finalise a draft, probably due to some internal disagreements.20 
Meanwhile, the CPB was formally ratified by the Parliament in August 2003. 
Subsequently, the President issued a new policy rule according to which the office of the 
secretariat of the NBC was to be transferred to the DoE, because of the DoE’s previous 
engagements in the negotiations of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
Several reactions emerged in response to that decision, especially amongst the biotech 
research institutes of the MoS, MoA and MoH. Those Ministries asked the President to 
pay more attention to the work that had been done in the former office of the secretariat 
at the MoS. After publishing and exchanging several letters from both sides, i.e. the 
Ministries and the DoE, the President finally changed the office again from the DoE to 
the MoS in a new order on 20 November 2003. 
In an important event, the biotech research centre of the MoA (ABRII)21 announced the 
successful field test of a variety of GM rice in 2004. This specific rice had shown high 
resistance to attacks by insects through inserting a Bt gene that produces a toxin.22 The 
First Deputy President joined the ceremony of harvesting this first Iranian GM rice in 
September 2004. He further promised that Iran would start commercial cultivation of 
this product in the following year. Those events occurred at a time when there was neither 
a biosafety law nor any regulation with respect to biotechnological products.  
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 Ibid 
21
 Agricultural Biotechnology Research Institute of Iran 
22
 http://www.scidev.net/en/news/iranian-scientists-produce-countrys-first-gm-rice.html  
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The DoE contended shortly after that tests on the health and environmental risks of this 
product had been insufficient and that the crop might incur substantial problems. The 
head of the DoE asked the MoA to stop cultivating this crop and to undertake adequate 
safety studies. She asked for satisfactory scientific evidence showing this product was 
safe.23 The head of the ABRII reacted vigorously, condemning the DoE for having 
insufficient knowledge of biotechnology and biosafety. He attested that the safety 
assessment of the product had been done and there was no basis for more concerns.24  
At that time, the DoE prepared a draft rule to ban cultivation and production of any GM 
crops before finalising the biosafety law. The reactions of experts and the MoA again 
posed a barrier to approving this rule by the Cabinet. Eventually, due to the pressures of 
the DoE and some inter-Ministerial conflicts, the MoS sent a letter in early 2005 to the 
President stating that this Ministry was not able to keep administrating the office of the 
secretariat. The sequence of events and disputes urged the Cabinet to make another 
decision in July 2005 specifying the new location of the office of the secretariat to be the 
MoA. This stipulation also asked the members of the NBC to finalise the draft of the law 
within three months.  
In September 2005, Mr Ahmadi Nejad replaced President Khatami. Consequently, he 
changed the Ministers and other medium-level offices. In February 2006, the Cabinet 
decided to change the location of the office of the secretariat back to the DoE, 
presumably after an agreement between the Minister of Agriculture and the head of the 
DoE. Subsequently, the DoE asked other Ministries to take part in negotiating the draft 
biosafety law.  
2.6.2. Second period of Negotiations over the Draft after 2006 
The second period of negotiations, from April 2006 until the approval of the law in May 
2009, can be divided into three main stages within which the Ministries and organisations 
discussed the draft law. The first stage was from April to December 2006, when senior 
representatives of some Ministries invited by the office (including the MoA, MoS and 
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 “Dam va Kesht va Sanat”, volume 57, September 2004, p. 18-20.  
24
 Ibid, p. 21-23. 
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MoH, for which their senior representatives were biotechnological experts), as well as the 
head of the office who was also the senior representative of the DoE, gathered to finalise a 
draft. These sessions were called the Coordinating Committee sessions. After ten sessions, 
followed by a two-day gathering, they could not reach a consensus on many aspects of the 
law. In December 2006, the head of the DoE arranged an NBC session, composed of the 
First Deputy President and other Ministers, to address the problem. As a consequence of 
this session, the second phase of legislation started in December 2006 and lasted until 
May 2007 under the title of the Reviewing Committee, composed of the head of the 
DoE and the deputy of other Ministries. This Committee eventually developed a draft 
and passed it to the Cabinet, while some issues regarding the scope of the law remained 
disputed. The third stage was the Parliamentary discussions in which the involved 
Ministries and the DoE discussed again the Government’s bill, and the result of this 
round was an entirely different draft in comparison to the original bill. This draft was 
eventually passed by the Parliament in May 2009 and came into force in August of the 
same year.  
In April 2006, the DoE started the process of preparing a draft biosafety law through 
inviting the seemingly relevant organisations at that time; these included MoS, MoA, 
MoH, the Ministry of Industry (MoI), the Ministry of Trade (MoT), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the Organisation of Standards.25 Every department had 
been asked to send its senior representative responsible for presenting its views of the 
biosafety law. In response, the MoS, the MoH and the MoA selected a biotechnological 
expert from their biotech research centres. For the other Ministries and organisations, 
only the representative of the MoFA was to some extent familiar with biotechnology and 
biosafety, while others did not engage in the process seriously.26 Even the head of the 
office of the secretariat, located in the DoE and representing the views of this department, 
was not a biotechnology expert but an expert in nanotechnology.  
Disagreements about different parts of the law came to the fore shortly after holding the 
first two sessions, at which participants put forward their opinions about characteristics 
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 However, those other Ministries and organisations left the process of negotiation after the NBC session and did not take part in the 
second and third round of negotiations.  
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 Both the representatives of the MoI and MoT mentioned in interviews that they had participated in the sessions just to be 
informed about the law. The Organisation of Standards also did not participate in most of the sessions.  
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of the biosafety law. Disputes tended to emerge between the DoE on one hand and the 
MoS and the MoH on the other, while the MoA supported the DoE on some issues, 
backed the MoS and the MoH on others, and in some respects had its own approach.  
After ten sessions discussing the biosafety law, followed by an unsuccessful two-day 
gathering, the head of the DoE arranged an NBC session to resolve the controversies 
through leveraging the political authority of the First Deputy President and other 
Ministers. However, her expectations were shattered by the serious disputes that emerged 
in that session. Subsequently, the First Deputy President asked the MoH, MoA and MoS 
as well as the DoE to sit down again to reach an agreement over the draft biosafety law.  
In starting the new sessions, called the Reviewing Committee (RC), the head of the DoE 
asked the deputies of those Ministries, rather than their senior officials, to take part in the 
sessions. The head of the DoE chaired all the RC sessions. Following eight sessions, a 
draft biosafety law reached its finalised version. The most explicit disagreement was over 
the scope of the law in which the MoS was asking for the exemption of both R&D 
activities and production processes, while the MoA was insisting on having both of them 
in the scope of the biosafety law. The MoH had no problem with this version as 
pharmaceuticals were exempted from the law, although the DoE was not happy with that 
decision. This draft was eventually sent to the NBC and the Cabinet for final approval 
and then transmission to the Parliament.  
As the Parliament normally sends bills to its relevant internal committees for further 
discussion, in this case it sent the bill to the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament, as 
the main relevant committee. Subsequently, the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament 
asked different Ministries, either their senior representatives or their deputies, to take part 
in the new round of negotiations over biosafety to improve the suggested bill. Therefore, 
the senior representatives of the MoH, MoA, MoS and DoE in the CC and the Deputy 
Ministers, as well as the head of the DoE participated in those negotiations. The result of 
that interactive process was an amended version of the biosafety draft published in 
October 2008, with substantial alterations from the Government’s bill. Considerable 
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changes in the draft urged the Government to withdraw its proposed bill on 1  January 
2009.  
The head of the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament announced shortly after that 
the urgent need for a biosafety law committed the committee to sending its own proposal 
to the Chamber as the new bill for Iran’s biosafety law. Subsequently, the biosafety law 
was passed by the Parliament in May 2009 with few alterations in comparison to the new 
bill, and came into force in August 2009.  
An interesting point about the three stages of negotiations in the second period of 
biosafety policy making in Iran, starting in 2006, is that the representatives of the 
Ministries and organisations in these phases varied. For the first phase, the CC was almost 
entirely composed of biotechnological experts as the senior representatives of Ministries 
and organisations. For the second phase, the RC sessions were held by inviting the 
Deputy Ministers rather than the biotech experts, and for the third phase, both experts 
and deputies participated in the sessions of the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament. 
Intriguingly, the controversies persisted in all three phases, while the outputs of those 
phases were three different results: nothing from the CC, a draft from the RC and an 
entirely different draft from the Parliamentary discussions, from which developed the 
biosafety law of the country.  
2.7. Overall Characteristics of the case of Iran 
The case of biosafety regulation in Iran represents several characteristics that deserve to be 
studied. This experience is ultimately characterised by the high degree of controversy 
among the Governmental organisations, chief among them the DoE, the MoA, MoS and 
MoS, and by the absence of any public dispute, media coverage, considerable international 
pressure or private benefit-seeking companies. However, in the context of Iran the three 
Ministries are responsible for developing biotechnology in their research centres, while at 
the same time the MoH is responsible for the health of the population and the MoA is 
responsible for ensuring there is enough food for the people.  
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On this basis, one might expect the MoA, as an organisation responsible for both 
developing agricultural science and feeding the population, to adopt a promotional 
approach in defending the development of GM crops, and the MoH, as an organisation 
which is in charge of ensuring human health, to take the side of caution. Ironically, the 
positions were reversed as the MoA has taken a cautionary approach while the MoH has 
chosen a promotional perspective. Hence, this situation was not a simple case of 
conflicting responsibilities, and if it was such a problem, the involvement of either the 
First Deputy President at the NBC, the Cabinet after that, or the passage of the law by 
the Parliament should have resolved the issue. However, none of these political 
interventions could achieve a resolution either throughout the process or after the passage 
of the law.  
In addition, there is another difference between the case of Iran and the experiences of the 
advanced countries. For Iran, the debates were not around the risk assessment of certain 
products, but over approving the text of a GM biosafety law.27 In this sense, the case of 
biosafety regulation in Iran lies at the heart of two broad and largely separate literatures: 
regulating technological risk on the one side, and the literature of public policy analysis, 
focusing on the process of public policy making and Governmental procedures on the 
other. Therefore, it is not merely a case of adopting a simple framework from either, but 
there is an intricacy in linking them to each other in a way that could provide a useful 
theoretical framework. Given this background, in the next chapter I will discuss those 
relevant theoretical fields that might help in explaining the controversies and changes in 
the process of biosafety regulation in Iran.  
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 Although there were some disputes in 2005 when the successful development of the GM rice advertised, because the MoA in the 
new Government banned the cultivation of the GM rice, all debates concentrated on the proper content of the biosafety law that in 
turn was supposed to inform the general guidelines of the risk assessment and risk management. 
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 Chapter 3. Theoretical Considerations   
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will review the relevant literature to extract useful insights for analysing 
the controversies about the biosafety law in Iran and the policy changes to the drafts 
suggested for this law. According to the previous chapter, the case of biosafety regulation 
in Iran could be epitomised by the following three characteristics, each of which having 
been the topic of different literature streams: 
1. It is an example of regulating technological risk, as the general concern of 
biosafety is regulating the possible risks of biotechnological products in 
conditions of scientific uncertainty and international policy differences and 
conflicts.  
2. It is marked by a high degree of controversy between Governmental organisations, 
which has lasted several years, and might continue.  
3. There were three substantially different policy drafts as the outputs of three 
rounds of negotiations that constituted the policy changes. 
There are considerable bodies of literature around each of these topics that I will review 
in this chapter illuminating parts of them and their possible application to the case of 
Iran. The first characteristic is mainly related to the literature on regulation of 
technological risk that analyses the experience of different countries and the models they 
have used for regulating the risk by deploying science as a traditional fact-finding entity. 
The second and the third characteristics of the experience of biosafety regulation in Iran 
fall within the border of public policy literature in which there are substantial works and 
contributions on understanding policy processes, policy changes and controversies.  
3.2. Regulation of Technological Risk 
Confronting technological risks, or avoiding them, has become a central theme of policy 
in the current era as the population is facing a variety of risks day to day. Therefore, a 
primary challenge for both the public and the policy makers is finding credible ways of 
dealing with technological risks (Jasanoff 1986). On this basis, several theoretical and 
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empirical studies have been undertaken over the last three decades to provide better 
understanding of the nature of this activity as well as developing better suggestions for 
policy makers.  
An important characteristic of this literature is that scholars have mostly discussed the 
controversies and differences amongst industrialised countries, in order to find out what 
factors led to the current regulatory differences (eg Jasanoff 2005, Isaac 2002, Millstone 
et al 2004), partly because of the importance of the differences and disputes between the 
USA and the EU over the trade of GM products (Sheingate 2006). With few exceptions 
(e.g. Murphy and Levidow 2006), this literature has not discussed policy changes as much 
as it has explained policy controversies. In this sense, one concern of the following 
literature review is how it might be possible to apply the insights of those studies about 
controversies among jurisdictions to the case of Governmental controversies in Iran.  
However, before discussing those models, I will illustrate the conceptual developments 
regarding the concept of risk itself as a background picture for elaborating the models of 
regulating risk. Then I will classify the models of regulation and elaborate on their 
characteristics and evolution through time, and will discuss their possible contribution to 
analysing the case of Iran.  
3.2.1. Conceptual developments of the concept of Risk 
In the last century, Frank Knight (1921) and John Maynard Keynes (1921) were two 
famous scholars who paid attention to the notions of risk and uncertainty. Distinguishing 
between risk and uncertainty in the decision-making process was a major progression in 
economic thinking accomplished by Knight (1921).28 According to Knight, risk is 
measurable, while uncertainty refers to the situations in which it is not possible to 
measure risks because there is no adequate basis for reliable calculation. Therefore, Knight 
suggested a separation of those immeasurable uncertainties from measurable risks (Knight 
1921).  
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 A full and interesting account of the historical development of the notions of risk and uncertainty in the 20th century is provided 
by Bernstein (1996).  
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Nevertheless, risk studies were not considered as an important area until the late 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s. Löfstedt and Frewer, in their edition that collects some 
influential studies about risk, noted: “it is a research area that has grown very rapidly over 
the last seven years … since then, three new major risk journals … have been launched, 
and various organizations … have been established.” (Löfstedt and Frewer 1998 p. x)  
The revival of considering risk as a central topic by policy makers, the public and 
academia at the end of the 20th century was associated with a shift in conceptualisation of 
risk. Stirling highlighted this movement by pointing out that the traditional perspectives 
were based on a variety of instrumental approaches to decision making under uncertainty 
and held in common a quantitative reductive approach to risk as a function of 
‘magnitudes’ and ‘likelihoods’ of a determined range of outcomes (Stirling 1998). In 
contrast, a broader-based, qualitative and descriptive social scientific idea proliferated at 
the end of the 20th century to emphasise more interpretative and subjective aspects of risk 
and uncertainty. The consequence of this shift was the change of the focal points away 
from ‘estimation’ and ‘analysis’ to ‘communication’ and ‘management’. In the next section, 
I will review the evolution of the models of risk regulation in more detail.  
3.2.2. Conceptual developments of the models for regulating risk  
Governmental and scholarly models for risk regulation have evolved through time. A way 
of classifying the models of regulation and decision making and their evolution is to 
consider two different sets of activities: 1) determining the policy goals and ends, and 2) 
determining the ways of implementing those goals, and which body is more appropriate 
to perform those activities, i.e. politics or science.  
The process of negotiations for drafting the biosafety law in Iran was composed of three 
rather different stages. In the first stage, biotechnology experts and officials, as senior 
representatives of Ministries and organisations, gathered to agree a draft, but they couldn’t 
reach a consensus so there was no clear output. In the second stage, only politicians 
(deputies of Ministries as well as the head of the DoE) joined the negotiations and finally 
developed a draft biosafety bill.  In the third stage of Parliamentary negotiations, both 
politicians and experts discussed the proposed Government biosafety bill and eventually 
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developed a rather different output in comparison to the output of the second stage. 
Those changes in the structure and composition of the bodies (i.e. experts, politicians, or 
both, albeit from the same Ministries and organisations) participating in drafting the law 
might imply switching between different models of decision making, so I will discuss 
those models and their implications for analysing the controversies below.  
Considering the classifications of policy goals and policy means, it is possible to envisage 
the process of finalising a draft biosafety law in Iran as a process of drafting some general 
policies (such as general approaches to biosafety regulation) as well as the structure of 
biosafety regulation, including who should decide policy goals in the future and how (e.g. 
the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) or Ministries), and who should implement 
those goals and how (e.g. who should conduct risk assessments, risk management, 
prosecution and enforcement of the law). In other words, the case of Iran was an 
experience of a policy design aimed to identify some general approaches to biosafety, as 
well as identifying the proper model of decision making to specify who should define the 
biosafety goals and how, and who should implement and enforce the biosafety law and 
how. The following models may also be useful to identify the perspectives of protagonists 
over the structure of defining policy goals and means highlighted above.  
In the following sections, I will discuss the evolution of the models over time along with 
their possible contributions to characterising the case of Iran and explaining the 
controversies.29  
3.2.2.1. Decisionism  
In the late  19th and early 20th centuries, the Weberian view of policy making portrayed it 
as a double stage process in which policy makers firstly define a set of goals and ends, 
followed by the second stage in which experts or bureaucrats identify the best ways of 
achieving those goals (Weber 1946). Major elements of this view were also present in the 
ideas behind the early development of the public policy analysis school when Lasswell 
(1951) introduced the policy sciences as a set of social sciences that could contribute to 
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 A fuller representation of the historical changes and evolutions of those models can be found in Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 
2005 
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decision making by identifying the best ways of achieving goals. This is what Millstone 
called a ‘decisionist’ model of policy making, according to which policy makers decide 
over ‘ends’ and the experts suggest the ‘means’ of achieving those ends (Millstone 2007). 
A graphical representation of this model is shown in Figure 3-1.  
Figure 3- 1 The Weberian decisionist model: 
politicians choose goals, experts determine means  
 
Source: Millstone 2007, p. 486 
A prime assumption of this model is that the sociological context does not impinge on 
the professional activities of experts in determining the facts, while the choice of policy 
goals is supposed to be highly affected by such a context. However, this model has not 
often been applied to the context of risk regulation and analysing policy controversies, in 
which experts and scientists are supposed to determine the risks of new technological 
products, or perhaps the risks of the processes of producing those products, because the 
concerns over risk arose in the 1980s, at which point the decisionist model was replaced 
by the new technocratic model. 
In terms of the policy process in the case of Iran, a Weberian decisionist model might 
partly characterise the second stage of negotiations in which the politicians (i.e. the head 
of the DoE and the Deputy Ministers) were supposed to draft the biosafety law, 
including general biosafety approaches, and the ways of deciding on policy goals and 
policy implementation in the future. But it cannot characterise this stage completely 
because decisionism considers experts as those with the responsibility of selecting the 
means, while in the second stage of negotiations there was no such role perceived for 
experts.  
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In this model, controversies are likely to arise due to conflicts between different groups of 
politicians, as science is often assumed to be objective and neutral. Nevertheless, this 
model of decision making might represent the views of some protagonists in Iran 
regarding the best structure for biosafety regulation.  
3.2.2.2. Technocracy  
The dominant European and the US model in the middle of the 20th century portrayed 
science as the key element of decision making, or what was called the ‘technocratic’ model 
in which science and only science should decide policies and the best ways of 
implementing them. The technocratic model contains a couple of important assumptions. 
Firstly, similar to the decisionist model, scientific judgments are seen as unbiased and the 
relevant scientists are seen as identifying and determining policies neutrally; secondly, 
there is the idea that science can provide answers to all questions of policy making and 
therefore there is no need to consider other factors. The application of this model to the 
context of risk regulation implies that scientists will identify the risks and the best ways of 
addressing them. A simple model of technocracy is shown in Figure 3-2.  
Figure 3- 2 Technocracy: Science and only science 
determines policy (ends and means) 
 
Source: Millstone 2007, p. 488 
In studies about disputes, technocracy simply suggests that one group is entirely correct 
and the opposition has deviated from the truth, perhaps because of some social factors 
like lack of sufficient knowledge, or prejudice (Martin 1988). This model has also been 
applied to analyse policy controversies (Miller 1997). Based on his experiences as a 
biotechnological expert, Miller argues that there are two sides to the controversies, the 
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right side, composed of biotechnologists and the wrong side constituting regulators and 
others. He claims that: “the wrong side of this issue have ignored scientific consensus and 
allowed – even encouraged – myths about biotechnology to be perpetuated. This raises 
the question, if reason and search for truth are not the basis for crafting … policy, what 
is? The answer currently seems to be politics, ideology and self interest.” (Miller 1997, 
Preface of the book, not paginated) Therefore, for technocracy the analysis is simple: one 
group upholds the spirit of science and is right, and other groups fall under non-scientific 
norms, like self-interest, prejudice, and ideology.  
Regarding the case of Iran, the first stage of negotiations, composed of biotech experts 
and some officials, to draft the biosafety law could be seen a type of semi-technocratic 
decision making (but not entirely technocratic, as some other officials were involved too) 
to determine necessary goals and means of biosafety regulation and the structure of 
regulation that should set goals and implement the law in future. Nonetheless, a 
technocratic model might also be an alternative way of characterising the views of some 
Ministries and organisations about the best ways of structuring biosafety regulation in 
Iran.  
3.2.2.3. Inverted Decisionist Model  
In the context of the USA, technocracy lost its legitimacy a few decades sooner than in 
the European context, as technocracy was alive in the latter until the BSE crisis in the UK 
in 1996. In the context of the USA, technocracy was replaced in the 1980s by a new 
model called ‘inverted decisionism’ (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005).  
The plural culture of USA policy making, within which courts and Congress contribute 
to decision making, undermined the plausibility of technocracy. In 1958, Congress passed 
legislation to set out how incomplete and uncertain scientific evidence about cancer risks 
should be interpreted by Government officials (Ibid).  
Consequently, a new model of policy making emerged, incorporating both policy makers 
and experts, but this time as an inversion of Weberian decisionism. According to this 
model, scientists only determine the thresholds of safety below which no adverse effects 
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will occur as a type of policy goal. Therefore, the job for policy makers is to ensure that 
those safety levels are not exceeded by identifying the appropriate policy means for that 
purpose (Millstone 2007). In this new model, science sets the goals and policy determines 
the means, as is shown in Figure 3-3. Similar to the decisionist model, the inverted 
decisionism model also shares the view that scientific judgments are neutral, although 
science alone is not seen as sufficient for decision making. 
Figure 3- 3 Inverted Decisionist Model. Science 
defines goals, policy selects means  
 
Source: Millstone 2007, p. 492 
In the academic circles, Weinberg articulated a critical paper introducing the concept of 
trans-science, indicating that “questions of fact and can be stated in the language of 
science, they are unanswerable by science; they transcend science.” (Weinberg 1972 p. 
209) He gives some examples of questions which could be formulated in the language of 
science, but which science itself is not able to answer through sound scientific methods. In 
the context of risk studies, other scholars have warned about the insufficiency of science 
in providing satisfactory answers to the questions of risk policy making and providing a 
sound foundation for risk regulation (e.g. Jacobson 1972, Verrett and Carper 1974).  
Regarding the case of Iran, it seems that inverted decisionism cannot provide an account 
for any stages of the negotiations by placing scientists and experts as goal setters, and 
politicians as the bodies identifying the means. Nevertheless, this model might represent 
the views of some antagonists in the case of Iran.  
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3.2.2.4. Towards Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Red-Book 
Model  
A controversial court decision about the threshold of risks and safety in 1980, the 
Benzene Decision Case, led to the popularity of the concepts of risk assessment and risk 
management. In that year, the US Supreme Court overruled the decision of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) about lowering the threshold of 
safety for permitted airborne concentrations of benzene from 10 parts per million (ppm) 
to 1 ppm (which was the lowest measurable threshold at that time). OSHA made that 
decision following evidence suggesting that occupational exposure to benzene was linked 
to rates of leukaemia. The court ruled that OSHA’s decision was not legitimate because it 
did not undertake sufficient scientific risk assessment to justify that there would be 
significant risk above that level.  
In 1983, the US National Research Council (NRC) published an influential book named 
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process (NRC 1983), which 
suggests a two-stage model of risk regulation, the first stage being risk assessment, 
followed by the second stage of risk management. This model is known as the Red-Book 
Model and is shown in Figure 3-4.30 According to this model, scientists should estimate 
risks based on scientific considerations and must be entirely separate from policy makers, 
who should select the necessary measures to manage those identified risks in order to 
make sure no risks beyond those thresholds will arise. 
Figure 3- 4 Red-Book Model of Risk Assessment and 
Risk Management 
 
Source: Millstone 2007, p. 495 
                                                 
30
 Because the cover of the report was red.  
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This model of risk assessment and risk management portrays controversies about the 
proper threshold of risks as entirely scientific debates, while the differences between 
countries should be linked to their different ways of risk management. For instance, 
Jasanoff investigates the differences between risk management experiences in certain 
countries to conclude that they had different political processes and institutional designs 
that in turn led to “widely divergent policies for managing the same technological 
hazards.” (Jasanoff 1986 p. 79)31  
Although this model is not relevant to the case of biosafety regulation in Iran, as the case 
of Iran was not a case of controversies about assessing and managing risks, different types 
of this model have largely been applied in several industrialised countries in order to 
assess and manage the risks of GM products. Subsequently, many studies and 
investigations have started to examine the performance of this model in practice, 
especially studies carried out by the scholars of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(SSK), which largely concern the assumption of this model that scientific judgments are 
neutral.  
3.2.2.5. Towards a Co-Evolutionary Model  
The Red-Book Model faced serious criticism supported by empirical studies showing that 
scientific advice is often impregnated with the values and interests of scientists and their 
institutions as well as those of powerful non-scientific institutions (e.g. Jasanoff 1990). 
The SSK studies criticised the procedures of risk assessment and risk management, which 
were routinely represented as purely scientific, and illuminated the unrealistic 
characteristics of the assumption that risk assessments are impartial.  
However, those concerns over the neutrality of science, especially in the context of policy 
making, were present even before introduction of the Red-Book Model. For instance, 
some studies have suggested that the problem of risk policy making is not just about the 
uncertainties of scientific assessments, but also about the incorporation of the political, 
economic and social interests of scientists in definition of the risks, questions to be 
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 Although in her book, she criticises the assumption of the neutrality of scientific advice. I will turn to this issue in the discussion 
of the next model.  
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addressed, and so on (e.g. Nelkin 1979, Gillespie et al 1979, Castleman and Ziem 1998). 
Another study has claimed that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the USA’s 
proposal to ban artificial sweeteners was based on deliberately invalidated data (Havender 
1982). 
There is a valuable contribution by Wynne (1975) regarding the experience of 
technology assessment, which was valued increasingly in that time as a vital activity for 
technology decision making. Wynne points to the problem of mainstream views of 
technology assessment (not just of risk technologies), which portray scientific knowledge 
as if it were able to assess technologies neutrally. 
Wynne applies those views in his inquiry into the Windscale nuclear controversy in the 
UK. As a pioneer study, and by portraying the picture of conflicts between pro-nuclear 
views on the one hand and its opponents on the other, Wynne argues that even scientific 
judgments should be seen as affected by a broader socio-political context (Wynne 1982). 
He discusses the two views, which he calls “the views on knowledge and values in 
politics”.32 The first view is that of ‘rational individualism’, which considers people as 
holding clear and stable values and goals, and that their behaviour is organised to achieve 
these goals. In the second view, which Wynne supports, these values and goals are often 
considered as vague, unstable and open to persuasion. 
Jasanoff, in her book The Fifth Branch (Jasanoff 1990), discusses the role of science in 
policy to bring about a more realistic picture of the interaction between the two. She 
argues that in practice, the technocratic way of representing policy making does not 
represent reality, at least in the three cases discussed in her book, because what experts do 
is “a hybrid activity that combines elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with large 
doses of social and political judgment.” (Jasanoff 1990 p. 229) She implies that 
regulatory bodies should acknowledge the fact that science and expertise is circumscribed 
by particular scientific, legal, administrative, and political factors.  
In the 1990s, several scholars applied the insights that science might not operate free 
from biases to analyse the experience of risk assessment and risk management in the 
                                                 
32
 He refers these two views to Unger’s book, Knowledge and Politics (1975) 
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context of the USA and the EU (Abraham 1993, Huff 2002). For instance, Abraham 
discussed how risk assessment of the medical drug ‘benoxaprofen’ in the UK and the USA 
may have been biased (Abraham 1993) and Huff tried to show how the monographs of 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), which was firstly distributed in 
1972, started to deviate from its original neutrality under the influence of industry since 
1995.  
Wynne, in referring to some crucial, but often overlooked, insights of his previous 
Windscale inquiry (Wynne 1982) points out that official experts frame risks based on 
some prior socio-institutional assumptions. He furthers this argument by making a 
distinction between two types of social framing assumptions that affect judgments: firstly, 
assumptions about relevant social behaviour, which is the source of differences in 
scientific reports – such as presuming the same qualities for social organisations in the 
future – and secondly, framing of what is meant by risk for the purposes of social 
decision making (Wynne 1992). 
Subsequent studies of regulating risk apply the idea of framing assumptions that frame 
the views of the experts, protagonists or policy makers at different levels. Studies of 
biotechnology risk regulation mainly use the notion of framing at a country level to 
analyse the disputes and differences between countries (e.g. Jasanoff 1995, 2005). In an 
analysis of the debates about biotechnology across the EU, Berkhout (2002) tried to 
show how arguments about the impacts of biotechnology had been framed differently. 
Levidow et al point to the issues of framing in the context of European Regulatory 
disputes over Herbicide Tolerant crops (Levidow et al 1997), and extend those ideas in 
analysing US-EU conflicts (Murphy and Levidow 2006) and the GM food trial policy 
within Europe (Levidow and Carr 2009).33  
Stirling (2008) through displaying the variety of judgments expressed by experts involved 
in advising the UK government on regulation of GM technology argued that: “the reason 
that these kinds of ‘sound scientific’ procedures can yield such contrasting pictures of risk 
is that the answers delivered in risk assessment typically depend on the framing of 
                                                 
33
 However, as I will discuss in the next chapter, scholars use the framing approach in different ways and I will suggest a workable 
framework for the case of Iran. 
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analysis” (Stirling 2008 p. 101). He had discussed earlier that the qualitative framing 
assumptions would largely influence the perspectives and judgements about risk 
assessments (Stirling and Mayer 2001).  
Different studies conducted by Millstone et al (2004) on understanding the disputes 
between the USA and the EU over trade of certain technological products and their risks, 
including GM crops, and later Millstone et al (2008) illustrate the differences between 
risk assessment experiences of certain countries in the light of their various framing 
assumptions and the theoretical results of these studies, as well as a categorisation of the 
possible framing assumptions (Millstone 2009).  
Millstone developed a graphical account of a model called a co-evolutionary model of risk 
regulation which is largely rooted in the insights emerging from the SSK literature (Figure 
3-5). According to this model, socio-economic and political considerations affect the 
experts’ risk assessment activities in the form of some upstream framing assumptions. In 
other words, those framing assumptions are a reflection of socio-economic and political 
considerations. 
 
Figure 3- 5 Co-evolutionary model: reciprocal links 
between science and policy  
 
 
Source: Millstone 2009, p. 628 
Millstone proposes that this conception of the framing assumption is very close to the 
provisions of the Codex Alimentarius Commission in defining ‘Risk Assessment Policies’ 
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as policies that should be defined as clearly as possible by risk managers (as a step in risk 
management), and in interaction with risk assessors and all other interested parties in 
advance of the risk assessment (Codex 2003). Therefore, this model acknowledges the 
interactions, or reciprocal linkages, between policy makers and experts, rather than 
adopting a linear and one-way model of regulation. In this sense, it could represent the 
third, and partly the first, stages of negotiations in Iran in which both experts and policy 
makers interacted to develop a draft biosafety law. Nevertheless, this model may represent 
the views of some protagonists in Iran about the proper way of organizing Biosafety 
policy making.  
Millstone argues that a co-evolutionary view may provide a suitable theoretical tool for 
investigating the source of differences between risk assessment experiences of jurisdictions 
by considering their different framing assumptions (Millstone 2009). Millstone et al 
apply this model to the case of differences and disputes between several countries, and 
identify several framing assumptions that were shared differently between jurisdictions 
(Millstone et al 2004, 2008).34  
However, it should be noted that the case of Iran was not one of risk assessment and risk 
management, but a process of negotiations for drafting a biosafety law in three different 
phases, almost always composed from the same organisations (i.e. the DoE, MoA, MoH 
and MoS), but at each stage with a different output. Therefore, I might consider a model 
in which experts and policy makers of the relevant organisations are assumed to be 
circumscribed by some socio-political factors that might lead to different and contrasting 
framing assumptions.35  
In this sense, it may be possible to envisage the case of biosafety policy making in Iran as 
an experience of risk policy making that might be affected by some prior framing 
assumptions, which normally come from the socio-political context, and the differences 
between those assumptions might provide an explanatory account for the controversies 
between those organisations.  
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 I will discuss the detail of different types of framing assumption in the next chapter in order to develop my theoretical framework. 
However, this chapter discusses the theories in a more general level.  
35
 There are many philosophical and sociological schools asserting the partiality of knowledge and science, but each based on their 
specific perspectives. I will not go throughout those debates, but also I will not accept the strong approaches suggesting that human 
knowledge and science are entirely constructed (eg Barnes 1974, Bloor 1976) and therefore there would be an absolute relativism.  
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Nonetheless, there are some concerns about this idea. Firstly, the concept of framing 
assumptions has been used for scientific risk assessments and therefore there is a concern 
about whether or not it could be applied to the case of legislation. The second concern is 
whether or not the concept of framing assumptions, which has been largely applied to 
country-level studies, could be used for analysing the differences and controversies 
between organisations and Ministries within a country. I will go on to discuss the 
literature on public policy analysis and studies on controversies between Governmental 
departments that might contribute to addressing the above concerns and may providing 
additional insights. 
Before discussing that literature, as I mentioned that those models also could represent the 
views of protagonists about the proper ways of structuring biosafety in Iran, and as those 
models are based on some assumptions that might account for the controversies, I will 
summarise them according to two basic assumptions that might provide a further 
theoretical tool for this research.  
3.2.3. Summarising the models of regulating risk 
The four presented models of the regulation of risk could be characterised by their two 
principal assumptions: one about the impartiality of scientific judgment, and the other 
about the sufficiency of science in answering relevant policy questions. The first 
characteristic as is shown by the vertical axis in Figure 3-6 includes two views about 
scientific advice as entirely neutral (at the top) or as partisan (below). The second feature 
is represented by the horizontal line and covers two views of scientific knowledge: the 
view suggesting that science is sufficient for answering all relevant policy problems on the 
left, and the alternative that considers a limited ability for science in this sense on the 
right.  
Thereby, technocracy is the view that not only considers scientific activities as neutral, but 
also assumes that science is able to answer all policy questions, which in turn renders the 
decision-making process entirely objective. Both decisionist and inverted decisionist 
models share a similar idea to technocracy in terms of the neutrality of science, but they 
do not perceive science as a sufficient source for answering all relevant policy questions. 
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Therefore, they consider a pivotal role for policy-makers in the decision-making process 
alongside science. Finally, the co-evolutionary model rejects both characteristics of the 
technocratic model by not only questioning the sufficiency of science for answering policy 
questions, but also by arguing that scientific activities are not always neutral.  
Figure 3- 6 summarising the models of risk 
regulation according to their assumptions  
As I stated before, the case of Iran involved a set of negotiations about the goals of 
biosafety and the means of achieving those goals through identifying the proper 
procedures of risk assessment and risk management and the roles and responsibilities of 
different organisations. Hence, the above assumptions about the neutrality of science and 
its sufficiency for policy making might have been present in the views of protagonists in 
the biosafety system in Iran, and I will use them in my theoretical framework, which I will 
elaborate in Chapter 4. Now, I turn to the literature of public policy analysis to 
investigate the possible contributions of this literature either in explaining policy 
controversies or policy changes.  
Sufficiency of Scientific Advice 
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3.3. Public Policy Analysis 
The literature stream of public policy analysis emerged mainly after the Second World 
War, starting with the seminal work of Lasswell (1951), which introduced policy science 
as a new discipline focusing on the application of the social sciences to the issues of 
governance and government, and to provide a greater assurance that policies will achieve 
their goals. As Allison pointed out, Lasswell’s work was part of the public administration 
school, focusing on the means of achieving chosen ends by politicians (Allison 2006). In 
this sense, the ideas of Lasswell (1951) could be traced back to Weber’s ideas on policy 
making which included the decisionist model discussed in the previous section, according 
to which, policy chooses the goals and science determines the means. 
Public policy benefited much from governmental support in the 1960s (Deleon 2006) 
especially due to the popularity of technocratic models in that decade (Allison 2006), 
according to which science is privileged as a source that could identify alternative goals 
and their outcomes as well as the means of achieving these goals (Fischer 2007). Scholars 
of public policy analysis continued to consider ways of formulating policy goals and 
determining policy means, as well as the implementation processes, among topics of 
analysis, even after technocracy lost its credibility. In this way, several approaches have 
been introduced by scholars to analyse various aspects of public policy making (e.g. Hill 
2008, Sabatier 1999, 2007, John 1998).36 These approaches imply different analytical 
tools for investigating different aspects of policy making experiences such as policy 
processes, policy varieties, policy changes or policy controversies.37  
In this section, I will briefly discuss the approaches applied for analysing policy 
controversies and policy changes as the two aspects of biosafety policy making in the case 
of Iran, both of them mainly concerned with the process of policy making rather than 
policy implementation.  
                                                 
36
 A recent and fuller account of the history and topics of public policy analysis is brought together in the Oxford Handbook of 
Public Policy by Moran et al 2006  
37
 For instance, Hill (2009) distinguishes four main approaches to analysing the policy process, as follows: 1- theories of power, 2- 
networks, 3- institutional theory and 4- rational choice theory. In a different approach Sabatier (1999 and 2007) considers some 
synthesised frameworks for explaining policy processes: the policy advocacy coalition (Sabatier 1991 and Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993), the policy streams approach (Kingdon 1984, 1995), and the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993). 
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3.3.1. Approaches to analysing policy controversies 
In their seminal work on analysing policy controversies and looking for ways of resolving 
them in practice, which built on case studies of controversies between Governmental 
agencies and organisations in the US and Germany, Schon and Rein (1994) characterise 
policy controversies as predicaments in which 1) the protagonists emphasise and refer to 
different facts in their arguments regarding the relevant evidence, and 2) even if they 
employ or discuss a similar fact, they give it different interpretations. This definition is 
quite close to the observation of Wynne (1982) of controversies as situations in which 
protagonists interpret the same reality in different manners.  
Schon and Rein (1994) count three contrasting views in public policy analysis that have 
been applied and might contribute to a better understanding of policy controversies. They 
count the first approach as the ‘policy sciences’ approach. This view shares similar 
fundamental assumptions with classical economic views in which decision making is 
conceived as a problem of selection among well-known options (i.e. presuming the 
alternatives and their possible consequences are well-determined). In this view, if a dispute 
arises, the policy sciences could provide value-free analyses to find the right answer.  
Schon and Rein (1994) argue that this approach cannot account for the types of 
controversies defined above, because it presumes policy sciences are a means to find the 
right answer to debated issues and therefore there will be no controversy after the 
involvement of science. Moreover, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, this view of the 
neutrality of scientific judgments and their sufficiency to answer policy problems 
resembles a technocratic view of policy making that has been widely criticised in the SSK 
literature.  
In the second approach, which is a type of ‘Rational-Choice’ theory (John 1998), policy 
making is conceived as the process of contention between interest groups, each of them 
holding different objective interests (Trueman 1962) and formulating different strategies 
for achieving their goals (Coleman 1982). This model does not scrutinise the role of 
scientific advice in decision making; however it is close to either the decisionist or 
inverted-decisionist model of policy making in which politicians are circumscribed by a 
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socio-cultural context and thus each of them will adhere to their own objective interests 
and leverage different means for realising their intentions. Therefore, the controversies in 
this approach are perceived as conflicts between objective interests.  
Although this approach might work in some situations, Schon and Rein (1994) argue 
that it cannot explain the endemic character of controversies, particularly those 
controversies that last for several years. This is mainly because conflicts of interests can 
normally be resolved through the process of negotiation, bargaining and compromise of 
interests in a known socio-political structure. Considering the case of Iran as a process of 
several years of unresolved controversies and many sessions of negotiation over the 
content of the draft biosafety law, this approach seems to offer a limited applicability.  
However, there are more theoretical concerns with this approach, regarding its emphasis 
on the objectivity of interests and the importance of instrumental rationality, which make 
it more vulnerable as a basic framework of study. Schon and Rein (1994) criticise this 
approach for its assumption that the interests of antagonists are objective and given in a 
well-defined situation, when the complexity and possible uncertainty of situations and 
decision making is a barrier to such objectivity. This is similar to the view of Wynne 
(1982), who criticizes the views that presume interests are clear, objective and stable, as I 
discussed in section 3.2.2.5.   
Another problem with this approach lies in its assumption that antagonists share a similar 
and objective definition of the policy problem, whereas in many situations this is not the 
case (Rittel and Webber 1973). In this sense, turning to the facts might amplify rather 
than resolve the issue (Schwarz and Thompson 1990).  
As an alternative, Schon and Rein propose the ‘frame’ approach, in which controversies 
are seen as arising because of conflicts between the frames of the antagonists. Frames, as 
underlying structure of belief, largely define the interests of protagonists and determine 
their policy positions and even their understandings of the policy problem. Thus, having 
two different set of frames could lead to two different understandings of the policy 
problem and policy interests, which in turn might engender enduring controversies. In 
other words, a policy controversy is a situation in which “two or more parties contend 
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with one another over the definition of a problematic policy situation and vie for control 
of the policy-making process... it is the frames held by the actors that determine what they 
see as being in their interests and, therefore, what interests they perceive as conflicting” 
(Schon and Rein 1994 p. 28-29) [italics in original].  
This is an approach that Fischer calls a post-empiricist (or post-positivist) approach to 
policy analysis that does not start with an obvious policy problem (Fischer 2003) but by 
envisaging policy actors in a complex situation with a primary difficulty of making sense 
of that complexity and the possible uncertainties (Hajer and Laws 2006). In this sense, it 
is the frame of the protagonists which largely defines their understanding of the situation, 
of the policy problem and of what is in their interests (Schon and Rein 1994), and which 
is supposed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the policy controversies (Surel 
2000).  
In short, two main approaches have been applied to explain political controversies. The 
first one is ‘rational-choice’ theory which considers the interests and goals of the 
protagonists as objective and given and that controversies arise because of conflicts of 
interests. According to the second approach, controversies emerge due to differences of 
the frames of the involved groups, which in turn leads to different definitions of the 
policy problems and even to different understandings of the involved groups’ own 
interests and the interests of each other.  
These two views of analysing policy controversies are similar to the two views discussed 
by Wynne (1982) and represented in the previous section. The primary difference 
between the two approaches discussed by Wynne is the assumption of objectivity of 
interests and instrumental rationality which is shared by the first view, while it is criticised 
in the second approach, which proposes that interests can be vague and subject to 
persuasion in a complex situation. As I discussed earlier, the SSK literature (e.g. Wynne 
1982) has also largely adopted the second approach by considering the effects of the 
broader socio-political system in the form of some prior framing assumptions.  
Hence, the co-evolutionary model I adopted earlier, as potentially the most appropriate 
model for the experience of regulation in Iran, shares several basic elements with the 
  
52 
framing approach to analysing policy controversies. However, as the concerns of the 
literature regarding technological risk regulation were the experiences of risk assessment 
and risk management and the differences between countries on this issue, the concept of 
framing assumptions has mainly been extended by this literature to analyse the scientific 
risk assessment debates rather than general policy-making experiences (e.g. Wynne 1992, 
Jasanoff 1993, Millstone 2009).38   
In this sense, the theoretical tools of public policy literature on controversy analysis might 
help to address the concerns over the possibility of applying the framing approach to the 
controversies over biotechnology regulation in Iran. On one hand, the literature on public 
policy applies the notion of framing to broader issues of policy making, not just to 
scientific risk assessments. On the other hand, the framing approach was developed in this 
literature to be useful in studying the controversies within a jurisdiction.  
Therefore, the idea of framing and framing assumptions could well offer a useful 
theoretical tool for analysing the case of inter-organisational disputes in the system of 
biosafety policy making in Iran, which on one hand is an experience of risk regulation and 
on the other hand is an experience of public policy. In the next chapter, I will consider the 
broader literature, applying both the notions of frames and framing assumption in more 
detail to develop a theoretical framework for my study.   
However, there is another aspect of policy making in the case of Iran that should be 
considered: three different outputs as the result of three rounds of negotiations. The first 
round of negotiations was mostly composed of experts and non-expert senior 
representatives and finished without a formal draft output; the second round was 
composed of policy makers (i.e. Deputy Ministers and the head of the DoE) and ended 
with a draft that was entirely changed in the discussions of the Agricultural Committee of 
the Parliament, composed of both experts and policy makers as well as MPs of the 
Agricultural Committee of the Parliament. In the next section, I will discuss those 
approaches for analysing policy changes.  
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 As I will discuss in the next chapter, there are some recent studies analysing biotechnology regulation in general, such as Jasanoff 
2005, Murphy and Levidow 2006 and Levidow and Carr 2009, borrowing from the contributions of Shon and Rein and Hajer. 
However, firstly they just adopted the notions of frame, narrative, and discourse uncritically without discussing the literature on 
public policy in more detail and secondly they applied those notions for analysing country differences rather than domestic 
controversies. I will discuss this literature in more detail in the next chapter.  
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3.3.2. Approaches to analysing policy changes 
In studying and analysing public policy, Peter John (1998) counts understanding policy 
change as a main topic of investigation for students and scholars in this field. He 
enumerates three approaches that might contribute to explaining policy changes: ‘rational-
choice’ theory, the ‘idea-based’ view, and ‘socio-economic’ approaches. According to John, 
the idea-Based view seems to have a better explanatory power in analysing policy change 
in comparison to the two other approaches.39 The definitions of these three approaches, 
which could be combined to yield hybrid approaches too, are: 
• Rational-choice theory: the preferences and bargaining of actors and institutions 
in a determined socio-economic structure explain decisions and outcomes.  
• Idea-based view: ideas about solutions to policy problems circulate and gain 
influence independent of or prior to interests in the policy process, and determine 
the decisions and policy outputs.  
• Socio-economic approaches: powerful socio-economic forces ensure that the 
intentions of the most powerful determine the outputs and outcomes.  
I discussed rational-choice theory in the previous section, which envisages policy making 
as a process in which the interests of actors are given in a determined socio-economic 
structure and the policy outputs emerge in a process of bargaining among these actors. In 
this way, the policy output will change if the interests of the actors change, even if the 
socio-economic structure remains unchanged. Referring to the discussions in the previous 
sections, this approach, which presumes public policy making as a process of conflicts of 
objective interests, is broadly criticised by the SSK literature, and I will not adopt this 
view in my theoretical framework.   
The socio-economic approach proposes that, because the policy output is determined by 
the most powerful organisation, changes to the policy output reflect changes in power 
relations. In this sense, three outputs for three stages of negotiations in the case of Iran 
could be the result of changes in the dominant power at each stage. This is a hypothesis 
                                                 
39
 He also refers to two other approaches that fit better in explaining policy stability, as opposed to policy change: institutional 
approaches, and group and network approaches. 
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that cannot be rejected at this point, although the stability of the office of the secretariat 
for the NBC, as well as the stable structure of the NBC during the process and that of the 
involved organisations might raise questions about validity of this proposition.  
The idea-based view suggests that policy changes because of changes in the ideas of policy 
makers or protagonists. In this sense, the output of each stage of negotiations in Iran 
might have changed because new ideas for resolving the policy problem had emerged. 
However, a primary issue in the ideas-based approach is defining ‘ideas’, as this term 
could be used with several meanings, ranging from ideas about facts and technical 
knowledge (Sabatier 1998) to worldviews and ideologies (Schon and Rein 1994). As I 
stated above when defining the controversies, the ideas that might account for the 
controversies and the change in policy output cannot be reduced to ideas about facts 
(Hajer and Laws 2006). Therefore, the relevant ideas in this context may resemble general 
ideas similar to the notion of frames (Keeley and Scoones 2003), and I will use this 
conception of ideas for the purpose of this study. Thus, this version of the idea-based 
view would suggest that the policy output may have changed because of changes to the 
policy frames (Hajer 1995).40 
Considering the case of radical policy change, there is another proposition in the framing 
approach suggesting that policy might change because the dominant frame could not 
resist new, and maybe social, tensions and criticisms that in turn could lead to a change of 
the dominant frame (Surel 2000).41 Murphy and Levidow apply this concept by 
combining it with the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Sabatier and the Policy 
Discourse Analysis of Hajer to analyse policy shifts in Europe as a result of public 
contestation attacking the dominant paradigm (Murphy and Levidow 2006). In this 
sense, the work of Murphy and Levidow suggests a combination of the two previous 
approaches by considering a dominant and powerful frame which was replaced as a result 
of criticisms from a rival frame.  
In short, the current theories suggest that the policy output of the three stages of 
negotiations changed, possibly because of a change in the dominant power, possibly 
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 In the next chapter and in developing my framework, I will discuss the different meanings of frame and narrative in more detail.  
41
 This approach is quite similar to the elaboration of Kuhn’s scientific paradigm shift as the result of new questions and criticisms.   
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because of a change in the policy frames of the protagonists in the system, leading to new 
understandings, or possibly because of the raising of new criticisms that in turn could 
jeopardise the position and power of the previously dominant frame.  
Having reviewed the important streams of literature deemed relevant to the case of Iran in 
the previous sections, it is now possible to redefine the objective of the current research 
and the research questions in more theoretical language in the following section.  
3.4. Refining the research objective and question in theoretical terms 
The previous findings of the literature about risk regulation, along with the two streams 
of public policy literature, can now be used in defining the concerns and objectives of this 
research in a more theoretical way. To recap the main theoretical points: 
- Studies about the disputes over biotechnology regulation suggest that the main 
root of controversies might be the diversity of the framing assumptions between 
countries. However, this concept has not been developed for analysing domestic 
organisational disputes over biotechnology regulation.  
- Work on identifying the sources of controversies in public policy decision 
making, the topics of which have not been risk but other popular types of policy 
making such as homelessness, suggests that differences in the frames of the 
protagonists might account for the persistence of controversies.  
- The literature on policy change suggests that policies might change as a result of 
changes to the frames of the protagonists, because of changes in power relations, 
or as a result of intensive criticisms of the dominant frame.   
Refining the research question from this theoretical perspective, the main research 
problem of this study could be stated as:  
Does adopting a co-evolutionary model for policy making help explain the Iranian 
controversies over biosafety regulation by focusing on contrasting framing assumptions?42 
Furthermore, is it possible to explain the changes to policy outputs in the light of 
                                                 
42
 I used the term ‘framing assumption’ rather than ‘frame’ in formulating the questions. I will illustrate the reason for preferring 
framing assumption over frame in the next chapter.  
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changing framing assumptions, or do other factors like changes in power relations need to 
be considered to explain the changes in the policy outputs?  
Thus, the primary empirical research question is defined as:  
• To what extent did the controversies between the MoS, MoH, MoA and DoE 
arise from differences in their framing assumptions? And how could these framing 
assumptions contribute to explaining policy changes?  
This research question could be divided to the following sub-questions: 
• What types of different frames or framing assumptions can be identified and 
elicited from the participatory organisations regarding the system of biosafety 
regulation of Iran?  
• To some extent are they different and even contradictory?  
• How did those framing assumptions change over time and why?  
• Can the changes in the framing assumptions help explain changes in the policy 
outputs of each stage? 
• If the framing assumptions remained unchanged, is it possible to understand the 
changes of the output of each policy stage in the light of changes to the dominant 
power? 
Answering these questions needs more clarification regarding the concepts of frames and 
framing assumptions, as well as a suitable theoretical framework and methodology for 
data gathering and data analysis. These tasks are the topic of the next chapter, which 
discusses the overall design of the current research.  
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 Chapter 4. Research Design  
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss the design of the current research, including the research 
strategy, theoretical framework, methodology, data sources and so on.  
4.2. Definition of Research Design 
In the physical sciences and to some extent in psychological research, the term ‘research 
design’ normally refers to providing experimental conditions under which the desired 
variable can be measured and other intervening variables can be controlled. In the 
supposed conditions, the researcher would then be able to interpret the events and draw 
causal conclusions (Blaikie 2000). Blaikie also quotes from some psychologists that in 
their view, research design aims to provide a situation in which individuals can be 
compared and analysed and an interpretation could be derived, although it might not be 
possible to reach a unique interpretation (Labovitz and Hagedorn 1976: cited in Blaikie 
2000, p. 36).  
But research design in other disciplines can be different, as Blaikie points to two other 
types of research design, in addition to the experimental type mentioned above. They are: 
1) linear and very quantitative approaches, and 2) qualitative research that normally uses 
interrelated processes. He suggests that for many social science researchers, it would be 
very difficult to run experimental research, as the ability to control the variables is limited. 
Therefore, while many social scientists prefer to use quantitative approaches, there are still 
many social scientists who prefer to use the qualitative approach (Blaikie 2000).  
My research is a study of a unique set of events in the past that increases the issue of 
control over variables. Therefore, it is not possible to use experimental approach as a basis 
of my research design. Moreover, considering the complexity of the case of biosafety 
regulation in general and contested assumptions and ideas that might lay the controversies 
within the specific context of Iran, linear and quantitative approach might not also cover 
several characterizations of the case of biosafety regulation in Iran, especially those 
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possible framing assumptions. Consequently, I prefer to consider a qualitative approach as 
the basis of my study focusing on a specific case of biosafety policy-making in Iran.  
Blaikie endorses the approach to research design suggested by Yin (1989), in which 
research design is defined as an action plan for linking research questions, empirical data 
and research conclusions. In criticising views focusing on specific methods of data 
gathering instead of on research design, Blaikie suggests an alternative view that introduces 
eight central elements of research design, considering the first four points as the most 
important: 1) research topic or problem, 2) research questions and objectives, 3) research 
strategies, 4) concepts, theories and models, 5) data sources, 6) selection from data 
sources, 7) data collection and timing, and 8) data reduction and analysis. However, he 
notes that the order of these eight elements may be different in different research.  
My research to a large extent fits the research design model suggested by Blaikie. 
However, I wish to further clarify my view of research design in more detail, which might 
also imply differences from Blaikie as follows.  
As the previous chapters indicate, I prefer to take a broad view of research design, 
suggesting that research is a way of linking two separate worlds of theories and concepts 
on one hand, and reality and experiences on the other, in order to answer a set of 
reasonable and interesting questions. Therefore, there is a distinction between two 
separate sets of questions, the empirical questions and the theoretical questions. In this 
sense, designing research is a way of developing a reasonable means to transform practical 
problems into the theoretical world, restating them in the language of theories as a 
window through which to look at the problems, developing a conceptual framework as a 
toolbox for dealing with the problems (which also guides which data are necessary and 
how to collect and analyse them in order to find the answers to the theoretical and 
empirical questions), and finally, through the implications of all these intellectual steps, 
finding a solution to the practical problem.  
If we envisage the process of science policy research, starting from a real problem and 
ending with a solution, academic research has the task of transforming this problem into 
the theoretical world, solving it in that world and then retransforming it to the real world 
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again. In this picture, the role and importance of theories and hypotheses are more than 
just an element of the research design, but a core element that guides the future steps of 
the research (this view is very close to Yin 2003b, which I will discuss in the next section 
and different from Blaikie who counted theories and models as just a building block for 
research design). Moreover, the theoretical research questions are not something ‘out 
there’ to be found prior to the application of theories, but arise as the result of 
transforming, or linking, real-world problems to the world of theories and concepts, 
thereby yielding the theoretical research questions.  
According to this view, I have therefore taken some key steps of the research design in the 
two previous chapters, which are: 1) the context of study and the particular empirical 
problem has been discussed, 2) the body of literature has been reviewed and relevant 
theoretical considerations have been identified, and 3) the practical question has been 
restated in the language of theories by concentrating on framing assumptions.  
The aim of this chapter is to fulfil the remaining tasks, which are clarifying the concepts 
of frames and framing assumptions, to develop useful units of analysis; examining their 
usefulness and applicability in the case of Iran; developing a theoretical framework; and 
identifying the required data sources and the ways of gathering and analysing these in 
order to answer the research questions.  
4.3. Research Strategy 
Methods of data collection on their own do not determine particular aspects of the 
research, but it is the researcher in interaction with theories and reality who designs the 
research and identifies the use of the methods. In designing this research, I assume that 
the current case of Iran could provide sufficient and interesting resources to be combined 
with the world of theories and contribute, not only to better explain an intricate policy 
problem, but also to suggest useful insights for resolving the problem as well as 
contributing to current theoretical debates. In this sense, my research strategy is case study 
(Yin 2003a) that means I have chosen a case that is deemed valuable both theoretically 
and empirically to be analysed. Moreover, while the case study can be used for different 
  
60 
purposes such as exploration, description, explanation, testing hypotheses and so on (Yin 
1981), the prime aim of this research is explanation.  
In case studies, theories play multiple roles in case studies “in the following areas: 
a. Selecting the cases to be studied, whether following a single-case or 
multiple-case design… 
b. Specifying what is being explored when you are doing explanatory case 
studies 
c. Defining a complete and appropriate description when you are doing 
descriptive case studies 
d. Stipulating rival theories when you are doing explanatory case studies… 
e. Generalizing the results to other cases. “ (Yin 2003b p. 5)  
As this research is an explanatory study, the literature is being used to 1) identify a proper 
case with some interesting characteristics, 2) specify what is being explored, 3) stipulate 
the relevant theories for explaining the case, and 4) help to generalise the results to some 
degree after concluding the data analysis.  
4.4. Theoretical Concerns of the Framework 
In the last chapter, I formulated the theoretical research question, which is mainly 
concerned with the notions of frames and framing assumptions in analysing either the 
roots of policy controversies or the changes to policy outputs. In my efforts to find 
proper solutions for these theoretical questions, I need to use or develop a suitable 
theoretical framework as a set of tools to help and enable me to find the answers to those 
questions.  
Therefore, in developing a useful theoretical framework, I focus on the concepts of the 
frame and framing assumptions as the main conceptual building blocks of the theoretical 
framework. This framework, in relation to the research questions, should help me in 
identifying the possible framing assumptions and their relations to the policy positions of 
the antagonists, which, I hypothesise, are in dispute with each other, and which have 
shaped the controversies within the system and between the DoE, MoS, MoA and MoH.  
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For this purpose, here I will discuss the application of the notions of frame and framing 
assumptions in the public policy analysis and risk and regulation literatures, as well as 
their possible contributions to developing such a framework. Before proceeding to this 
topic, first I will discuss the historical roots of this concept.  
4.4.1. Frame: Origin and Development 
Several scholars (Schon and Rein 1993, Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, Jasanoff 
2005) have claimed that the concept of ‘frame’ was originally introduced by Ervin 
Goffman (1974) in his sociological work about organising experience. However, 
reviewing the introductory chapter of Goffman’s book reveals that he borrowed the term 
from Gregory Bateson’s book, A Theory of Play and Phantasy (Bateson 1955).  
According to Delanty and Strydom the seminal work of Goffman is part of an 
interpretative tradition “that developed in the wake of the earlier phenomenological and 
hermeneutic philosophies… advocated in different ways the need for social science to 
address common-sense forms of knowledge” (Delanty and Strydom 2003 p. 85). Hence, 
focusing on more subjective elements of knowledge renders an approach that “is 
interested in the cognitive processes and structures operative in every day life” (Ibid p. 
87). Consequently, the meaning of a social fact should be viewed through the lens of the 
“cognitive processes, definitions, tacit forms of understanding, and practical reasoning 
that are constitutive of it” (ibid). 
According to this view, Goffman opens his book by asking an old question, originally 
posed by William James: “under what circumstances do we think things are real?” 
(Goffman 1974 p. 2) He traces the arguments of James and their phenomenological roots 
and then the later developments in this respect, to ask a central question as the main 
concern of his work: how do people answer the question of ‘what is it that’s going on 
here?’ in their everyday life when they face any current situation. By arguing that 
“definitions of a situation in the view of individuals are built up in accordance with 
principles of organization which govern events … and our subjective involvement in 
them”, Goffman notes: “frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as 
I am able to identify.” (Ibid p 10-11) In referring to “these basic elements”, Goffman 
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means the basic elements of the subjective involvement of individuals in the situation, and 
‘frame’ is a term he uses to refer to the integration of all these subjective elements in a 
coherent structure.  
Although Goffman claims that his book is not about the organisation of society and the 
core matters of sociology, because they could be analysed without reference to frame at 
all, various fields currently use the idea of framing as one of their fundamental themes, 
such as media literature (Gamson and Modigliani 1989) or social movements (e.g. 
Benford and Snow 2000), and, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, some public 
policy analysis also uses this notion in controversy analysis (Schon and Rein 1994). This 
means that several scholars following Goffman adopted the concept of frame and used it 
for purposes other than his original intention.  
In other words, Goffman uses the concept of frame to refer to the elements that he 
identifies in the mind-set of individuals when they become involved in a particular 
situation to understand how they organise their experiences, while some other scholars try 
to use the concept in analysing social events, like social movements, controversies and so 
on. Consequently, the notion of frame is not just being used as Goffman envisaged.  
This differentiated use of the concept partly lies in the fact that some scholars have not 
based their work on the original contribution of Goffman, but instead have used the term 
with a different meaning for their study. For instance, Benford and Snow refer to 
Goffman by claiming that for Goffman, “frame denoted schemata of interpretation that 
enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space 
and the world at large.” (Benford and Snow 2000 p. 614) This representation is different 
from that which I stated above and, by reference, to Goffman’s book; we will find that the 
schemata of interpretation for Goffman was part of the definition of ‘primary 
frameworks’, which in turn is one element of the mind-set of individuals and an element 
of frame.  
However, the concept of frame is applied by scholars in quite different ways, and I adopt 
a definition not strictly based on Goffman’s own, but one that is useful for answering my 
research questions and that is mainly based on the literature reviewed in the previous 
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chapter. Therefore, in the next section I will discuss the development of the concept in 
the literature of public policy and subsequently in the literature of risk and regulation.  
4.4.2. Frame and Policy Controversies 
As I have discussed, the popularity of the notion of frame in policy analysis began with 
the work of Schon and Rein (1994). Before publishing a book in 1994, Schon and Rein 
wrote a chapter about reframing policy discourses (Schon and Rein 1993) in another 
book titled Argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning, edited by Fischer and 
Forester (1993). In that chapter, concentrating on stubborn policy controversies, Schon 
and Rein argue that those controversies cannot be understood in terms of separating facts 
from values, because participants hold the frames in which values, facts, theories and 
interests are integrated. They then pose a central question about resolving policy 
controversies: “what can possibly be the basis for resolving conflicts of frames when the 
frames themselves determine what counts as evidence and how evidence is interpreted?” 
(Schon and Rein 1993 p. 145) Schon and Rein stress that they “deal with policy 
controversies in the absence of an agreed-upon basis for resolving them.” (Ibid) In other 
words, their main concern is finding a way to resolve controversies, considering that 
controversies normally arise from the conflict of frames.  
Schon and Rein define framing “as a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and 
making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, 
persuading, and acting”, and thus “frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-
defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on.” (P. 146) On this 
basis, Schon and Rein define one aspect of critical policy analysis as an activity to identify 
the taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie people’s understanding and actions, and 
the relationships between hidden premises and normative conclusions.  
In 1994, Schon and Rein wrote a book about policy controversies, arguing that 
intractable policy controversies can be analysed in terms of frame conflicts, in which 
frames were understood as “underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation” 
that determine policy positions (Schon and Rein 1994 p 23). Moreover, they discuss the 
relationships between interests and frames by arguing that interests are shaped by frames 
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because the frames of “the actors determine what they see as being in their interests and, 
therefore, what interests they perceive as conflicting.” (p. 29)  
Frames can operate at different levels, which Schon and Rein (1994) classify into: 1) 
policy frames, 2) institutional frames, and 3) metacultural frames. A policy frame is one 
that underlies the definition of the policy problem in a specific policy situation. 
Institutional frames are those prevailing in particular institutions and which could affect 
the perception of individuals internal to that institution about the policy situation and the 
policy problem. Finally, there could be some cultural shared systems of belief in the form 
of metacultural frames, which are organised around generative metaphors like disease and 
cure, or nature and nurture.  
In a paper published in 1996, Rein and Schon distinguished between four different 
meanings of a frame: ‘scaffolding’, ‘boundary’43, ‘schemata of interpretation’44 and ‘generic 
diagnostic/prescriptive’ stories. In adopting the fourth definition, which they referred to 
as ‘metacultural frames’ in their 1994 book, they emphasised the utility of metaphors to 
highlight the normative aspects of frames, especially when they suggest that such 
narratives not only explain what needs fixing, but also how it might be fixed, like the 
metaphor of a disease that needs a cure (Rein and Schon 1996). 
In conclusion regarding the conceptualisation of Schon and Rein of the meaning of 
frame, it seems that their ideas have evolved through time to finally adopt the concept of 
a narrative as one to explain policy controversies. Nevertheless, even in their last 
contribution, they underlined the importance of a core element in all of the four 
definitions of frame: the existence of an assumptional basis (Ibid p. 88).  
The concept of narrative has been substantially used and applied in different studies. For 
instance, Krogman (1996) analyses the Louisiana wetlands controversy by identifying 
three different groups according to their shared stories: ‘regulators’, ‘regulated’ and 
‘environmentalists’. The debates surrounding low-level radioactive waste in California has 
been analysed by Bedsworth et al (2004). They highlight three policy frames: the legal 
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 Intriguingly, Rein and Schon attribute this view to Goffman when he talked about selection of a stream of events. However, 
Goffman refers to this action as ‘strips’, not frames. 
44
 Rein and Schon attribute this view to Snow et al (1986), while Snow himself borrowed the term from Goffman’s concept of 
primary frameworks, and I referred to their 2000 paper in this respect above.  
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and scientific frame, the pragmatic frame that recognises the importance of down-to-earth 
matters, and the cautious and sceptical frame that reflects elements of environmentalism, 
justice and precaution. These narratives “lead to differences in policy actors’ 
determinations of what are legitimate drivers for action, their bases for trusting claims, 
and their attitudes toward risk and uncertainty” (Bedsworth et al 2004 p. 408). The 
authors argue that these three contrary narratives imply different solutions and 
ramifications for solving the problem. 
There are some variations to the concept of narrative as well. In the same book in which 
Schon and Rein (1993) discuss the importance of framing, i.e. the book edited by Fischer 
and Forester (1993), Martin Hajer provides an interesting analysis of the policy frames in 
the case of the British Acid Rain controversies by pointing to the fact that, although 
powerful vested interests played significant roles, the controversy itself signified a more 
fundamental conflict. He contends that “whether or not a situation is perceived as a 
political problem depends on the narrative in which it is discussed” (Hajer 1993 p. 44). 
In this sense, large groups of dead trees can be seen as the product of natural stress or as 
victims of pollution. The narrative of pollution in relation to the problem of 
environmental change might be linked to something bigger: the crisis of industrial society.  
He extends the analysis further in a book published in 1995, and applies many elements 
of Schon and Rein’s view: the policy problem, the policy situation and the narratives 
underlying different understandings of them (Hajer 1995). In this sense, Hajer tends to 
define narratives as general discourses representing broader perspectives that relate people 
from different backgrounds to each other without necessarily understanding each other 
(e.g. Keynesianism discourse). A discourse “orders the way in which policy actors perceive 
reality, define problems, and choose to pursue solutions in particular direction.” (Hajer 
and Laws 2006 p. 261) However, as the case in Iran was limited to a few Ministries and a 
main Governmental organisation (i.e. the DoE), applying the concept of discourse as a 
very broad notion connecting several people might not be helpful. Nonetheless, I shall use 
the general characterisation of discourse by Hajer and Laws (2006) in my framework.  
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In short, while Schon and Rein were initially concerned about policy frames in policy 
controversies, they later tended to emphasise the importance of policy narratives as a 
means not only to define policy problems, but also to suggest how they might be resolved. 
However, this general definition does not imply a specific framework for study and it is 
up to the researcher trying to work with Schon and Rein’s approach to review different 
documents and other sources deeply to extract the possible generic narratives, more on a 
trial and error basis.  
This is the point that Schon and Rein stressed themselves, saying that “the difficulties in 
frame analysis lie in their fuzzy nature … the same course of action may be consistent 
with different types of policy frames and the same frame may lead to different courses of 
action; we have to deal with hybrid families of frames even within the same organisation; 
and sometimes it may be difficult to distinguish between conflicts within the same frame 
or cutting across different frames, or between real versus potential frame shifts.” (Schon 
and Rein 1994 p 34-35)  
Last but not least, there is yet another little considered point in the literature stream, 
which is the assumptional basis of different definitions of frames, either as narratives, as 
schemata of interpretation or as boundaries and scaffolding.  
4.4.3. Framing Assumptions and Risk and Regulation 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Wynne analyses controversies by applying a 
concept of ‘cosmologies’ as “a comprehensive system of thought which is rooted in social 
practice and experience.” (Wynne 1982 p. 12) This concept is very close to the initial 
ideas of Schon and Rein (1993) in defining frames.  
However, when Wynne applies these ideas in the context of scientific risk assessments, he 
finds the concept of framing assumptions a more useful analytical tool for that context. 
By pointing to the social aspects of risk and the experiences of risk assessments, Wynne 
(1992) makes a distinction between two components of framing: firstly, assumptions 
about relevant social behaviour, which is the source of differences in scientific reports – 
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such as presuming the same qualities for social organisations at times in the future – and 
secondly, framing of what is to count as risk for the purposes of social decision making.  
These ideas, and the emphasis on the social factors that frame risk are echoed by Jasanoff 
(1993) in her editorial paper in the second issue of the journal Risk Analysis about the 
necessity of considering qualitative approaches along with the quantitative methods of 
risk assessment. She discusses different practical examples of the circumstances in which 
risk assessors make simplifying assumptions about the context within which the risk 
arises. The main argument of her article is that “what we claim to know about risk, how 
we acquire more information, and how we interpret facts in our possession are all 
contingent on contextual factors, ranging from individual or organizational experiences to 
national political culture.” (Jasanoff 1993 p. 127) Hence, the concept of framing 
assumptions was first introduced in the beginning of the 1990s as the assumptions the 
risk assessors make in their quantitative, and presumed scientific assessments.  
In their study to highlight framing issues in the context of risk assessment, particularly in 
the case of Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Levidow et al (1997) borrow the idea of framing 
assumptions from Wynne (1992) and Jasanoff (1993), assuming that “technical evidence 
is inseparable from assumptions about nature and society” (Levidow et al 1997 p. 474), 
to discuss four disputed boundaries defining the role and limits of regulatory science in 
the context of European biosafety regulation. The four disputed boundaries discussed by 
Levidow et al (1997) are:  
a. Bounds of administrative responsibility: this refers to identifying institutional 
responsibilities, while risk lies across (and not within) specialised current institutional 
responsibilities. In this sense, the EU bounds of responsibilities for GM HT crops 
remained unclear and disputed.  
b. Bounds of causality: the scope of the risk and the risk-generating system is another 
contested boundary, as it was unclear which potential forms of harm to include and 
which to exclude from the calculations and decision making.  
c. Bounds of acceptable effects and control: this mainly deals with the criteria of 
accepting effects and controlling measures to identify the boundaries within which the 
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effects are considered harmless, and the control measures provided for preventing 
harmful effects.  
d. Bounds of expertise and evidence: this refers to identifying the relevant scientific 
disciplines to be included and responsible for risk assessment and those to be 
excluded, which in turn would affect the types and adequacy of evidence needed for 
safety judgments.  
In comparison to Wynne (1992) and Jasanoff (1993), who emphasise the framing 
assumptions lying at the heart of risk assessment activities, or the social factors that affect 
scientific activities, Levidow et al (1997) extend the debate to argue that the four 
boundary issues are the matters that regulatory bodies should and do deal with, if only 
implicitly, and make decisions about. In this sense, although Levidow et al do not directly 
identify specific framing assumptions, they point to the boundary issues that should be 
considered by regulators. They further suggest that within each boundary, there might be 
several possibly conflicting framing assumptions.  
This idea of looking at the disputed boundary issues that might reveal framing 
assumptions is interesting, and I will apply it as a part of my methodology. However, 
Levidow et al (1997) do not suggest a clear framework for identifying framing 
assumptions, and in analysing each case, the researcher should first identify the boundary 
conflicts and then try to find their underlying framing assumptions. In addition, another 
problem with this framework is its emphasis on the contested boundaries, while 
overlooking other disputed issues.  
Some potentially useful literature about framing has been developed by Millstone and his 
colleagues in their attempt to reveal the sources of disagreements in trade disputes 
between the US and the EU vis-à-vis different products, among them GM crops 
(Millstone et al 2004). They conceptualise the framing assumptions as a part of the co-
evolutionary45 model, concluding that some sorts of framing assumptions, or what 
Millstone et al, following the Codex Alimentarius Commission, call Risk Assessment 
Policies (RAP), might account for the differences between scientific appraisals of risks 
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 Which I discussed in the previous chapter 
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across those jurisdictions. In this sense, they extend the initial ideas of Wynne (1992) and 
Jasanoff (1993) about framing assumptions in risk assessment experiments. Millstone 
endorses the suggestion of the Codex that those upstream framing assumptions (or Risk 
Assessment Policies) should be clarified and decided by regulators after consultations 
with risk assessors and other interested parties in advance of risk assessments. The result 
of Millstone et al’s empirical studies (Millstone et al 2004, 2008) in terms of classifying 
framing assumptions are summarised (Millstone 2009) as:  
1. “Substantive RAPs [which] are concerned with delineating which potential 
changes and effects are to be included within the scope of risk assessments and 
which are outside their scope, and which kinds of evidence are admissible and 
which are not…   
2. Procedural RAPs [which] are concerned with the processes by which risk 
assessments are conducted and reported…  
3. Interpretative RAPs [which] are concerned with the ways in which data are 
interpreted. Data and documents do not interpret themselves; interpretation often 
involves judgements and assumptions.” (Millstone 2009 p. 631)  
Some ideas behind this classification by Millstone are very close to the studies of Levidow 
et al (1997), as both scholars are concerned with framing issues in the context of 
biotechnology regulation and the importance of regulatory bodies in taking part in issues 
over framing. However, contrary to Levidow et al, who identify four disputed boundaries 
that might point to different sets of framing assumptions, Millstone tries to identify and 
classify the different types of framing assumptions in the experience of risk assessment, 
based on the experiences of countries within and beyond the European Union. I will use 
the results of these findings on different framing assumptions in my theoretical 
framework, though their classification of the types of framing assumptions might not be 
directly appropriate for the case of Iran, as the case of Iran was not a contention over 
particular risk assessments but over biosafety regulation on a more general level.  
The work of Jasanoff (1995) on the three cultures of regulation in the USA, the UK and 
Germany underlies her later book, Designs on Nature, on the relationships between 
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politics and science in the case of agricultural and medical biotechnology (Jasanoff 2005). 
She adopts a narrative approach to framing biotechnology regulation, arguing that in 
policy making experience, particularly in science and technology regulation, story-telling 
produces some cognitive frames which “impose discipline on unruly events by creating 
understandable causal relationships, identifying agents of harmful behaviour, and finding 
solutions that convey a sense of security and moral order.” (Jasanoff 2005 p. 24)  
On this basis, Jasanoff defines three different cultures in the UK, the USA and Germany 
as “three controlling narratives that framed the course of policy development on genetic 
engineering”. Respectively for these three countries, “(1) a novel process for intervening 
in nature, (2) a source of new products for the benefit of humans and the environment, 
and (3) a state-sponsored program of standardization and control carrying profound 
implications for human dignity and freedom, and raising questions of constitutional 
significance.” (Jasanoff 2005 p. 39) [italics in original] In this sense, as Jasanoff is keen to 
discuss the effects of broad national culture on policy and science, her ideas are close to 
the notion of narratives adopted by Schon and Rein (1996) as the generic factors 
underlying the perspectives of those three advanced countries regarding biotechnology 
regulation. In this sense, Jasanoff extends the analysis to discuss the framing of regulation, 
though by applying the notion of narratives rather than that of framing assumptions. 
Nevertheless, a problem in this study is that it seeks to explicate the differences between 
the three countries and their ways of framing biotechnology by a single factor, i.e. their 
narrative about biotechnology, which might not provide a satisfactory framework for the 
purposes of my analysis.  
Murphy and Levidow (2006), in their analysis of the transatlantic conflicts over 
agricultural biotechnology, apply the concept of framing to the policy discourses that 
shaped three different policy dialogues across the Atlantic. (As I discussed earlier, 
discourse is a type of very broad narrative, developed by Hajer 1995.) They identify three 
groups linked together based on their beliefs and policy discourses, while the dialogues 
between those discourses, according to Murphy and Levidow, shape the conflicts between 
and within both the USA and the EU.  
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The three dialogues are: 1) Transatlantic Business Dialogue, promoting trade 
harmonisation, 2) Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, promoting the right of knowing and 
choosing for consumers, and 3) Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue, seeking proof of 
safety of agro-biotech products. Murphy and Levidow also analyse the dynamics of 
evolution in the interaction between those three discourses. In this way, they suggest an 
approach for not only analysing the transatlantic conflicts, but disputes within territories. 
However, there were not such policy discourses and dialogues in the case of Iran, as most 
of the controversies took place between governmental departments and behind closed 
doors, which in turn undermines the usefulness of the discourse approach for the case of 
Iran.  
Levidow and Carr (2009) build on the previous analysis of Murphy and Levidow (2006) 
analysing the GM food trial policy in the context of the EU to cast more light on what 
they call the democratic deficit in the EU experience. They use the concept of framing 
based on Rein and Schon’s definition as a “way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and 
making sense of a complex reality.” (Rein and Schon 1991 p. 263 cited in Levidow and 
Carr 2009, p. 38)46 Accordingly, they make a distinction between three discursive frames 
across the agro-biotechnology policy arena:  agro-biotech promoters, state bodies, and 
agro-biotech opponents, each holding different views over issues of policy making such as 
innovation and regulation, risk and sustainable agriculture, GM labelling and agricultural 
futures.  
Although this framework has proven to be useful for analysing the experience of 
European agro-biotech regulation by distinguishing between the frames of the involved 
actors, it might not be useful for developing a framework for the case of Iran, as in Iran 
the controversies were between governmental agencies without participation of other 
types of actors.  
In short, the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) literature on biotechnology and 
risk regulation started from the analysis of Wynne (1982) about the Windscale nuclear 
                                                 
46
 Although they refer to Rein and Schon 1991, it seems that there was a typographical error in the book 
because there is no such publication in 1991 by Rein and Schon; presumably the 1993 publication was 
intended  
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controversies, then shifted to applying the concept of framing assumptions to risk 
assessment experiences (Wynne 1992, Jasanoff 1993, Stirling 2008) and consequently to 
applying the concept of framing assumptions in explicating the differences between the 
outputs of risk assessments in jurisdictions, and the role of regulators in identifying or 
making explicit risk assessment policies (Millstone et al 2004, 2008). Other applications 
of the concept include: framing with regard to the contested boundaries in biotechnology 
risk assessments in the context of the EU (Levidow et al 1997), policy discourses and 
dialogues as a major source of emerging transatlantic conflicts (Murphy and Levidow 
2006), three different policy frames shaping the EU GM food trial conflicts (Levidow 
and Carr 2009), and delineating the differences between the UK, the US and Germany 
over biotechnology regulation by applying the concept of narratives (Jasanoff 2005).  
This evolution shows that the concept of framing in the literature of risk and regulation 
can also be used for a variety purposes as there is considerable flexibility in the concept of 
framing and framing assumptions. As tracing the trends of intellectual evolution shows, 
other literature strands have started to borrow the notions of frames, narratives and 
discourses from the literature of public policy to develop useful frameworks for their 
studies (such as Jasanoff 2005, Murphy and Levidow 2006 and Levidow and Carr 
2009). However, as I argued above, these literatures cannot propose a framework suitable 
for analysing the controversies and changes in the case of biosafety regulation in Iran. 
Moreever, these studies have been mainly based on national cases and differences and 
disputes between countries, without paying considerable attention to possible internal 
conflicts within countries.  
Hence, in the next section I will try to develop a framework for this study by deploying 
the insights from the literature of both public policy analysis and risk regulation as a way 
to develop a novel perspective and perhaps one that is more generalisable in comparison 
to previous work.  
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4.5. Developing a Framework 
In developing the framework, first of all I will clarify the unit of analysis with respect to 
the meaning of frame that I intend to apply, and then I will discuss the other elements of 
the framework of this study.  
4.5.1. Units of Analysis 
For the purpose of developing a useful framework focusing on the notions of frames and 
framing assumption, it is worth recapping the two broad meanings of the concept in the 
reviewed literature:  
a. Frame as a generic narrative, or a type of discourse that frames the views of 
protagonists, and which is mostly used in studies on public controversies, mainly 
following the contributions of Schon and Rein (1993, 1994, 1996) and Hajer (1993, 
1995). These notions have also been applied by scholars in the field of risk regulation 
like narratives used by Jasanoff (2005), discourses applied by Murphy and Levidow 
(2006) and frames used by Levidow and Carr (2009) to explain differences and 
conflicts over biotechnology policy and regulation.  
b. Frames as framing assumptions, broadly discussed in studies about the experience of 
risk assessments and used to explicate how these assumptions might frame the results 
of risk assessments (Wynne 1992 and Jasanoff 1993) and eventually lead to different 
regulations between countries (Millstone et al 2004, 2008). 
For the purpose of the current research, I will use the concept of a ‘framing assumption’ 
as a basic unit of analysis for several reasons that in turn might offer a novel aspect to the 
framework, as framing assumptions have not been considered as a basic concept for 
analysing regulation, but instead have mainly been used for analysing risk assessment 
experiences.  
The first reason for this lies in the difficulty of applying the concept of narratives, as the 
literature does not suggest a theoretical framework for how to use this concept for the 
purposes of analysis that render a type of exploratory research subject to interpretation. 
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As a motivation for developing a more general framework for analysing policy 
controversies, and possibly policy changes, it seems that by applying the notion of 
framing assumption and coupling it with some insights from the literature on public 
policy analysis, this objective might be realised.  
Secondly, although the concept of narratives has been applied to both the contexts of 
intra- and inter-governmental disputes, studies on biotechnology risk regulation have 
highlighted several particular framing assumptions that might also be important in the 
case of Iran, as it was a case of biotechnology and risk regulation, which might otherwise 
be overlooked.  
Thirdly, and linked to the second reason, as Schon and Rein (1996) suggest, narratives 
have a strong assumptional basis that means even when using the concept of narratives as 
the basic unit of analysis, there might be some unexplored assumptions that in turn might 
jeopardise or limit the explanatory power of the research. However, focusing on the 
framing assumptions may provide a better explanation of controversies and policy 
outcomes and probably a better understanding of the assumptional foundations of 
narratives. In addition, framing assumptions might be more easily linked and matched to 
the theories of idea-based policy analysis.  
As assumptions might be defined at several levels, i.e. individuals, groups, organisations or 
countries (Schon and Rein 1994), I will consider the assumptions of the organisations 
involved in the process of negotiation for drafting the biosafety law as the contentions 
were originally between the Ministries and organisations over the three phases of 
negotiations and behind closed doors. In this sense, I will not adopt the idea of 
considering coalitions of groups as a basic unit of analysis (e.g. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993 or Hajer 1993, 1995) because of the special structure of that policy process 
in Iran.47 
                                                 
47
 For instance, the case of conflicts in China about GM cotton and GM rice has been analysed by Keeley (2006). According to his 
analysis, there are many similarities between the structure of biotechnology in China and Iran in a way that government plays a very 
important role in biotechnology development in China and negotiations were held behind the closed doors. However, Keeley (2006) 
applied the concept of discourse coalitions to identify the groups which were joined together because of the similarity of their ideas. 
However, as I mentioned before, the case of Iran is different as it was a contention between organizations and ministries about the 
biosafety law throughout the time.  
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4.5.2. The Suggested Framework 
I have constructed a framework by borrowing from both streams of literature that in turn 
also inform my methodology. The intricacy of this work is in linking two broad sets of 
literature, each of which with its specific concerns and developed in different contexts. I 
have tried to suggest a framework that will integrate the insights of those two streams of 
literature for the purposes of identifying framing assumptions in the context of Iran.  
On one hand, I use the literature on public policy analysis to suggest a general framework 
for identifying the different aspects of the policy the definitions of which might be 
constructed based on different framing assumptions. This framework might also provide 
(partial) theoretical confidence that several relevant aspects of the policy making 
experience are considered. On the other hand, the empirical studies on risk assessment 
framing assumptions have already identified several framing assumptions in other 
countries, which could be located in the general framework resulting from public policy 
analysis literature, which in turn could provide the substance of that framework.  
For instance, in the literature on public policy analysis, Schon and Rein (1994) talk about 
differences in understandings about policy problems due to different framing 
assumptions. They also point to different understandings from problematic policy 
situations that might lead to different formulations of policy problems. This classification 
means that a researcher could search for definitions of those two elements, as a type of 
framework, to search for their underlying framing assumptions.  
This framework could be completed by locating the framing assumptions identified in the 
studies on risk assessment framing assumptions. For instance, Millstone et al (2004) 
count different assumptions about the scope of the risk as whether it is short term or long 
term, considering direct or indirect effects, and covering only target or also non-target 
organisms. These sorts of assumptions might also be present in the case of Iran, and the 
research could search for signs of similar assumptions in that context. In addition, I will 
consider a variety of possible types of assumptions in my framework.  
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In other words, my theoretical framework has two dimensions. I will use the literature on 
public policy analysis to classify the diverse aspects of policy making on which their 
definitions might be constructed based on various framing assumptions, such as what 
counts as a policy problem, and by scrutinising the definitions of those aspects, I will try 
to identify different framing assumptions. The literature on regulating biotechnology and 
risk, in complement, could help in pointing to possible framing assumptions that might 
be present in the case of Iran and therefore might lead to different definitions of the 
identified aspects of policy making.  
On this basis I suggest the following framework for characterising the policy aspects that 
might be differently understood based on different framing assumptions. I will later 
complement this framework by particular framing assumptions: 
a. The identification and characterisation of the ‘policy problem’ that needs 
to be resolved 
b. The ‘risk system’, including the risk-generating system that was accounted 
as the source of risks as well as the scope of risks that signify the border of 
causalities within that system 
c. The ‘policy prescriptions’, or the ways of addressing the problem and the 
problematic situation. 
This framework borrows from the suggestion of Hajer and Laws (2006) that a policy 
discourse constitutes three elements, reality, problems and solutions, which in turn cover 
the previous characterisations of Hajer (1993), Schon and Rein (1994) and Rein and 
Schon (1996) in which the former two point to the policy problem and policy situation, 
and the latter refers to the problem and the ways of addressing it. However, the risk 
system is similar to what Levidow et al (1997) have discussed as boundaries of causalities, 
including the scope of the risks and the risk-generating system.  
These three dimensions of policy making might be understood differently based on 
different assumptions of the contending protagonists, which in turn might affect their 
overall approach about biosafety regulation. For instance, what are the problems? What 
are the elements of the system that lead to the problems, and how are causalities defined 
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in this system? And what policy suggestions could lead to resolving the problems? All 
might be understood differently based on the different framing assumptions of the 
protagonists.  
Hence, instead of integrating them under an umbrella to call them a single policy 
discourse or narrative, I will seek to explore the various assumptions involved in defining 
each of the above policy aspects (a-c) by applying the insights of studies in the literature 
of risk regulation. For this purpose, I will try to locate the variety of framing assumptions 
identified by that literature relating to the above policy aspects (a-c), as those assumptions 
might also be present in the case of Iran. However, this does not mean that the framework 
is confined to those provisionally identified framing assumptions, but just that they 
represent some possible framing assumptions.  
1- Framing assumptions affecting definitions of policy problems:  
As a possible point of disparity, protagonists might adopt different definitions about the 
policy problems that need to be considered and addressed, due to prior framing 
assumptions. As for the case of biosafety regulation in Iran, this means that although 
different organisations negotiated over the proper biosafety law for the country, it is 
possible that they adopted different definitions of the policy problems that should be 
resolved through enacting a biosafety law. For instance, the problem might be seen by one 
Ministry as finalising a law, while for another it might be minimising the risks of 
biotechnology, or exploiting the benefits of this technology. In defining such problems, 
protagonists might have several framing assumptions that affect their formulation of the 
problem at hand. The following assumptions might be present in the case of Iran: 
a. Different assumptions about biotechnology might lead to different formulations of 
the policy problem. For instance, Jasanoff’s (2005) account of biotechnology as a 
novel product, a process or as a programme is one possibility.  
b. Even when rejecting or undermining the risks of biotechnology as a central 
assumption, some protagonists might have different assumptions that in turn affect 
their understanding of policy problems.   
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2- Framing assumptions affecting definitions of the risk system:  
A risk system is a system composed of risk-generating system as well as the scope of those 
perceived risks. This system might be understood differently by protagonists and for each 
Ministry or organisation, some elements might be perceived as more important than 
others, and the roles of those elements might also be envisaged differently. Two parts of 
this risk system are particularly important, the sub-system that is believed to contribute to 
generating risks, and the sub-system that is impinged by the impacts of those perceived 
risks and the causalities that define the border of impacts (i.e. scope of risks). Therefore, 
this system covers several socio-technical and ecological elements, and could be 
understood differently because of the adoption of different framing assumptions by 
protagonists, such as:  
a. Assumptions that organisations adopt about each other (e.g. Wynne 1982) 
b. Ideas about future uses of products in the system: for export or for domestic use  
c. Assumptions about the causalities within the system, as referred to by Levidow et al 
(1997), or what Millstone et al (2004) count as the scope of the physical risks 
including risks to the human health as well as environment 
d. Another scope of risks could be political, social or cultural risks, in addition to the 
physical risks, which are discussed by Jasanoff (1995) 
e. Assumptions about external contexts such as understanding of other countries’ 
approaches, the role and interpretation of CPB and so on  
f. Other possible assumptions in envisaging the socio-technical system and its borders 
that I will try to identify, such as the importance of considering Iran as a developing 
country and its different possible interpretations.  
3- Framing assumptions affecting definitions of policy prescriptions:  
Even if the antagonists have similar ideas about the risk system and policy problems, there 
might still be differences in their views on how to address policy problems in that 
particular situation because of the adoption of different framing assumptions. These 
assumptions could be:  
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a. Which structural mechanism should be applied for managing and administrating 
biosafety in order to confront the problem. Figure 3-6 in the previous chapter 
provides an account of the assumptions behind those models in terms of the 
assumptions about: 
i. Whether or not science and scientific judgments are neutral  
ii. Whether or not science can provide sufficient answers to policy 
problems 
b. Assumptions about the benchmark of decision making (for instance whether to trade 
off risks and benefits, or how to do that in terms of distributional comparisons, 
minimising risk, or maximising benefits), which in turn suggest how to confront the 
problem.  
4- Other assumptions: 
Although I have tried to construct a framework including most of the relevant literature, 
there might be other assumptions that cannot be captured by those categories. Therefore, 
the data analysis will remain open-ended. 
4.6. Research Methodology 
The methodology applied to the current research is largely determined by my theoretical 
framework, along with the empirical topic as well as the selected context. After explaining 
the scope of the research including the actors to be considered and the time span of the 
study, I will discuss the data requirements, data collection and data analysis accordingly in 
this section.  
4.6.1. Actors 
The four most prominent Governmental organisations in the Iranian regulatory system 
vis-à-vis biosafety are: the Department of Environment (DoE), the Ministry of Health 
(MoH), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and the Ministry of Science (MoS). The 
DoE has been involved in the issue since Iran’s ratification of the Biodiversity Convention 
in 1996. In January 2006, this department was selected as the office of the secretariat for 
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the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) by the Cabinet, and the head of that office was 
also the senior representative of the DoE to the Coordinating Committee (CC) sessions.   
The MoS has a large institute of genetic engineering and biotechnology named the 
National Institute of Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (NIGEB), which works on 
the development of biotechnology fields including medical biotechnology, plant 
biotechnology, animal and marine biotechnology, industrial and environmental 
biotechnology and basic sciences. This institute was established in 1989 to work on both 
medical and agricultural biotechnology and the senior representative of this Ministry to 
the CC sessions was a chief scientist from that institute who was also the chair of an 
biosafety committee within NIGEB.  
The MoA is the main body responsible for providing agricultural goods and helping 
Iranian farmers, who mainly work on their own farms. The Agricultural Biotechnology 
Research Institute of Iran (ABRII) of this Ministry, which was established in 1983, was 
the place in which the Iranian GM rice was first developed in 2004. ABRII is the relevant 
institution in the MoA that has been involved in drafting the biosafety law in Iran, and 
the senior representatives of the MoA on the CC was the head of this institute, receiving 
advice from its many other biotechnological experts.  
The MoH conducts substantial research activities in medical biotechnology. The Pasteur 
Institute is the leading organisation in developing biotechnological medicines in Iran. 
This Ministry was also involved in the biosafety law drafting process from the outset. 
The Pasteur Institute of Iran mainly handles the biosafety issues in this Ministry, and the 
senior representative of this Ministry to the sessions of the CC was a chief biotechnology 
scientist from this institute.  
4.6.2. Time Span 
Although the CPB was ratified by the Iranian Parliament in August 2003, the 
controversies about biosafety regulation did not officially emerge until 2006, when the 
DoE invited other organisations to present their views in the negotiating sessions over a 
draft biosafety law. Thereafter, different organisations put forward their opinions about 
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biosafety and the necessary legislation, which in turn generated increasing controversy 
about the content of the biosafety law. In Chapter 2, when describing the context, I 
elaborated on the two periods of historical debate over biosafety, before and after 2006, 
and this research will focus on the second period, from April 2006 until the passing of 
the law by the Parliament in May 2009. This period is itself composed of three stages of 
negotiations, namely the CC sessions, the Reviewing Committee (RC) sessions and the 
Parliamentary sessions. The empirical chapters will therefore be organised to cover those 
periods in chronological order.  
4.6.3. Data Sources 
Patton (2002) counts three different sources of qualitative data, which are: 1) interviews, 
2) documents, and 3) observations. I shall use all three types of sources for the purpose of 
the current research.  
Documents include inter- and intra-departmental letters, the formally presented opinions 
of the relevant organisations that mainly came out after a two-day gathering about the 
biosafety law (which was held just after the end of the CC sessions to finalise the draft 
law), internal reports, and other formal and informal hand-written and typed papers, 
along with public and media interviews by institutional actors.  
I also conducted several interviews over two periods. The first round of interviews was 
conducted in summer 2008 when the draft law was sent to Parliament, and the second 
round in summer 2009 when the law was passed by Parliament. In each period, I 
interviewed senior representatives of each of the four organisations.  
Although I observed the behaviour of the organisations during the period of research to 
some extent, my main source of observation was the official voice recordings of the 
negotiating sessions, including the tapes of the CC sessions, the tapes of the two-day 
gathering, the tape of the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) session and the tapes of 
the RC sessions. Listening to the opinions and arguments of the organisations over nearly 
30 sessions provided a rich source of data to identify and analyse the framing 
assumptions.  
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4.6.4. Process of Data Collection 
I conducted the first round of interviews and data gathering in summer 2008. During that 
period, I contacted senior representatives of the four organisations and obtained some 
initial documents, as well as conducting interviews with them. However, the main task of 
data collection was carried out in summer 2009 when I went to Iran to complete 
gathering the required data.  
In this second period, I was looking for more data about the perspectives of the 
protagonists on the biosafety law, especially their opinions as presented in the different 
sessions over the legislation of biosafety. I asked the protagonists to allow me access to 
the records of the negotiating sessions. In addition to these efforts, I also tried to develop 
closer connections to the protagonists to establish a form of participant observation 
looking at their general approaches and asking some questions about the biosafety law at 
different opportunities.  
As a result of interactions with the MoH, I established a very close connection with the 
main contact in this Ministry who had been involved in the biosafety legislation process. I 
met him frequently in that period, each time asking for more information relevant to my 
project, or my dissertation. He helped considerably in accessing the letters and documents 
of this Ministry.  
During this time, Agricultural Biotechnology Research Institute of Iran (ABRII), the 
biotechnological research centre of MoA, held a course on risk assessment and its rules 
and guidelines. Registering for this three-day programme, I visited ABRII and asked new 
questions of the head of this department as the main person involved in the process of 
legislation. Moreover, I was then able to access more documents, especially the Ministry’s 
reports concerning different versions of the draft biosafety law. Last but not least, the 
institute presented their opinions on risk assessment and risk management in the course 
sessions, especially on the first day, which provided substantial information on how they 
see and analyse biosafety.  
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Another opportunity was provided by the representative of the MoH; I was invited by a 
chief biotechnological expert in the MoS, who represented the views of this Ministry in 
the legislative process, to present my initial findings as a keynote paper in the Sixth 
National Congress on Biotechnology in Iran, the most important scientific event in this 
field, held every two years. This event gave me the opportunity to participate in a three-
day programme, talking with different biotechnological experts. Intriguingly, I found 
many experts working in universities to be agnostic about the process of biosafety 
legislation in the country, while at the same time I was able to ask more questions of 
representatives of the involved Ministries with respect to my work. Consequently I was 
able to go to an office in the MoS which held several important documents of which I 
was able to obtain copies.    
In parallel, I tried to convince the DoE, as the office of the secretariat of the NBC, to 
allow me access to the voice recordings of the negotiation sessions. After two months of 
negotiating with DoE, alongside testing other informal linkages, the head of the office 
finally allowed me to go to DoE and listen to the cassette recordings, without permission 
to take them away or copy them. As a result, I spent around three weeks going to the 
office of the secretariat to listen to and make notes about the sessions. Incidentally, during 
these three weeks I became familiar with the DoE’s everyday work. Eventually, and 
possibly because of a change of the head of the DoE, the head of the office let me copy 
the voice recordings as an original source of data, covering almost all the negotiation 
sessions.  
4.6.5. Data Analysis 
In applying my theoretical framework, I will look for definitions of policy problems and 
definitions of the risk system as well as policy prescriptions to identify the possible 
framing assumptions. In this way, the suggested theoretical framework should be helpful 
in analysing data. It points to the dimensions of the policy that might indicate or reveal 
different framing assumptions. Therefore, I will look for indications of assumptions 
defining the risk system, policy problems or the prescriptions for resolving problems. 
Searching for definitions of those three elements could be seen as a search at the general 
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level in comparison to the parallel search, in which I will search for any sense of the 
identified framing assumptions in the literature of biotechnology risk regulation to find 
out whether or not they, or similar notions, were present in the case of Iran. This could be 
seen as a search at particular levels. Thus, the movement from general definitions to 
particular assumptions can be complemented by the parallel movement from particular 
assumptions to general definitions, which together might yield a convergent analysis or 
facilitate triangulation.  
Further, I shall consider the approach of Levidow et al (1997) indicating that the framing 
assumptions might be found in the highly contested boundary issues, and will consider 
the controversies that erupted (not just related to boundary issues) during the sessions as 
a main place that might reveal further framing assumptions. However, this does not 
undermine the importance of considering all the debates and discussions throughout the 
sessions, rather than just focusing on the disputes that erupted.   
I will conduct this analysis at three different stages of the negotiations. I will first analyse 
the first round of negotiations, including the CC sessions and the subsequent two-day 
gathering that ended without any clear result. I will similarly analyse the NBC sessions as 
well as the RC sessions as the second stage of negotiations, and then I will similarly 
analyse the available data for the third stage of Parliamentary discussions.  
Thus, for each stage I will have a table, similar to Table 4-1, which is the simplified 
diagrammatic representation of key elements of my framework, including the framing 
assumptions of the organisations with regard to policy problems, the risk system, and the 
prescriptions for resolving problems. Populating the empty cells of the table will provide 
a set of resources concerning to what extent these organisations hold different framing 
assumptions that in turn may provide an explanation of the controversies. 
The differences between the framing assumptions should suggest the degree to which 
framing assumptions might have underlain the controversies. The results of the analysis 
will show the extent and degree of differences and will highlight the points where the 
contrasts are sharper. In connection to the background picture represented in Chapter 2 
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about the context of other countries, similarities to and differences from the debates of 
those countries may also emerge at the end.  
Table 4- 1 A sample of data analysis table 
 MoH MoS MoA DoE 
Assumptions affecting understandings of the nature of 
policy problems 
    
Assumptions affecting defining the risk system     
Assumptions influencing the policy prescriptions      
Other     
Finally, a comparison of evolving versions of the table as a result of analysing three 
rounds of negotiations will be used for analysing the dynamics of the process. I will 
compare the versions of the table to find possible changes in framing assumptions and 
their possible connections to changes in the policy outputs. If I find a considerable change 
in the framing assumptions that could help to explain changes in the policy outputs, the 
question will then be why and how those framing assumptions have changed, and also 
why the controversies were not resolved if the framing assumptions changed. If I find that 
the framing assumptions remained unchanged, then the question would be why policy 
outputs changed while framing assumptions remained unchanged. 
In the next three empirical chapters, I will discuss the three stages of negotiations 
respectively, trying to identify the diversity of the protagonists’ framing assumptions in 
order to populate the analytical table and characterise its cells, which in turn might help 
find the answers to the research questions and the factors underlying policy controversies 
and policy changes in the context of biosafety policy making in Iran.   
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 Chapter 5. The first phase of negotiations: Coordination Committee and 
Two-Day gathering, May-December 2006 
5.1. Introduction 
As stated in the final part of the previous chapter, the aim of the remaining empirical 
inquiries is twofold: to explain the controversies as well as the policy outputs through 
eliciting the framing assumptions of the four major organisations involved in the process, 
i.e. MoA, MoS, MoH and DoE.  
The current chapter examines the first stage of the negotiations towards the biosafety 
legislation, which lasted nearly eight months from May to December 2006, chaired by the 
head of the office of the secretariat of the NBC located in the DoE, who at the same time 
was representing the views of the DoE. Therefore, I shall refer to the chair of the sessions 
and the head of the office interchangeably.  
In this phase, representatives of the organisations participated in the negotiations, called 
the Coordination Committee (CC) sessions. The invited organisations at the beginning 
were: the Ministry of Trade (MoT), the Ministry of Industry (MoI) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) as well as the four major organisations mentioned above. The 
MoT and the MoI were only participating in the sessions to be informed about the 
content of the future law;48 and the MoFA was mainly concerned with the international 
aspects of biosafety regulation with respect to Iran’s commitments to the CPB. However, 
the representative of the MoFA was nonetheless involved in the more sophisticated levels 
of discussion mainly because of his personal interests.49 The MoA, MoH and MoS sent 
biotechnology experts from their biotech research centres as their senior representatives.  
Therefore, concentrating on the main four organisations of the study, in this chapter I am 
going to discuss the relationships between framing assumptions and the controversies as 
well as the policy output of this stage. For this purpose, I will first elaborate the 
administrative and procedural features of the negotiations that were mainly articulated in 
                                                 
48
 This is what their representatives indicated in interviews. The voice recordings of the sessions also confirm that they had not been 
involved in the topics.  
49
 However, the MoFA did not participate in the later stages of negotiations (i.e. Reviewing Committee).  
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the first session of the CC. In the light of this characterisation, I will show how the main 
points of disagreement were postponed by the chair of the session to the two-day 
gathering, which was held after ten sessions of the CC.  
I will then turn to the two-day gathering which was mainly aimed at finalising the draft 
law as the next step. This congregation ended with clashes between the members without 
any clear result. Elaborating the successive sessions of the two-day gathering, I will 
delineate the main points of conflict and show how the members could not proceed 
beyond Article 3 of the 20 articles of the draft law, at which point disputes erupted on 
the second day and continued up to the point when the members decided to leave the 
session. 
I will concentrate on framing assumptions to show how some important and different 
framing assumptions underlay the disagreements between Ministries and departments. I 
will use a variety of relevant data sources, like documents and letters published before and 
after the two-day gathering, in addition to the voice recordings of the sessions. In some 
contexts, it has not been possible to identify the framing assumption of a certain 
organisation vis-à-vis a specific topic. This is partly because the representatives preferred 
to stay silent in certain debates, while the available documents up to that point also may 
not be adequate for extracting their framing assumptions on that particular topic. For 
instance, the MoA did not enter into the discussion over the opening clauses of the law, 
which in turn posed a difficulty in understanding its assumption about biotechnology.  
Therefore, the partly-elaborated table at the end of this chapter remains incomplete. Its 
empty cells will be populated in subsequent chapters, some in the elaboration of the NBC 
committee and the Reviewing Committee (RC), and some through using the information 
that has come from interviews and documents.  Finally, I will discuss the extent to which 
the framing assumptions can contribute to explaining the policy output of this stage.  
5.2. Overall procedural and administrative features 
The CC was an intermediate committee between the NBC and the Ministries and 
organisations before 2006. This committee was composed of representatives of the 
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Ministries and organisations and its purpose was to discuss various issues pertaining to 
biosafety. The new office of the secretariat in the DoE asked other Ministries to 
introduce their new senior representatives to the CC to work on drafting the law that 
incorporated their variety of perspectives.  
After ten sessions to discuss the draft, the members came together in a two-day gathering 
to finalise it. However, that gathering ended with clashes between members without any 
clear result over the draft law. In the following parts of this chapter, I will highlight the 
procedural and administrative features of those sessions. Five characteristics of the 
sessions are imperative in gaining a better understanding of the procedural and 
administrative processes.  
5.2.1. Discussing a preliminary draft as the memorandum of meetings 
The first point refers to the memorandum of the sessions. In the first session, all 
Ministries endorsed the decision of the office to bring Ministries and the DoE together 
for the sake of incorporating different views of the biosafety law. Consequently, the 
members suggested not wasting time on the previous drafts prepared in the individual 
organisations. Instead, they asked four people – none of them formally representing a 
Ministry – to prepare a preliminary draft as the basis for discussions in the future 
sessions. 
This team spent a great deal of time over a fortnight (between the first session, which was 
held on 24 May and the second one on 7 June 2006) to produce a new and preliminary 
draft as the basis of discussions in the future CC sessions. Consequently, this draft shaped 
the memorandum of the meetings (MOM), based on which the members took part in the 
sessions, read clause by clause, put forward their opinions  and sometimes continued 
discussing over the challenging points.  
5.2.2. Rush over finalising the draft by the chair of the sessions 
The second point was the office of the secretariat’s hurry to stop various discussions and 
finalise the draft as soon as possible. The urgency for finalising the draft was reflected in 
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the opening speech of the head of the office in the first session of the CC held on 24 May 
2006. He argued that:  
• The most important task was finalising the draft law as soon as possible.  
• There seemed to be few previous draft versions, prepared by MoS and DoE.  
• It was undesirable to start the work from beginning; instead, the current available 
drafts could form a starting point.  
• It might therefore not be necessary to go through the details to finalise the draft.  
• He hoped that after four sessions, not only a general agreement would have been 
reached, but also that considerable materials would have been prepared to be 
approved by the NBC. 
• On that basis, he hoped to be able to hold the NBC session within two months.50  
During later sessions, the head of the office continued to emphasise the necessity of 
finalising the draft as soon as possible. Further, whenever a serious or basic discussion 
arose, the head of the office tried to bring it to an end, sometimes by pointing to the 
sufficiency of the discussion, sometimes by claiming that there was no substantial 
difference between contested points, sometimes by postponing the issue, promising it 
could be discussed by more detail at the two-day gathering, and sometimes by pretending 
that the arguments were complementary to each other.  
The sessions of the CC were replete with examples of interventions by the chair of the 
session mainly for the sake of ending debates. For instance, at the start of the second 
session, a member read the suggested text for the opening clauses of the draft as: 
“although modern biotechnology bears certain benefits for humans, we should not forget 
the possible hazards of this technology…”51 A biotechnological scientist who was not a 
formal representative of an involved organisation, but an expert who had been invited to 
participate in the negotiations, stated that “this type of beginning might not be 
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appropriate because it directly expresses concerns about biotechnology, while we know 
that biotechnology development is also among the goals of the country.”52  
The MoFA replied that this reflected a general principle of the CPB with respect to 
biotechnology, and the MoS suggested that it may be better to first list the benefits of 
biotechnology and then move onto safety concerns. Discussions continued over whether 
or not this would be a good opening statement, until the chair of the session interrupted 
them by saying: “although I know having deep discussions would be helpful, we should 
consider the time as well. We need to finalise the law as soon as possible. Having 
expressed these concerns, I would suggest the members of the team who prepared this 
preliminary draft to sit down and revise the opening clauses again. So let’s move to the 
next part of the draft.”53 This type of intervention happened frequently. 
5.2.3. No proper acknowledgement of controversies by the office 
In relation to the previous point about the rush over finalising the law, the office of the 
secretariat located in the DoE to a large extent denied or perhaps did not recognise the 
existence of principle disagreements and the many diverse framing assumptions. I was able 
to access an interesting document prepared by the office that shows how the office 
articulated the different opinions of the organisations, but did not point to their framing 
assumptions, after the clashes of the two-day gathering.54 This document tried to 
highlight the differences between organisations and is divided into several parts; the first 
section is titled “general principles”. Other parts of this document listed the opinions of 
the Ministries as well as the DoE over provisions of the draft, such as the location of the 
office, the process of authorisation for releases, prosecutions and so on. In the first section 
about the general principles, the document merely stated:  
“MoA: 
1- The law should cover and fill our current legal gaps 
2- It should not contradict the current duties of organisations 
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3- It must not create an overlap between responsibilities of organisations or shift the 
duties from one organisation to another 
4- The law should not be reduced to operational rules 
5- The duties suggested for organisations by the CPB need to be considered.   
MoH:  
1- The law should not become a barrier in the way of research”55. 
However, the document provided no other information about, or characterisations of the 
approaches of those Ministries. This primarily shows that the office did not acknowledge 
the principal differences in perspective between the Ministries and the DoE, even after the 
big clash at the end of the two-day gathering.  
5.2.4. Lack of sufficient discussion over the meaning of biosafety 
Fourthly, the members did not use their time to discuss their understandings of biosafety. 
It is intriguing for me to see how they wasted a great deal of time in the sessions without 
discussing biosafety in any detail. The roots of this phenomenon can also be traced to the 
first session. After agreeing to discuss the preliminary draft to be developed by the 
independent team, the MoS suggested identifying the general principles (or what it called 
a framework) in the remaining time of the first session as an intellectual input for the 
independent team. For this Ministry, the ultimate requirement was having a clear 
understanding of the definition of biosafety in particular, as well other definitions 
required for developing the draft.  
The MoS then went on to propose its own suggestion about the meaning of biosafety by 
defining which matters were to be included as biosafety. Meanwhile, the MoH changed 
the topic from defining biosafety to remarking on the differences between organisations, 
by pointing that the “definition of biosafety might be different in the Ministries and 
organisations involved. This fact calls for the necessity of holding a session within which 
every department present its own perspective on biosafety. A general agreement in that 
                                                 
55
 Ibid 
  
92 
session could lay the foundations for writing the draft.”56  This suggestion by the MoH 
was rejected by the other members, who mainly pointed out that this process would be 
time-consuming and might even lead to substantial disputes.  
Members subsequently agreed to adopt the definitions of the CPB as the basic definitions 
of the preliminary draft. After this, there was little discussion over the definition of 
biosafety.  
5.2.5. Consensus-based decision making 
The last but not the least point is regarding the general presumption by all members that 
every decision should be based on a consensus. However, there was no clear mechanism 
for obtaining consensus; instead, consensus would be obtained if there was no clear 
opposition in the session.  
Now I turn to the next section; for this purpose I will concentrate on the two-day 
gathering for two reasons. Firstly, many issues were postponed by the chair of the CC 
sessions who promised that they could be discussed in more detail at the two-day 
gathering. As a result, members generally ceased seriously pursuing the debates in the CC 
meetings. The second reason, which has to do more with the practicalities of writing a 
dissertation, lies in the fact that it would not be possible to present and elaborate all the 
data (ten sessions of the CC, each around two and a half hours, and eleven successive 
sessions of the two-day gathering, each close to two hours) in an empirical chapter.  
5.3. Framing Assumptions 
This section is organised in a way that first of all provides a general introduction to the 
two-day gathering, followed by highlighting three important framing assumptions which 
were reflected in three heated and unexpected disputes among the members.  
The purpose of the two-day gathering was to finalise the draft to be passed to the Cabinet 
and finally to Parliament. The head of the DoE joined the beginning of the session and 
delivered a short speech to show her respect for what she called the “sincere efforts” of 
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the representatives of Ministries and organisations in drafting the law. Praising the 
participants as experts in this field, she asked them to craft a draft that met the following 
criteria:  
- be finalised as quickly as possible  
- be a facilitator of research and development of biotechnology 
- consider the monitoring aspect of biosafety according to the CPB 
- empower the government with sufficient information vis-à-vis 
biotechnological activities in the country 
These statements show that potential imports were not at the centre of concerns and of 
the biosafety law, at least for the DoE at this stage. However, the data on the next stages 
of negotiations also confirm that there were no disputes over imports and the necessity of 
checking and testing imported crops, nor were there discussions about how Iran should 
conduct this process.  
Three intriguing disputes provide the context from which I shall elicit three sets of 
framing assumptions:57 1) an unexpected debate over the opening clauses of the law, 
which lasted nearly two hours, while the head of office had initially suggested eliminating 
discussion of this part; 2) an emergent challenge between the MoS and the MoH on one 
side and the MoA, the MoFA and the DoE on the other regarding the differences 
between field trials and experimental releases, which took more than one and a half hours, 
a topic that the head of the office had asked be discussed in one minute; and 3) the 
controversies over the location of the office of the secretariat, which lasted half a day and 
finally ended with clashes between members precluding any agreement.  
As I mentioned earlier in my analytical framework, it could have been expected that the 
members would differently envisage the policy problems, the risk system (including the 
risk-generating system and scope of risks) and other causalities within this system as well 
as policy prescriptions for addressing problems according to their different framing 
assumptions. The result of the analysis of this stage of negotiations reveals that, with 
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respect to the above three elements of policy making, members held substantially diverse 
sets of framing assumptions, as set out below.  
5.3.1. Safety or harm in biotechnology as an assumption in defining the policy problem 
Contrasting the principal assumptions with regard to the safety or harm of biotechnology 
generated two entirely different views towards the policy problem. On one hand, there 
was a view proposing that biotechnology should be considered as safe unless evidence of 
harm emerged. The supporters of this view were the MoH and the MoS. On the other 
hand, the DoE held the view that biotechnology should be considered harmful and that 
for each GM crop, proof of safety would be necessary before authorisation. For the 
former (i.e. MoS and MoH), biotechnology was considered like other technologies that 
might pose some risks and harm, while for the latter (i.e. DoE) biotechnology was 
basically seen a hazard. The data on the view of the MoA were not sufficient at this stage. 
These assumptions to a large extent shaped the perceptions of the antagonists over the 
policy problem that needed to be addressed by the biosafety law. Considering 
biotechnology as a source of harm or perceiving it as a normal form of technology largely 
affected the understanding of the protagonists of the problems that needed to be 
addressed by the biosafety law. In this sense, for the DoE the policy problem was 
biotechnology itself, while for the MoS and the MoH, the problem was essentially 
biotechnology development, considering its possible negative effects.  
This could explain why the MoH complained about the opening clauses of the draft, 
although it was not a part of the formal law, arguing: “the current opening clauses give a 
sense of restriction and fear of biotechnology. This needs to be changed by referring not 
only to the national biotechnology plan, but also to the importance of biotechnology 
development for the country, as well as the other achievements of this field.” 58 
The MoS endorsed the view of the MoH, suggesting that there was a need to emphasise 
the importance of biotechnology development, particularly stressing its important 
position in National Development Programmes such as the five year plan of the country. 
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Moreover, this Ministry condemned talking much about possible hazards in the opening 
statements of the draft because “it produces a sense that biotechnology is harmful, while 
this technology is not harmful in itself. ‘Hazards’ should be replaced by ‘possible risks’ 
that might arise from reproduction or release of modified organisms.”59 
On the other hand, the DoE stressed that the duty of the current committee was the 
development of a draft biosafety law, not the development of biotechnology. For the 
DoE, the essential element of the introduction to the draft was to highlight the 
importance of a precautionary approach as a general principle for confronting possible 
hazards.  
The statements quoted above convey important indications about the framing 
assumptions of those organisations. On one hand, MoH and MoS argued that 
biotechnology is not essentially hazardous; therefore the draft should not take hazards, 
problems and precautions seriously. Instead, the opening clauses should emphasise the 
importance of biotechnology as a vital technology for development and the progress of 
nation. In contrast, the view of DoE was characterised by fears of biotechnology as 
something that engenders hazards, and the idea that biosafety is necessary in order to 
minimise these hazards.  
Members did not, however, spend considerable time discussing those assumptions about 
biotechnology, notwithstanding the fact that they held entirely different assumptions. 
They occasionally came across this issue in their discussions to argue whether 
biotechnology is safe or hazardous, but they did not directly debate the topic. A 
noteworthy instance in the two-day gathering was when the members were talking about 
objectives of the law; a biotechnological expert who was not representing any organisation 
but was participating as a guest, objected: “the statements all bear a negative sense about 
biotechnology. It is like there is a hazard there and we all are trying to fight this hazard.”60 
The MoFA replied: “this is because it is not still proven that biotechnology is safe.”61 
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Whereupon the MoS exclaimed: “also it is not yet proven that it is harmful.”62 This 
disagreement provoked laughter among the other members and remained unresolved.  
However, presuming biotechnology is something hazardous or something that might bear 
risks would have substantial impacts on the perceptions of the policy problem and thus 
the general approach of the biosafety law. As that expert mentioned, “is biotechnology 
something negative we are going to fight with, or it is something positive we are going to 
use in a secure way?”63 Referring to the contrasting views above, if biotechnology is 
hazardous, this would be the problem itself, while if biotechnology is something 
beneficial associated with occasional possible risks, the problem would be identifying and 
addressing those risks, not confronting biotechnology more generally. Moreover, these 
assumptions about biotechnology have important implications for the implementation of 
the law and the required evidence, which I will turn to in later chapters.  
5.3.2. Risk system: are research and researchers part of a risk-generating system? 
Including or excluding research activities as a part of the system that might generate risk 
was also a topic for controversies that reflected different views amongst the antagonists 
about the risk-generating system. In this respect, the MoS and the MoH shared the 
assumption that research would not be a source of risk as researchers would take 
sufficient protective measures. On the other hand, the DoE and the MoA were immensely 
concerned about the possible risks that might arise in the process of research. 
The MoS argued that researchers should be able to bring their scientific experiments to 
the level of farms free from biosafety regulation, as this stage of research aims to explore 
the characteristics of the modified organisms aside from their interaction with the 
environment. For instance, a researcher may need to plant 300 lines of variety of crops to 
find out which one satisfies his desired characteristic. For the MoS, a field trial was a type 
of research within which the researcher should be free to undertake experiments on 
various lines to find out which ones work. At that stage, the researcher has no products to 
sell or distribute. Observing interaction with the environment is an activity that should be 
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done for successful lines at a later stage. The MoH also supported this view by portraying 
researchers as the best people to know how to safely carry out their research. 
On the opposing side, however, the MoA warned that ‘field trials’ are a type of product 
release because there is the possibility of transferring genes into the environment. 
Therefore, an examination of the characteristics of the crop needs to be performed in a 
contained environment to permit the control of relevant variables; otherwise, interaction 
and gene flow might occur in the experimental phases that in turn might pose substantial 
problems and even harm. The MoA stressed that research activities could be a source of 
risk, especially if the researchers failed to provide satisfactory safety measures in their 
work. On this basis, the MoA felt that the biosafety law should be clear about research 
activities by clarifying the requirements of the research. The DoE also backed the view of 
the MoA by pointing to the possibilities of gene transfer and consequent problems that 
might arise during research.  
This debate had also occurred, though to a lesser extent, in the sixth session of the CC. 
When the MoH asked for an exemption of research from the law, the MoA pointed to 
the problems that might arise in the process of research. For the MoA, there was no basis 
for trusting researchers because the quality of research could not be guaranteed all over 
the country. The representative of MoA revealed his concern particularly for research that 
might be undertaken in low-quality labs, for instance those that are located in poor 
universities, as a possible important source of risk. However, the MoH claimed that there 
would be no problem as laboratories maintain certain safety levels (levels 1 to 3), and 
safety personnel always check these requirements.  
In short, substantial controversies over whether or not research needed to be covered by 
the law were associated with a central assumption: whether the law should be drafted 
based on an assumption of trust of research activities, or whether it should be written 
presuming research to be a source of potential risk. In the next chapter, I will discuss this 
issue in more detail in the light of new data from the second stage of negotiations.  
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5.3.3. The roles and responsibilities of biotechnology experts in policy prescription 
Different suggestions of ways of dealing with and addressing the policy problem, as the 
third element of my framework, point to a sharp distinction between the framing 
assumptions of the members, which was manifested in a debate over the proper role of 
biotechnological experts in different activities pertaining to biosafety regulation and 
aimed at avoiding or resolving policy problems. Different views of the protagonists over 
this issue were impregnated with various framing assumptions, including the sufficiency of 
biotechnology science in answering all risk policy problems as well as the neutrality of 
their judgments and opinions. These two assumptions are the ones I used to distinguish 
between the technocracy, decisionism and co-evolutionary models in Chapter 3.  
In the case of Iran, the debates over the role of science were reflected in debates over the 
role of biotechnology experts in the process of legislation and implementation. These 
could be classified in terms of: 1) the extent to which biotechnological experts should 
play a role in drafting the biosafety law; 2) the extent of the role of biotechnological 
experts in setting standards, like standards of handling GMO transportation; 3) the role 
of biotechnological experts in implementing the law and in risk assessment and risk 
management; 4) the role of experts in enforcing the law to make sure it is properly 
obeyed; and 5) the role of experts in making overall policies of the country with respect 
to biosafety (as members of the NBC).  
Linked to this categorisation, another important set of framing assumptions concerned 
the extent to which the protagonists believed in the necessity of a separation between 
promotional roles and regulatory responsibilities, including the five roles mentioned 
above. It is worth noting here that according to the institutionalisation of biotechnology 
in Iran that was described in Chapter 2, the biotechnological experts of the MoA, the 
MoS and the MoH were among the few eligible experts who could contribute to the risk 
assessment, but were also the people who were involved in promotional activities.  
In the view of the DoE, having authority over the office of the secretariat was perceived to 
be the critical feature of biosafety regulation. An indication of this perceived importance 
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can be found in the statements of the representative of this department in the two-day 
gathering, such as: “in our view, all biosafety is about the location of the office of the 
secretariat, what was the root of many disputes in the past.”64  
The DoE placed critical importance on the separation of promotional activities (which 
are done in other Ministries) and regulatory responsibilities. On this basis, the DoE 
stated: “the controlling dimension of biosafety is very clear. This department is not 
involved in biotechnology development and therefore should be the responsible 
organisation for biosafety to monitor and control biotechnology. Thus, the office of the 
secretariat must be in the DoE.”65 The interpretation of these comments could be that the 
DoE conceived biosafety as controlling biotechnology activities, a task that needed to be 
removed from the organisations working on biotechnology development, and located in a 
body with environmental protection high on its agenda.  
On this basis, the DoE did not agree with the suggestion that other Ministries should be 
involved in the authorisation of releases. Their view on this topic is reflected in a 
document prepared by the office after the two-day gathering. In the section about 
responsibilities, the document summarised the view of the DoE as: “the office should be 
the only Competent National Authority (CNA) to receive all requests, and, if necessary, 
send them to other Ministries to get their advice and finally issue authorisation.”66 That is 
to say, the role of biotechnological experts and their biotech research centres in other 
Ministries was perceived by the DoE as merely having a role as advisors to come into play 
at the discretion of the office. Another ramification of this view is that it implies a 
complete separation between organizations with promotional responsibilities, which could 
provide advice for risk assessment, and the regulatory jobs such as authorisation and 
enforcing the law.  
Incorporating biotechnological experts into the process of drafting the law could be a sign 
that the DoE perceived a role for them in this area, because the DoE initiated the CC 
sessions by inviting senior representatives of other Ministries. An alternative explanation 
could be that the DoE had not thought out its position in advance of convening the CC. 
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The documentation also suggests that in the view of the DoE, biotechnological experts 
should have nothing to do with determining overall policies of the country to become 
part of the NBC.  
The MoH held a view very close to the technocratic model, although it might not be 
characterised entirely as technocratic view. For this Ministry, not only drafting the 
biosafety law but also implementing the law and making proper policies for biosafety fell 
within the territory of biotechnology science. On the first day of the two-day gathering, 
this Ministry stressed: “because the field of biosafety is essentially sophisticated, 
regulations have to be drafted by modern biotechnology experts.”67  Further, on the 
subject of who should take the leading role with respect to implementing the law, the 
MoH emphasised the central role of biotechnological experts in a letter to the office of 
the secretariat on 13 August 2006, before the two-day gathering.  In one paragraph, the 
letter underlined the essential role of biotechnological experts and in another paragraph, it 
argued that all implementation and management duties should be delegated to these 
experts, stating that: “operational activities in relation to management, control, 
monitoring and assessment in principle should obviously be carried out by Ministerial 
committees because of their expertise in this area, and hence they should be considered 
Competent National Authorities (CNA).”68 This Ministry endorsed the suggestion that 
even the NBC should incorporate some biotechnological experts into its composition. As 
a result, for this Ministry there was no need to consider any separation or conflict 
between bodies with promotional responsibilities and those with regulatory 
responsibilities.69  
Available documents suggest that the MoS, much like the MoH, held a model very close 
to the technocratic model at that stage of negotiations in considering an ultimate role for 
biotechnological experts at different stages of decision making. There is a document from 
the office which summarises the opinions of the MoS at the start of the CC sessions. 70 In 
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terms of identifying the members of the NBC, the MoS suggested adding three 
outstanding biotechnological experts as well as the representative of the biosafety society 
of Iran as a scientific community to provide sound scientific information for other 
members of the NBC, which could be composed of relevant Ministers as well as the 
President or the First Deputy. This shows that in the view of this Ministry, biotechnology 
scientists should play an important role in national policy-making, though they could not 
be given the full authority to do this job.  
With respect to implementing the law, the MoS stressed several times that decisions 
about research activities should not be included under biosafety, unless the researchers 
want to release a product. The MoS suggested that the law should empower the CC as 
the body that takes decisions over the release of GM products, which would encompass a 
mix of scientific representatives of Ministries involved in the promotion of biotechnology 
and representatives of other Ministries and organisations that might not be experts in the 
field. Incorporating biotechnology science at all stages of decision making denotes that 
for the MoS, the separation between promotional responsibilities and regulatory 
responsibilities was not necessary, yet the MoS strongly supported the view that 
biotechnological scientists should be present at all stages of decision making.  
The view of the MoA resembles a type of Weberian decisionist policy making model, 
which on one hand emphasises the necessity of having scientific experts in 
implementation and on the other hand calls for goal setting by politicians. On this basis, 
the MoA stressed that the implementation of the law, including authorisation, risk 
assessment and even managing the risk should be carried out by the expert organisations, 
while the general policies of the country and specific decisions should be delegated to the 
NBC as a political body. In other words, politicians set the biosafety policies and goals 
while experts implement them.  
Together with the MoS and the MoH, the MoA also condemned the lack of sufficient 
knowledge and expertise in the DoE as a factor that might pose substantial problems in 
the way of biosafety. The MoA strongly supported the idea that experts should take the 
leading role in implementing the law as well as contributing to drafting the law. A 
  
102 
document prepared by the DoE after the two-day gathering summarising the views of 
organisations and Ministries reveals more about the views of the MoA.71 In terms of 
authorisation, the document states that the MoA suggested the authorisation should be 
done by the MoA and the MoH as two expert organisations that should also be the only 
CNAs. This means that for the MoA, implementing the law and making decisions under 
provisions of the law was seen an activity that had most to do with expertise rather than 
politics. This could also explain the concerns of the MoA from the outset about the 
shortage of scientific knowledge in the DoE as the location of the office of the secretariat.  
On the issue of general policies for biosafety, the MoA repeatedly stressed that it was a 
political responsibility that should be separated from scientific judgments.72 In other 
words, while biotechnology experts should be involved in the process of implementing the 
law through assessing and managing the risks, the overall policies of the country are a 
subject scientific expertise cannot decide. Therefore, the NBC should be composed of 
people with political responsibilities rather than biotechnological experts or scientific 
representatives of Ministries and organisations.   
5.4. Discussion of the Results 
This chapter has reviewed the first stage of the legislative negotiations to find out the 
possible underlying framing assumptions of organisations and Ministries about policy 
problems, the risk system and prescriptions for addressing those problems. The available 
data has revealed that some different and even contradictory framing assumptions 
between organisations and Ministries underpinned their entirely different approaches. In 
this section, I will integrate the findings into a table (Table 5-1) and will then discuss 
how those assumptions were discussed in the literature of technological risk regulation.  
5.4.1. Summary of the Findings 
Table 5-1 shows the major themes on which the DoE and the MoH, the MoS and the 
MoA held different, and to some extent contradictory, framing assumptions at this stage 
of negotiations. A pivotal problem arises regarding the assumptions over safety or harm in 
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biotechnology: is it assumed to be safe until proven hazardous, or assumed to pose risks 
until proven safe? This assumption largely affects the definition of the problem, as in the 
former understanding, the problem would be biotechnology itself, whereas in the latter 
the problem would merely be considering the possible risks that might arise from 
development and application of biotechnology. This pivotal issue highlighted a 
distinction between the MoH and the MoS on one hand and the DoE on the other hand, 
while the position of the MoA was not clear at this stage.  
Presuming the research activities of scientists as a part of the risk system that might 
generate risks shapes a sharp distinction between two groups: 1) the MoH and the MoS, 
which were suggesting that the law should trust scientific research, and 2) the MoA and 
the DoE, which were arguing that the process of research may also be characterised by 
risks that in turn might pose harm to the environment or to human health, and therefore 
the law should cover all research activities.  
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Table 5- 1 Divergent framing assumptions of Ministries and organisations at the time of 
the CC and the two-day gathering 
Elements of Framing Contested Issues MoH MoS MoA DoE 
Framing Assumptions Assumptions affecting 
understandings of the nature 
of policy problems 
Presuming 
biotechnology safe 
or harmful? 
Presuming biotechnology is 
safe unless there is proof of 
harm.  
Presuming biotechnology is 
safe unless there is proof of 
harm.  
[Lack of data for the first 
stage of negotiations] 
Presuming biotechnology is a 
harmful innovation if there is no 
proof of safety.  
Assumptions regarding the 
risk system 
Research activities 
as a source of 
possible risk? 
No. Researchers are the best 
people to ensure the safety 
of their work.  
No. Research activities will 
not generate risks.  
Yes. Researchers might fail 
to put in place safety 
measures and therefore 
impose substantial risks.  
Yes. Research activities as a part 
of the risk-generating system.  
Role of 
biotechnological 
experts in the 
process of 
regulation? 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should draft the 
biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should implement 
the law 
• Biotechnological scientists 
play a decisive role in 
general biosafety policy-
making 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should contribute to 
drafting the biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should implement 
the law before releasing 
products 
• Biotechnological scientists 
and policy-makers should 
decide together over releases 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should play a decisive role in 
general biosafety policy-
making 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should be incorporated in 
the drafting 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should  
implement the law 
• Biotechnology scientists 
should not be involved in 
general biosafety policy 
 
• Biotechnological scientists could 
be incorporated in the drafting 
• Biotechnological scientists should 
not take part in implementation 
and enforcement 
• Biotechnological scientists should 
not be involved in general 
biosafety policy 
Assumptions about ways of 
dealing with the problem 
(e.g. models of risk 
assessment and risk 
management) 
Separation of 
promotional from 
regulatory 
responsibilities? 
No need for separation at all No need for separation at all 
• No separation between 
promotion and 
implementation  
• Separation between policy 
and implementation 
• Separation in that there is no role 
for biotechnological science in 
implementing, or enforcing 
policy 
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With respect to the role of biotechnological experts, however, the diversity of views 
among the members is greater. Although for both the MoH and the MoS 
biotechnological science should be incorporated into the stages from drafting to 
implementation and even involved in making general policies, the MoH presumed that 
drafting and implementing the law was purely a scientific job to be done by 
biotechnological experts, which in turn suggests a purely technocratic view according to 
which science could objectively solve all relevant policy problems. For the MoS, 
biotechnological experts in cooperation with other authorities should draft and 
implement the law, which differentiates its view from a pure technocracy. The MoA 
suggested that the process of implementing the law should be purely a task for experts; on 
the other hand, this Ministry envisaged no place for scientists in the process of 
determining overall biosafety policies and therefore it presupposed a separation of science 
from politics by locating scientists in the implementation stage and politicians in general 
policy making, which resembles a decisionist model. Finally, the DoE accepted a role for 
biotechnological scientists in participating in drafting the law, while it was strongly 
opposed to giving them any role in implementing or enforcing the law.  
Overall, the approach of the MoH could be characterised as a view that not only accepted 
the promotion of biotechnology and research, but also assigned a vital role to 
biotechnological scientists in the regulation of biotechnology. Although the MoS also 
supported the notions of promotion and research, its approach was not as the same as the 
MoH with regard to the exclusive role of biotechnological experts at all stages of decision 
making. The view of the MoA over the safety of biotechnology was not clear at this stage, 
though this Ministry was seriously concerned that research activities could be a source of 
risk. The MoA also supported the idea that implementing the law would be a scientific 
task, although not just involving biotechnology science, while at the same time it 
maintained a sharp distinction between the political decision-making of the NBC and the 
implementation of the law by expert organisations. Serious concerns of the DoE over the 
safety of biotechnology along with worries about research activities as a part of the risk-
generating system were coupled with its view that biotechnology scientists should have no 
  
106 
role in implementing the law; it envisaged a sharp separation between promotional and 
regulatory responsibilities.  
5.4.2. Identified assumptions in the literature  
In my theoretical framework in Chapter 4, I listed several academic works discussing 
framing assumptions in regulating biotechnological risk that may be useful here. The 
above table, although it is an initial finding for the first stage of negotiations, contains 
some notions that are very close to the assumptions identified by the risk regulation 
literature. The first principal issue about biotechnology was reflected in Millstone et al 
(2004) in their discussion of symmetry of the required data. They describe a type of 
symmetry as to whether or not GM crops are assumed risky unless shown to be safe, or 
assumed safe unless shown to be harmful.  
In terms of the risk-generating system and the question of whether risks can arise from 
research activities, this notion is very close to Jasanoff’s (1995, 2005) formulation of 
biotechnology as a product or process. Jasanoff highlighted the differences between the 
USA and the UK in their different views over regulating biotechnology as a product, as a  
process or as both. However, my framework implies that biotechnology as a product or a 
process could be understood in relation to the risk system, in that part of it accounts for 
generating risks, and whether biotechnology products constitute this system or whether 
the processes of biotechnology development should also be counted as a part of this 
system. The evidence shows that for the MoH and the MoS biotechnology research 
processes were not a matter of risk generation, while for the MoA and the DoE those 
processes might engender risks and harm.  
5.5. An account of the policy output 
This stage of policy making ended with clashes between organisations, and without any 
clear results. To understand changes to policy in later stages of the negotiations, it would 
be helpful to discuss the output of the two-day gathering to clarify how the members 
agreed to leave the session without any clear decisions. For this purpose, I will take a 
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closer look at the efforts of the members and the circumstances in which the members 
decided to end the discussions.  
The sequence of events through which members disputed on the location of the office 
could be summarised as:73 
1- The MoA, the MoH and the MoS disagreed with locating the office in the DoE, 
arguing that it lacked expertise and knowledge. Another group, namely the DoE, 
the MoI and the MoFA agreed to delegate the office of the secretariat for the 
NBC to the DoE.  
2- The former group suggested not identifying the location of the office in the law, 
but leaving it within the authority of the NBC. This suggestion was rejected by 
the second group.  
3- As another resolution, the first group (i.e. MoH, MoS and MoA) offered to write 
notes of disagreements in brackets to signify that the session could not reach a 
clear decision. That offer was refused by the second group.  
4- The head of the office of the secretariat of the NBC (who was also the 
representative of the DoE) left the session at lunchtime to talk and consult with 
the head of the DoE. However, what he then reported in the afternoon on behalf 
of the head of the DoE was rejected by the MoS, the MoH and the MoA.  The 
second group argued that the opinions of the DoE were not acceptable to their 
affiliated Ministries.  
5- The DoE and the MoFA suggested diminishing the presumed responsibilities for 
the NBC office and delegating more responsibilities to other Ministries. The 
second group (i.e. MoA, MoS and MoH) replied that they would accept this idea 
just as long as their Ministries were recognised as the CNAs which could 
authorise relevant categories of products.  
6- The MoT proposed writing the disagreements in a covering letter rather than 
stating them in the text of the draft. The MoH, the MoS and the MoA rejected 
that suggestion.  
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7- The MoS suggested using a voting system as a last resort. However, a problem 
emerged with respect to the order in which the suggestions would be brought to 
the vote, i.e. firstly voting on the bracket and then, if it failed, moving to the next 
idea or to other alternatives. The members could not reach an agreement in this 
respect and therefore voting did not proceed.  
8- Eventually, the session ended without any agreement or result.  
Looking back at this journey, a common characteristic is that repeatedly one group or a 
few members were able to resist the suggestions of other groups or members. It resembles 
a system within which power is equally distributed: all members were on a par with each 
other, while the decisions needed to be consensual. Therefore, regarding the policy output 
at this stage, and given the fact that no organisation had sufficient power to impose its 
opinion, it is possible to conjecture that the contradictory position of the framing 
assumptions of members could account for the lack of an output at that stage. On this 
basis, an interesting topic for the next section is analysing the change to this output, 
which was a draft biosafety law, to find out how that output was achieved. Did the 
members change their framing assumptions? Could some of them not resist the arguments 
and criticisms, leading to a paradigmatic change, or did the power relations change? In the 
next chapter I will discuss the NBC session and the RC as the subsequent efforts for 
developing a draft.  
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 Chapter 6. The Second Phase of Negotiations: National Biosafety 
Committee and Reviewing Committee, December 2006-May 2007  
6.1. Introduction 
After the failure of the CC to produce a draft biosafety law, the head of the DoE tried to 
solve the problem in a different way. As the office of the secretariat of the NBC, the DoE 
arranged a session of this committee involving the related Ministers and the first Deputy 
President to find a political resolution. However, the problem was not solved by that 
NBC session and the members continued discussions over the draft in a new round of 
negotiations. This was called the Reviewing Committee (RC) and consisted of eight 
sessions. For the RC sessions, the head of the DoE changed the participants by inviting 
Deputy Ministers rather than their senior biotechnology representatives to pursue a 
political approach. Eventually, as a result of the RC sessions, a draft biosafety law was 
passed to the NBC.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the NBC session as well as the RC sessions as a separate 
policy process, and examine the way it generated an output in the form of a draft 
biosafety law. The main concerns of this chapter are: did the framing assumptions, which 
in part were identified in the previous chapter, emerge again in this stage of negotiations? 
If so, did they change and if they did, to what extent and why? Did the new data, with 
respect to this stage, lead to new framing assumptions? Are they related to the output of 
this stage of the policy process, and if so, how? To what extent do the framings and their 
changes contribute to understanding the new policy output?  
6.2. National Biosafety Committee Session 
The NBC session was held on 14 December 2006 and was attended by the following: the 
first Deputy President, the Minister of Agriculture and his Deputy, the head of the DoE 
and one of her Deputies, the Deputy Minister of Health, and the Deputy Minister of 
Science. In addition, the head of the office of the secretariat, who was the senior 
representative of the DoE, as well as the representatives of the MoH, the MoS and the 
MoA in the CC negotiations were present in this session.  
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The head of the DoE started the session by pointing to the main problems, as she saw 
them, which had arisen in the earlier policy process (i.e. the CC). Intriguingly, she stressed 
that there was no disagreement with respect to the initial parts of the draft, including its 
opening clauses, definitions, objectives, and the scope of the law.74 In fact, those were the 
only topics that could be discussed at the two-day gathering. The head of the DoE 
pretended, or perhaps believed, that there were no problems regarding those topics, while 
the analysis in the former chapter contradicts this view and argues that the members of 
the CC held different framing assumptions, especially with regard to the opening clauses 
of the draft as well as scope of the law. 
In the head of the DoE’s view, the main problem arose in the suggested structure for 
implementing the law, especially vis-à-vis two important topics: 1) identifying the 
Competent National Authorities (CNAs) that would have the authority to issue or cancel 
authorisations, and 2) the location of the office of the secretariat and whether the location 
needed to be determined by the law. The head of the DoE optimistically claimed that if 
the NBC session could find a solution to those problems, the other parts of the draft 
could be finalised very soon.  
Referring to the framing assumptions identified in the previous chapter, the statement of 
the head of the DoE at the beginning of the NBC showed how she had not acknowledged 
the main points of disagreement over the framing assumptions. In fact, she represented 
the problem as something that merely had to do with implementation and allocating 
responsibilities. Further, by considering this view of the DoE, we might better understand 
why the head of the DoE convened the NBC session to deal with this problem: in 
principle, she was seeking a resolution and a decision from the political authorities to 
settle a division of responsibilities, without addressing several contested framing 
assumptions, such as those that incorporate the problem definition and competing 
understandings of the risk system.  
The reaction of the Minister of Agriculture to the head of the DoE’s speech may have 
undermined the latter’s expectations. The Minister of Agriculture argued that the former 
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decision of the MoA to agree with the shift of the office to the DoE at the beginning of 
2006 was mainly aimed at reducing tensions. He continued: “the performance of the DoE 
was so weak that the MoA regrets that decision.”75 The other members then put forward 
their opinions and finally the Deputy President suggested some principles as a basis for 
rewriting the draft in further sessions, which were called the RC sessions.  
Notwithstanding the fact that two hours in a political session was not sufficient for the 
members to present their full viewpoints, some interesting points were raised vis-à-vis 
framing assumptions that can be added to the framing assumptions identified in the last 
chapter. I shall continue the discussion by asking if there is any evidence in the speeches 
of the members of the NBC that might enhance our understanding of their framing 
assumptions. Moreover, were there further signs of new framing assumptions?  
6.2.1. Safety and harm of biotechnology in defining the policy problem 
Safety or harm of biotechnology was identified in the last chapter as an important 
underlying framing assumption that strongly influenced the understandings of general 
policy problems that should be addressed by biosafety law. In the NBC session, new 
points appeared that help enrich this picture.  
The senior representative of the MoA pointed out that the MoA was currently 
authorising varieties of agricultural crops and goods and it could do the same for GM 
products. He argued that a GMO is not a distinctive category; instead, it is something 
familiar that has just been manipulated. He characterised the process of manipulation not 
as something unusual, insisting that biotechnology is not different from other familiar 
technologies such as traditional plant breeding. Although he did not reveal much about to 
what extent he expected biotechnology to be safe or harmful, he portrayed biotechnology 
as more or less similar to other technologies, which might signify that for the MoA 
biotechnology might not be seen as hazardous, or as no more hazardous than familiar 
plant-breeding methods.76   
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The Deputy DoE defended their approach by saying: “there is a missing point vis-à-vis 
the goals of biosafety. It is for maintaining the biodiversity of the environment in its 
current form, as a whole and integrated entity in the world and through restricting 
manipulation by humans. It is about not changing God’s creation.”77 This statement 
conveys a view that biotechnology was perceived by the DoE as manipulating the 
creations of God. This notion refines the previously-identified negative view of the DoE 
towards biotechnology: something that is, at least, often threatening.78  
The senior representative of the MoS revealed much about the approach of that Ministry. 
He said: “there are two views of biosafety: 1) biotechnology is harmful and biosafety 
seeks to find ways for preventing harm by hindering the development and use of 
biotechnology, and 2) biotechnology is beneficial, but might confer some risks, like other 
technologies. The MoS believes in the second approach.”79 This statement is very 
illuminating because it not only clarifies the position of the MoS with regard to harm and 
safety in biotechnology, but also shows that the MoS was aware of the presence of such 
conflicting views towards biotechnology. Nevertheless, this issue was not subsequently 
discussed.  
6.2.2. The risk system 
The analysis in the previous chapter suggests that there were differences between the 
protagonists in terms of their assumptions towards the risk system, including the risk-
generating system, as well scope of those risks. The data for this phase of negotiations 
indicate two sets of framing assumptions: 1) assumptions about the risk-generating 
system as part of the risk system, and 2) assumptions about the scope of the risks and the 
border of causalities within the system.  
6.2.2.1. Risk-generation and the role of research activities  
The previous findings suggest that part of the disagreement stemmed from diverse 
understandings of the extent to which research activities might be a source of risks, and 
                                                 
77
 Ibid 
78
 There is little evidence pointing to the popularity of this view in the DoE. Therefore, I prefer to take the side of caution with 
respect to attributing an absolute anti-biotechnology view to this department rooted in a religious assumption.  
79
 Official voice recordings of the NBC session held on 14 December 2006 (author’s translation). 
  
113 
therefore whether or not the law should trust research activities. In this respect, the 
representative of the MoA proposed that identifying GM products80 and their risks would 
not need a separate biosafety law. He argued: “enacting the biosafety law as a new law 
becomes especially important because Iran is going to develop and make progress in 
biotechnology, and as this process confers both positive and negative sides, there is a need 
for a law to deal with the process and reduce the possible risks coming from it.” 81 These 
ideas show that in the view of the MoA, development activities and processes were 
counted as a part of the risk-generating-system, which in turn called for a biosafety law 
and implied that research activities needed to be included in the scope of that biosafety 
law. 
In clear oppositions, both the MoH and the MoS argued for an exemption of research 
activities, emphasising the restrictive nature of the DoE’s approach as well as the essential 
role of research in biotechnology development and the progress of the country. However, 
the members never discussed whether or not risks might arise during research.  
6.2.2.2. Scope of the risks as part of the perceived impact within the risk system  
Different perceptions about the scope of risks shaped another part of the different views 
about the risk system and referred to the border of impacts and causalities within the 
system (scope of risks). Discussions in the NBC session revealed another difference in 
those respects.  
The Deputy of the MoA revealed a new notion about the scope of risk. He repeatedly 
emphasised the importance of having a law that would fill the current gaps in Iranian law. 
Pointing to the intricacy of developing a law to meet international commitments as well 
as internal needs, he highlighted a widespread concern in the MoA arising from the lack 
of a biosafety law. The Deputy of the MoA admitted that the non-existence of a biosafety 
law was itself a political risk to Iran, as several other countries had already asked Iran to 
provide certificates indicating that its exported products were GM-free (e.g. tomatoes and 
pistachios). This was mainly because Iran and those trading partners had joined the CPB 
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and therefore had mutual obligations. For this reason, there was a need to compromise 
between different approaches for the sake of enacting a law as soon as possible to address 
the external political risks.82 In this sense, in the view of the MoA, the risks were not just 
physical risks to be discussed in terms of human health and environmental issues, but also 
included the political risks that might come from the lack of a biosafety law.  
6.2.3. Policy prescriptions and the role of biotechnological experts 
The head of the DoE revealed a great deal about the approach of her organisation by 
claiming that the critical feature of biosafety regulation is control of biotechnology to 
protect biodiversity, and that therefore responsibility for regulation should be separated 
from responsibility for biotechnology promotion. Moreover, because the DoE would not 
benefit from applying this technology, it felt that it was best placed to carry out 
regulation. These statements make it clear that, in the view of this department, there must 
be a sharp distinction between regulation and promotion. On this basis, the DoE argued 
that the office of the secretariat of the NBC should be in the DoE as the sole CNA.83  
These arguments also suggest that the DoE was suspicious of those actively trying to 
promote biotechnology, either agricultural or pharmaceutical. In emphasising that the 
department would not benefit, the DoE implicitly suggested that the people who could 
benefit from biotechnology might be influenced by their interests and values in decision-
making, and consequently were not suitable institutions for controlling biotechnology as a 
critical part of regulation. Further, these statements help us to better understand the 
concerns of the department over research activities as a part of the risk-generating system, 
as researchers might not always provide sufficient safety measures in their work when 
pursuing their own economic and technological interests.  
These concerns led the DoE to emphasise the necessity of imposing severe penalties and 
prosecutions in response to violations, to balance benefit-seeking behaviours with possible 
negative consequences. Hence, in the view of this department, biosafety regulation should 
be responsible for controlling and monitoring biotechnological activities as a disinterested 
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organisation with the power to impose penalties over contraventions. This could also 
explain why the head of the DoE chose a non-biotechnological expert as the head of the 
office of the secretariat to make sure that he would not pursue biotechnological 
interests.84   
Both the Minister of Agriculture and his deputy condemned the view of the DoE on the 
control of biotechnology. Referring to two expert organisations in their Ministry, i.e., the 
Protecting Plants Organisation, responsible for monitoring all plants, and the Veterinary 
Organisation, responsible for controlling all meats and animal parts that are being used in 
the country, they rejected the approach of the DoE by asking how the DoE could 
accomplish such professional tasks without any expertise in biotechnology. This reveals 
that in their view experts have very important roles to play in implementing the law. On 
this basis, the MoA entirely disagreed with the approach of the DoE in having sole 
responsibility for biosafety. Their emphasis on the necessity of including biotechnology 
experts in implementing the law might suggest that in their view those experts or expert 
organisations act independently of vested interests; however the representative of the 
MoA did not explicitly argue this in the NBC session.  
6.3. National Biosafety Committee Output 
After two hours listening to the views of organisations and Ministries, the First Deputy 
President drew some conclusions as a basis for a new draft to be prepared in a session, or 
multiple sessions, to be held by incorporating the DoE, the MoH, the MoS and the MoA 
as the four main organisations involved in the issue, and preferably in the presence of the 
head of the DoE.  
The First Deputy President suggested the following guidelines:  
1- Ministries and the DoE discharge their mandates without overlapping with the 
responsibilities of others 
2- Exclude research activities in laboratories from the scope of the law  
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3- Responsibility for authorisation to be held by the MoA and the MoH, while the 
information is to be shared with the office of the secretariat of the NBC  
4- The NBC office plays a solely coordinating role 
5- International relations to be considered within the responsibilities of the NBC 
office 
6- The NBC office could bring cases of violations to the Coordinating Committee 
and if they could not reach a decision, NBC should deal with them.  
The Deputy of the DoE dissented from the first guideline by arguing that biosafety is 
different from other fields because it needs a central monitoring institution.85 He 
reminded the First Deputy President of a former challenge regarding Avian Flu, about 
which the First Deputy had proposed a similar guideline that organisations should not 
overlap with each other. The Deputy DoE added that biosafety is different from Avian 
Flu, and requires a different approach. The head of the DoE then added that biosafety is 
for the control of biotechnology and the DoE is the organisation that should be 
responsible for this task because it will gain no benefit from biotechnology development. 
Nonetheless, the First Deputy President dismissed the concerns of the DoE and ended 
the session.  
Regarding this policy output, although the members were arguing based on different 
framing assumptions, there was not a heated debate in that session comprising people 
with political responsibilities including the First Deputy President. In contrast to the 
experience of the two-day gathering, which ended with a clash between organisations and 
Ministries, this time the First Deputy President used his power to overrule the criticisms 
of the DoE on the one hand, and to dismiss the complaints of other Ministries during the 
session about the responsibility of the DoE in taking the office of the secretariat on the 
other. In other words, analysing the experience of the NBC session suggests that the most 
powerful person in that process used his authority to end the session with some clear 
outputs by rejecting some views in favour of others and by proposing new actions.  
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In this sense, while framing assumptions could help account for the positions of the 
Ministries and organisations during the process and the roots of the controversies, 
understanding them would not provide an account of the policy output without some 
understanding of the power relations as well as the framing assumptions. Hypothetically, 
if there had been sufficient knowledge about the power relations, knowledge of the 
framing assumptions might have made it possible to anticipate the policy outcomes. 
However, for the NBC session, there is no knowledge about the framing assumptions of 
the First Deputy President as the most powerful person.  
6.4. Reviewing Committee Sessions 
RC negotiations started after the NBC session and continued for eight sessions. When 
the DoE could not reach a satisfactory solution in the NBC (and perhaps the problem 
worsened for this department when the First Deputy President rejected any idea of 
locating all responsibilities for biosafety in one organisation), the head of the DoE invited 
deputy ministers to come to a meeting on 26 December 2006 (less than a fortnight after 
the NBC session) to endorse the minutes of that session and use the resulting guidelines 
as an overall approach, to conclude a draft as soon as possible.  
At the beginning of the first session of the RC, the head of the DoE summarised the 
results of the NBC session as follows: 
- Laboratory research was to be exempted from the scope of the law 
- There was a need to review other laws and regulations and not cut across them 
- The office of the secretariat of the NBC was supposed to take on a coordinating 
role, although its location was not discussed in the NBC session 
- It was undecided who should play the controlling role86 
The Deputy MoH claimed that another decision of the NBC session had been about the 
scope of the biosafety law, namely that it should be the same as the scope of the CPB, 
which meant that pharmaceuticals would be exempted from the scope of the biosafety 
law. The Deputy MoH claimed that the Deputy President had proposed this in response 
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to a question from the MoH after the cassette recorder had been switched off towards the 
end of the NBC session, while the head of the DoE claimed that she did not hear 
anything regarding this issue in the NBC session. Ironically, the head of the office of the 
secretariat located in the DoE supported the MoH, but the head of the DoE remained 
adamant. After an hour debating the outputs of the NBC session, the members decided at 
the end of the first meeting of the RC to go through the draft once again and read it 
paragraph by paragraph to quickly finalise it (hopefully within two sessions, according to 
the view of the head of the DoE). 87  
These events from the first session of the RC imply two points. First of all, they 
demonstrate that although the NBC session ended with some guidelines that had been 
tabled by the First Deputy President, interpretations among the members of the results of 
that session were different when they discussed them in the first session of the RC. In this 
session, the head of the DoE summarised one of the conclusions of the NBC session as: 
no decision had been taken about who should control biotechnological activities. 
However, according to the analysis of this research, having control over biotechnology 
was crucial for the DoE and partly for the MoA, while the MoS and the MoH did not 
see the necessity of this task. In other words, the DoE interpreted at least some results of 
the NBC session according to its own understanding of biosafety and because of its 
framing assumptions that biotechnology should be considered risky, and biotechnology 
scientists might follow their own interests.  
Secondly, the members did not have similar ideas with respect to which points had been 
previously agreed. The example of disputes over whether or not the First Deputy 
President had suggested setting the scope of the law as similar to the scope of the CPB 
was a case in point. Further, as I pointed out before in discussing the NBC, some, like the 
DoE, were not in favour of concluding that the Ministries would take part in 
implementing the law, i.e. disagreeing over what had been clearly presented as the output 
of the NBC session by the First Deputy President.  
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As the members agreed to read the draft again and, as a result, to discuss the challenging 
issues once again, similar to the style of negotiations in the CC, there were plenty of 
occasions in the RC sessions when protagonists revealed their framing assumptions. In the 
following sections, based on the data from eight sessions of the RC, I will highlight the 
framing assumptions that had not arisen in the CC and thus were not discussed in the 
previous chapter, or those which contribute to a better understanding of the formerly 
identified framing assumptions.  
6.4.1. Safety and harm of biotechnology in relation to the policy problem 
There were some comments during the RC sessions which not only confirmed the earlier 
indications of the framing assumptions about safety and harm of biotechnology, but also 
suggested a better understanding of the views of the Ministries and the DoE on this topic.  
The head of the DoE both in the first and second sessions of the RC revealed her 
concerns over the safety of biotechnological products by stressing that it should be the 
responsibility of researchers to prove88 that their biotechnological products are safe, by 
providing sufficient and satisfactory scientific evidence. As an example, referring to the 
Iranian GM rice, she asked how it was possible to make sure it was safe.89 These 
comments clearly show that, in the view of the DoE, biotechnological products like the 
Iranian GM rice were not seen as un-problematically safe. However, she did not specify 
how much evidence would be sufficient to make the DoE certain with respect to the 
safety of biotechnological products.90  
In response to these concerns of the head of the DoE, the representative of the MoH 
argued that there was no risk from the GM rice because the inserted gene was already 
present in the environment, especially in the soil.91 For the MoH, if GM rice was felt not 
to be safe, it was the responsibility of its opponents to demonstrate that it was harmful to 
the environment. In the third session of the RC, the Deputy of the MoH complained: 
“the DoE raises concerns over biotechnology development, which are not legitimate. 
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There is no basis for worrying about biotechnology development.”92 Also in the first RC 
session he stressed that “it seems the DoE likes to restrict internal activities mainly 
because of its own concerns. This is not reasonable.”93 This implied that in the view of 
the MoH, a modified product that emerged from the process of research would not pose 
considerable risks.  
6.4.2. The risk system 
Following the previous findings, the general biosafety system could be divided into two 
sub-systems: 1) the system that contributes to generating the risk, the issue for the case of 
Iran being whether or not research activities should be seen as part of this system, and 2) 
the system that might be affected by those risks, and the border of causalities that defines 
this system.  
6.4.2.1. Research as a part of risk-generating system 
The head of the DoE repeatedly revealed her concerns with respect to the developmental 
activities within the country, mainly arising from a lack of trust in the safety of the 
research of Iranian scientists. In the first RC session, she drew the attention of the MoH 
to the fact that even presuming current scientists obey safety rules, what if future 
generations did not comply with safety measures? Was it possible to leave everything to 
the scientists? Therefore, there was a need for stringent rules and regulations.94 In the 
third RC session she raised a fear about people who might not take safety concerns 
seriously. The head of the DoE then recommended devising the law in a way to close all 
possible opportunities for abusing biotechnology.95 The stress by the head of the DoE on 
possible problems in future was clearly linked to her assumption that the interest of 
scientists could be a factor leading them to implement safety measures inadequately that 
could render the process of research a part of the risk-generating system.   
In this respect, the MoA adapted an approach close to that of the DoE by recommending 
the inclusion of research activities in the scope of the law to prevent possible harmful 
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mistakes by researchers who would otherwise remain free to undertake any activity they 
might wish.96 However, the source of their concerns was different, as the DoE was 
primarily pointing to the possibilities of abusing biotechnology, while the MoA was 
primarily concerned with the lack of sufficient experimental equipment and controls in 
the laboratories or other research fields that could engender harm. In this sense, the MoA 
was asking research activities to be included as a possible source of risk not because of the 
same assumption as the DoE, i.e. concerns about the interests of scientists, but because of 
a concern about the equipment and facilities around the country.   
On the other hand, the MoH and the MoS reiterated their former positions on the 
necessity of trusting research in the law by claiming that no risk would arise during the 
process of research. 
6.4.2.2. Scope of the risk and the causalities within the risk system 
The discussions between the MoH and the DoE on the issue of GM rice also provided 
indications about their different assumptions regarding the scope of the risk. The head of 
the DoE clearly raised the question that while the GM rice was developed in a way to kill 
certain target insects, how was it possible to make sure that it would not harm other non-
target insects?97 This question points to the fact that in the view of the DoE, not just 
target organisms, but also non-target organisms should be included in the scope of risks. 
In the second RC session, the head of the DoE proposed also considering indirect as well 
as long-term effects of GM products.98  
The MoH complained that there was no need to consider indirect and long-term effects, 
or non-target harm. The assumption that science should be responsible for regulation as 
the only source of reliable knowledge framed the view of the MoH about the scope of the 
risks. The Deputy of the MoH argued that the DoE’s sorts of concerns were not 
scientific and therefore not legitimate, and were invoked just to create barriers in the way 
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of scientific risk assessments.99 For the MoH, while the issue needed to be handled in a 
scientific way, concerns about long-term and indirect effects are not the ones scientists 
can yet legitimately address.100 In this way, the MoH suggested a narrower scope for the 
assessment of risks, but also revealed another assumption, namely that the scope of the 
risk assessment should be decided by scientists, not politicians. 
6.4.3. Prescriptions and the role of biotechnology experts  
Challenges over the proper roles and responsibilities of biosafety continued in the RC. 
The DoE reiterated that the pursuit of biosafety entailed that the DoE should be the 
central player as a monitoring agent, separate from pursuing benefits from biotechnology. 
Nonetheless, there was a change in the approach of this organisation with respect to two 
issues. Firstly, changing the structure of negotiations by inviting the deputies of Ministers 
and giving no role to the biotechnological experts in the discussions about drafting the 
law was a sign that, in the view of the DoE, those experts should not even participate in 
drafting the biosafety law, or at least would not be able to help in drafting a law, although 
they had had a role as the senior representatives of Ministries in the former CC 
negotiations. Moreover, the DoE further proposed to the RC that the biosafety law 
should even indicate that the post-law CC101 should be composed from the deputy 
ministers, not the representatives of the involved ministries who might be 
biotechnological experts.102 (A post-law CC was suggested by some members as another 
part of the biosafety structure to set operational rules and procedures of risk assessment 
and risk management as well further administrative tasks.) The MoS rejected this idea by 
referring to the fact that the responsibilities of the CC would mainly be setting the 
standards and rules. In the view of the MoS, these jobs were appropriate for experts, not 
Deputy Ministers. However, the head of the DoE dismissed this idea by replying that the 
Deputies Ministers could consult experts. This suggests that the DoE was trying to 
preclude any decisive role for biotechnological experts, even in setting the standards.103  
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Secondly, while the first Deputy President had suggested that the MoA and the MoH 
should be involved in the process of implementing the law, such as authorising products 
for release, the negative view of the DoE of the inclusion of those bodies with 
promotional responsibilities was evident. The head of the DoE argued that the RC 
should write the law presuming that the bodies who were supposed to implement the law 
might not follow the rules of biosafety; therefore, the biosafety law should be written 
strongly enough to provide assurance on those issues as well.104 She repeated this view in 
the next session, arguing that if in the future the organisations involved in the 
implementation of biosafety tried to act solely according to their own promotional 
interests, the law should be able to prevent them.105 That is to say, while the DoE was 
concerned about the interests and benefits of bodies involved in the process of promoting 
biotechnology; it was therefore worried about delegating a role to those Ministries with 
respect to implementing the law.  
On the other hand, the MoA pointed to the lack of proper scientific knowledge and 
background in the DoE as the main factor that had obstructed negotiations over 
biosafety. The MoA asked how the DoE could undertake the professional tasks in this 
context. Suggesting the necessity of having a few CNAs rather than just one in the DoE, 
the Deputy of this Ministry claimed that CNAs should not engage in political activities, 
but that their decisions should be entirely scientific, in accordance with the evidence and 
facts.106 The Deputy of the MoA referred to the organisation within that Ministry that is 
responsible for protecting plants as an example of an unbiased expert organisation: if it 
decides to quarantine a plant, even the Minister of Agriculture cannot change that 
decision. This statement clearly indicates that, in the view of the MoA, expert 
organisations can not only act independently of organisational or Ministerial interests, but 
also that their activities can be structured in a way that political bodies could and should 
not affect the decisions of experts.  
The separation between promotional responsibilities and regulatory duties was another 
dimension of the view of the MoA, which believed that the overall biosafety policies 
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needed to be determined by politicians in the NBC, and not by scientists and experts. 
Discussing the proper role of the NBC, the representative of the MoA suggested that this 
committee should be constituted from politicians to determine the general policies and 
approaches of the country. The MoA claimed the necessity of having a clear distinction 
between expert bodies and policy-makers in a way that the former implements the law, 
while the latter play the role of goal-setters. Hence, in the view of the MoA, both science 
and politics need to be incorporated into the process, but in accordance with a clear 
separation between their roles, resembling a Weberian decisionist approach.  
The approach of the MoH and the MoS remained unchanged from the CC on the 
necessity of giving the major role to biotechnology scientists, not only by empowering the 
expert organisations to become CNAs, but also by incorporating some experts into the 
NBC with a decisive role to make sure that policies are based on sound science. However, 
as I suggested in the last chapter, there was a difference between these Ministries with 
respect to the exact role of scientists in that the MoH suggested an approach closer to 
technocracy in comparison to the MoS. Table 6-1 summarises the assumptions of the 
Ministries and the DoE at the end of the RC.  
6.5. Discussion of the results 
In this section, I will sketch a revised table of the results of this phase of negotiations and 
will discuss the theoretical foundations of the new findings.  
6.5.1. The new table of framing 
Table 6-1 is an updated version of Table 5-1 characterising the framing assumptions and 
indicating the changes in the framing assumptions.  
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Table 6- 1 Divergent framing assumptions of Ministries and organisations at the end of 
Reviewing Committee 
Elements of Framing Contested Issues MoH MoS MoA DoE 
Framing Assumptions Assumptions affecting 
understandings of the 
nature of the policy 
problem 
Presuming 
biotechnology safe or 
harmful? 
Presuming biotechnology is 
safe unless there is proof of 
harm.  
Presuming biotechnology is safe 
unless there is proof of harm.  
Biotchnology is like other 
technologies (so might be 
harmful) 
Presuming biotechnology is 
a harmful manipulation 
unless there is proof of 
safety  
Research activities as a 
source of possible risk? 
No. Researchers are the best 
people to ensure the safety of 
their work.  
No. Research activities would 
not generate risks.  
Yes. Researchers might fail 
to put in place  safety 
measures and therefore 
impose risks. 
Yes. Researchers might 
cause harm because of their 
interests.  
Lack of the law as a 
source of political risk? 
- - Yes - 
Assumptions regarding 
risk system 
Scope of the risk and 
the causalities within 
the system? 
Physical.  
Short-term, direct effects and 
target organisms.  
[not enough information at this 
stage] 
Physical and political [not 
enough information about 
the scope of each] 
Physical, including  
long-term, indirect effects 
and non-target organisms.  
Role of 
biotechnological 
experts in the process 
of regulation? 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should draft the 
biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should set the 
safety standards 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should implement 
the law 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should play decisive role in 
general biosafety policy 
making 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should contribute to drafting 
the biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological scientists 
should set the safety standards 
• Only biotechnological scientists 
should implement the law 
before releasing products 
• Biotechnological scientists and 
policy together should decide 
over releases 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should play a decisive role in 
general biosafety policy making 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should be involved in 
drafting the biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should set the 
safety standards 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists  should 
implement the law 
• Biotechnology scientists 
should not be involved in 
general biosafety policy 
 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should only advise the 
deputies in drafting the 
biosafety law 
• Biotechnological scientists  
should only advise on 
setting the safety standards 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should not take part in 
implementation or 
enforcement 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should not be involved in 
general biosafety policy 
Assumptions about ways 
of dealing with the 
problem (e.g. models of 
risk assessment and risk 
management) 
Separation of 
promotional from 
regulatory 
responsibilities? 
No need for separation at all No need for separation at all 
• Separation between 
political goal-setting and 
other expert tasks 
• No separation in drafting 
Separation in that there 
should be no decisive role for 
biotechnological scientists at 
different stages 
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The most obvious change between Tables 5.1 and 6.1 is the addition of an assumption 
about the scope of the possible risks and their causal effects as part of the 
conceptualisations of the risk system, as well as considering the political risk arising from 
a lack of a biosafety law as part of the risk-generating system. In this respect, for the DoE 
the problem was not only the direct, short-term effects of GMOs on target organisms, 
but also the possible long-term effects of these products as well as their influence on non-
target organisms and their indirect impacts. In addition, the DoE was unhappy about 
developmental activities as a source of risk generation, due to its concerns about the risks 
of biotechnology and also because of its negative assumption that scientists’ interests 
might lead them to overlook essential safety measures. As a result, the DoE suggested a 
process for biosafety regulation that excluded all bodies with promotional responsibilities 
from regulatory decision making.  
The negative view of the DoE towards biotechnological experts was not shared by any 
other Ministry, although the MoA was worried about research activities because of 
technical concerns. The concerns of the DoE about the risks of biotechnology were not 
apparent in the views of the other Ministries. In sharp contrast, the MoH did not believe 
in such a broad scope of the risk assessment, fundamentally because this Ministry was not 
worried about biotechnological harm and, further, because those issues were assumed to 
be beyond the scope of current scientific deliberations, meaning that they were therefore 
not reliable scientific questions in the MoH’s opinion. Conversely, the MoA was worried 
about the political risks stemming from the lack of a biosafety law, while the country was 
obliged to abide by its international commitments, having ratified the CPB. From this 
perspective, one part of the risk-generating system for the MoA was the lack of a 
biosafety law. The views of the MoS over the scope of the risk need more investigation, 
which I will turn to in the next chapter.  
Table 6-1 also indicates some changes in the DoE’s view vis-à-vis the role of promotional 
and sponsoring bodies in regulation. While at the outset, the DoE arranged the CC in a 
way that meant biotechnological experts could take part in the negotiation process, in 
particular as the senior representative of individual Ministries; the DoE however changed 
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its mind after the NBC session by inviting only Deputy Ministers as the people with the 
political responsibility to draft the biosafety law. Moreover, with respect to the 
responsibilities of the post-law CC (which was intended to draft operational rules and 
procedures), the DoE insisted that it should be composed of Deputy Ministers rather 
than biotechnological experts, presuming that scientists might act partially in the interests 
of their research activities.  
6.5.2. Identified assumptions and the literature 
It is possible to summarise the new findings under two broad headings: firstly, the 
suspicious view, as held by the DoE, of organisations and individuals (especially biotech 
researchers) with promotional responsibilities, which was observed by Wynne (1980 and 
1982); and secondly, the disagreements over the scope of the possible risks that should be 
considered in regulatory processes (Millstone et al 2004 and 2008).  
Wynne observes that trust in institutions lies at the heart of risk perceptions (1980). He 
further argues that in the Windscale case, the critics of the scientific experts did not 
approach the issue technically (unlike the experts, who framed the issue technically), but 
instead framed the issue presuming that the promotional bodies would be untrustworthy 
and biased because they might not consider proper safety measures at the expense of 
developmental interests (Wynne 1982). These findings seem parallel to the views of the 
DoE in the present case, as this department was extremely concerned about the partiality 
of promotional bodies in regulation.  
Millstone et al (2004) pointed to different views with respect to the scope of risk 
assessments as a matter of differences between countries as to whether or not various risks 
should be considered, including for example direct/indirect risks, short/long-term risks 
and risks to target/non-target organisms. Some of the disparities in the Iranian system 
could be attributed to the differences in the views of the involved organisations about the 
scope of the risk that should be considered by the biosafety law and in the process of risk 
assessment.  
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6.6. An account of the policy output 
In the remaining part of this chapter, I turn to the analysis of the policy outputs of this 
stage, which was a draft biosafety law. My inquiry in this chapter has shown that the 
framing assumptions did not change substantially during this stage of negotiations when 
compared to the elicited assumptions from the CC sessions, discussed in the previous 
chapter. Therefore, the question is: if the framing assumptions remained contradictory 
and unchanged, how did the RC end with a draft biosafety law as an output, which was 
then sent to the NBC and the Cabinet for final approval? 
It might be worth pointing to a media interview with the head of the office after the end 
of the RC, in which he stated: “we proceeded at a good pace with agreement over 
different parts of the draft. However, there was only a disagreement between the MoS and 
the MoA on the scope of the law, which could be resolved in the NBC or by the Cabinet 
through the interaction of the related Ministers.” (Interview with MehrNews Agency, 29 
July 2007)107  
Therefore, the question is how a draft was produced in the end, when the members had 
not generally been in agreement. To put it differently, if the members had the power to 
insist on their different and to some extent contradictory framing assumptions, how did 
they end up with a draft biosafety law? Why had the failure of the CC to produce a draft 
not reoccurred in the RC? 
Scrutinising the final session of the RC, held on 8 of May 2007, is very revealing in this 
respect. During this session the head of the DoE requested the signatures of approval of 
the MoS and the MoA on the draft, as she already had the signature of the MoH.108  
At the start of this session, the MoS expressed its concerns over including ‘production’ 
activities in the scope of the law, which mainly referred to the production of GM 
products in factories. This Ministry asked that production be exempted from the scope of 
the final draft. Meanwhile, the MoA pointed out that if they were to change something 
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with respect to the scope of the law, not only production but research should be covered 
by the law. Further, in calling the current draft an unprofessional text, the MoA claimed 
that the necessary changes were about much more than just the scope of the law, because 
the location of the office of the secretariat should also be changed from the DoE to the 
MoA. Intriguingly, the head of the DoE replied that this final session was not going to 
discuss the topics that had previously been discussed, otherwise the DoE would propose 
changing the scope to include pharmaceuticals too (given the fact that the MoH had 
devoted immense effort to their exclusion).109 This short dialogue indicates that even at 
the last session of the RC, disagreements remained unresolved.110  
Finally, the head of the DoE pointed to the minutes of the previous sessions containing 
the signatures of both the MoS and the MoA. She therefore asked the members to end 
the debates at that point and sign the final draft, warning that otherwise even the notes of 
the previous sessions were sufficient and that there was no need for this final approval 
signature. In other words, she emphasised that the office was able to pass the draft to the 
NBC, regardless of having the final approval of all the Ministries. After more discussions, 
lasting over an hour, eventually the MoS and the MoA did not sign the specific article 
determining the scope of the law, although they had signed other parts of the draft in the 
previous RC sessions. 
At the end of the session the head of the DoE stated that although the MoA and the 
MoS disagreed about the scope of the law, this draft would be passed to the government 
as the final version. In the view of the DoE, if the Ministers of Agriculture and Science 
were concerned about this issue, they could talk together and find a solution. The head of 
the DoE then announced that “this was the last session, and the work on the draft is 
finished.”111 On this basis, we can better understand the meaning of the words used by the 
head of office in his interview cited above, in which he stated that the MoA and the MoS 
only disagreed over the scope of the law. In fact the draft policy was the version enforced 
and to some extent selected by the DoE, which had not only chaired the session, but 
which also had control over the minutes. 
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There were plenty of other occasions during the RC sessions when the head of the DoE 
exerted power to influence the draft. However, instead of detailing those examples, it 
would be more revealing to concentrate on the text of the RC’s final draft to examine to 
what extent it was close to the framing assumptions of the DoE.  
6.6.1. Analysing the draft  
The claim of this chapter vis-à-vis policy output is that although the framing assumptions 
that underpinned the controversies remained largely unchanged, the policy outcome could 
be best explained by noting the power relations in the policy process rather than by 
reference to the framing assumptions. I have argued that the head of the DoE exercised 
power to influence the decisions and produce a draft at the end of this stage by deciding 
which perspectives should prevail.  
However, the power relations could not suffice to explain the content of the policy 
output. The content of the policy output can be understood in relation to the framing 
assumptions of the dominant power, i.e. the DoE. In the other words, my main claim is 
that we can best understand the policy output by combining the power relations with the 
framing assumptions, or rather that power determined which framing assumptions 
prevailed. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss the text of the draft biosafety law 
as the output of the RC and will compare it with the framing assumptions of the DoE to 
examine the validity of this claim.  
Essential parts of the final draft could be summarised as follows:112  
• Emphasising a ‘precautionary approach’ for confronting or mitigating the possible 
risks of biotechnology. In addition, only the CPB was referred to in this part as 
the most important international agreement without referring to national 
development plans emphasising the promotion of biotechnology.  
• In the definitions, ‘release’ was defined as any type of non-contained use of 
GMOs, while all types of research, even field trials, were defined as experiments 
that should be done in circumstances of contained use without any possibility of 
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interaction with the environment. This reflects the extreme concerns of the DoE 
over the risks of GM products or processes that there should not be any 
possibility of interaction with the environment in the process of research, before 
ensuring there would be no risk. This also reflects the lack of proper 
biotechnology knowledge inside the DoE.  
• The structure of the NBC proposed in the final draft was to be established solely 
with the Ministers and the First Deputy President. However, in the absence of the 
Deputy, the head of the DoE would chair the sessions. The DoE dismissed the 
arguments of the MoH and the MoS for having three biotechnological experts in 
the NBC as the providers of sound scientific knowledge and decision making. In 
addition, the following Ministries were involved: Foreign Affairs, Trade, Industry 
and Defence, which had previously endorsed the approach of the DoE in the CC 
sessions.  
• The post-law CC proposed in the draft was to be constituted by the Deputy 
Ministers, not senior representatives of Ministries who could be biotechnological 
experts. This committee would be chaired by the head of the DoE. This proposal 
discounted complaints of other ministries that the post-law CC should be 
composed of experts rather than politicians.  
• The office of the secretariat was to be located in the DoE which would also hold 
responsibility as the National Focal Point (NFP) for international 
communications. The office was also supposed to monitor and assess the 
implementation of the decisions of the NBC. This also reflects the intention of 
the DoE in taking control over the office of the secretariat amidst ever-increasing 
disagreements from other Ministries.   
• Ministerial and organisational groups were not to be CNAs, but were proposed to 
be established under their organisational and Ministerial mandates as providers of 
information and knowledge. As they were not authorised to be CNAs by the 
draft, they had therefore not been given power to make decisions or issue 
authorisation for the release of GMOs. This was also in opposition to the 
concerns of the MoA, the MoS and the MoH, who wanted to become CNAs 
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with the right of decision making, but in favour of the concerns of the DoE over 
authorising the promotional bodies that might be affected by their own interests.  
• Authorisations, according to the draft, should be done in interaction with the 
office of the secretariat of the NBC, which was also to be in the DoE. That office 
would ask other organisational groups to be involved in the process of decision 
making (including the DoE) by providing information and knowledge. If all 
involved organisations were agreed, authorisation would be allowed. Note that 
this included the DoE and the office could always ask the environmental group of 
that department to be involved in the process, and, according to the framing 
assumptions of the DoE about biotechnology, they should make sure any certain 
products were safe before agreeing with their release or marketing. This means 
that the DoE could be involved in all cases of authorisation and play a decisive 
role.  
• The scope of the draft law covered all activities in relation to management, release, 
use, exploitation, export, import, handling, movement and shipment of 
agricultural GMOs (although pharmaceuticals were exempted) and their 
derivatives. Thus, production was considered in the scope of the law by the draft 
(i.e. the DoE had set the scope in this way), while the MoS and MoA were 
allowed to negotiate further about this subject in the Cabinet.  
• The draft stressed that the rules governing research would be determined in the 
NBC, which was designed by the DoE, eliminating biotechnological experts but 
including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Industry and Defence. This 
means that even research activities were not clearly exempted by the draft as the 
First Deputy President had previously suggested.  
The above discussion conveys the spirit of the framing assumptions of the DoE: extreme 
concerns over the safety of biotechnology as well as about the bodies involved in 
biotechnology promotion, calling for strict monitoring and control over their activities by 
an impartial organisation, along with rejecting any role for promotional bodies in 
implementing the law.  
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In short, although framing assumptions alone could not explain the policy output, 
knowing the power relations and the dominant organisation, those framing assumptions 
could contribute to understanding, or even predicting the policy output.  
6.6.2. The process in the Cabinet 
The final session of the RC was held on 8 May 2007. In an interview on 29 July 2007, 
i.e. less than three months later, the head of the office reported that the second session of 
the NBC113 had been held and the controversies between the MoA and the MoS over the 
scope of the law remained unresolved even after that session. 114 This type of reporting 
indicates at the very least that the controversies were continuing at the high level of 
decision making at that time, at least between the MoA and the MoS.115  
Although there is a shortage of information about the policy process at the high level of 
decision making and between Ministers, there are some indications that at least the MoA 
and the MoS were in conflict with each other over the scope of the law. As an example 
confirming that the controversies were still alive, the Minister of Science, in an interview 
on 25 September 2007, i.e. nearly five months after finishing the RC discussions, said 
that he had asked the DoE to trust the approach of the MoS to biosafety.116 He stressed 
that the MoS could provide sound scientific reasons that biotechnology would not harm 
the environment. The draft biosafety law was finally approved by the Cabinet on 28 May 
2008, a year after the final session of the RC and nine months after the second NBC 
session.117  
The final draft, which was approved by the Cabinet and sent to the Parliament, contained 
no sign of change from the final draft of the Reviewing Committee.118 The only alteration 
to the content was about the scope of the law, from which ‘production’ was excluded (i.e. 
the MoS prevailed over the MoA on this issue). Nonetheless, the government had split 
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the draft into two separate parts: the first part determining the operational structure, and 
the second part covering other issues. The Cabinet decided to send just the second part to 
the Parliament and approved the first part as a governmental stipulation determining the 
structure of the NBC, the CC, the office of the secretariat and the Ministerial and 
organisational groups. On 5 August 2008, Parliament announced that it had received the 
government’s Biosafety Bill.119 In the next chapter, I will discuss the Parliamentary process 
and the changes made to the bill in the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament. 
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 Chapter 7. The Third Phase of Negotiations: Parliamentary Process, August 
2009 - May 2009  
7.1. Introduction 
The last chapter investigated the process by which a draft biosafety law was prepared by 
the RC and passed to the Parliament. The output of the RC was a draft intimately 
reflecting the views and assumptions of the DoE over biosafety. In this chapter, I shall 
discuss the process in which the Parliament amended the Government’s bill, and finally 
passed a new version as Iran’s formal biosafety law.  
In this chapter, I will not follow the style of discussion of two previous chapters because 
there has been no access to voice recordings or other similar minutes regarding the 
sessions of the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament, the main body that dealt with 
the proposal before transferring the bill to the main Chamber. The sessions of this 
Committee were held by inviting the deputies and senior representatives of the MoA, 
MoS and MoH as well as the head of the DoE and the head of the office located in the 
DoE, in addition to several other biotechnological experts. These sessions finally resulted 
in an amended draft of the biosafety law.  
I conducted a first round of interviews after the end of the RC in summer 2008, but 
before the start of the Parliamentary sessions, and a second round of interviews were 
conducted in summer 2009 after passage of the law by the main Chamber. I will use those 
data to organise this chapter. After a short description of the third phase of legislation in 
the next section, I shall discuss findings from the interviews based along several 
dimensions. Firstly, I will track the changes of framing assumptions to find out to what 
extent the framing assumptions of the protagonists changed after the previous 
Governmental negotiations and during the Parliamentary discussions. Secondly, I will try 
to populate the empty or less fully-explained cells of the table of framing assumptions, 
using the data from the second round of interviews as the final viewpoints of the 
protagonists that might be different from their assumptions in the earlier stages.120  
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Based on those assumptions, I will discuss the policy output of the Agricultural 
Committee of the Parliament by further testing the hypothesis of the previous chapter vis-
à-vis the power relations during the sessions. In addition, I shall describe the process in 
the main Chamber which led to enacting the biosafety law by drawing on the minutes of 
the speeches in the Chamber over the three days spent discussing the biosafety bill, i.e. 12, 
13 and 17 of May 2009.121  
7.2. Process of Legislation 
On 6 August 2008, the Parliament of Iran announced receiving the Government’s bill for 
the biosafety law. After finishing formal administrative procedures, the bill was sent to the 
Agricultural Committee of the Parliament on 26 August 2008, as the most relevant 
committee for further discussion, before transferring it to the Chamber. Nearly two 
months were sufficient for this committee to publish an initial amended draft on 15 
October 2008, including substantial changes compared to the Government’s bill.122 Less 
than three months later on 1st January 2009, the Government asked Parliament to 
withdraw its suggested bill which was the result of RC negotiations.123  
In a radio interview after the withdrawal of the Government’s bill, the head of the 
Agricultural Committee of the Parliament claimed that in the sessions of the Agricultural 
Committee that resulted in the amended draft, all Ministries and organisations who had 
been formerly involved in the CC and RC negotiations were present, and all agreed the 
alterations and modifications.124 He suggested that if it were possible to continue the 
sessions, it would probably end all controversies by developing a final draft.  
However, he did not mention or explain why the DoE as the office of the secretariat had 
urged the Government to withdraw the bill. The head of the DoE implied that the main 
reason for withdrawing the bill was the devastating alterations introduced in the 
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Agricultural Committee sessions, which had changed it into a biotechnology development 
law rather than biosafety one.125  
In the same radio interview, the chair of the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament 
also unveiled the plan of this committee to continue the sessions and submit the final 
proposal to the Parliament as a new biosafety bill. His prediction came true; on 26 
January 2009 Parliament announced receiving the new bill for the biosafety law from the 
Agricultural Committee. Indeed, when the DoE urged the Government to withdraw the 
bill, it likely did not expect that the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament would 
submit its version as a new bill less than a month after that withdrawal. The main 
Chamber then spent three days discussing the biosafety proposal on 12, 13 and 17 May 
2009, and the biosafety law of Iran passed on 17 May 2009.  
7.3. Interviews and Framing Assumptions 
As I have indicated previously, there was a problem in accessing information about what 
happened in the Agricultural Committee sessions that was as detailed as the information I 
obtained for the process of negotiations in the Government. In the following paragraphs, 
I will discuss the insights that came from my interviews to enrich our understanding of 
the framing assumptions, when compared to the findings of the previous chapters. 
Intriguingly, the interviewees highlighted the same points that they had emphasised in the 
CC and the RC, showing the overall stability of their framing assumptions. Nonetheless, I 
shall use relevant documents as other sources of data. With a detailed picture of the 
framing assumptions it should be possible to analyse the policy output of this stage.   
7.3.1. Policy Problems: Safety or harm of biotechnology influencing the definition of 
the problem 
Regarding the assumptions about the harm and safety of biotechnology that largely affect 
the definition of the problem in hand, protagonists revealed more, especially about their 
general views of ‘technology’ and ‘technology development’.  
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7.3.1.1. The MoH 
The representative of the MoH on 5 July 2008 hailed biotechnology as a masterpiece for 
helping humans, aiding the development of human life and addressing some unsatisfied 
needs such as world hunger. He described biotechnology as a major tool for solving 
current problems in health, food and agriculture and subsequently provided several 
examples of how biotechnology could help humans through manipulating the genetic 
structure of foods or medicines as further means of support for his argument.  
Regarding possible risks from this technology, he argued that there is no difference 
between biotechnology and other technologies. He suggested that a problem might arise 
from abusing biotechnology, similar to other technologies, in the same way that a knife 
can be used to kill people, but this is not a legitimate reason for banning the production 
or sale of knives. In representing biotechnology as primarily beneficial, like tractors which 
are beneficial for farmers, the representative of MoH argued that safety concerns should 
be focused on preventing abuses of biotechnology.126  
The Deputy Minister of Health also endorsed this view by suggesting that there is no 
difference between modern and traditional biotechnology. In the latter, crops were 
modified externally through the mechanism of natural selection, while in the former, 
genes are being modified internally by humans. The view of the MoH was that there is no 
basis for fearing risk or harm from biotechnology. The Deputy Minister emphasised that 
a GM product is no different from a natural product. In the view of this Ministry, there is 
no difference between the risks of biotechnology and those of other technologies, and 
fundamentally there is no safety difference between genetically modified and natural 
foods or crops. The MoH had always been very relaxed in terms of any scientific 
development and argued that research activities should be left free of regulation.127  
7.3.1.2. The MoS 
On 2 July 2008 the representative of the MoS claimed that genetic engineering is a 
process for reducing the required time for gene transfer. There is no doubt that genes are 
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transferring in the environment in traditional plant breeding, and by gene manipulation 
scientists are just speeding up processes that otherwise might have taken thousands of 
years. All technologies might pose some risks and biotechnology is not distinctive in this 
way, just like cars or aeroplanes, for which possible risks are assessed, managed and 
accepted. As humans need transportation and have accepted those technologies by 
reducing their possible negative effects, biotechnologists try to examine a variety of 
products over seven or eight years to find a workable product, and one that confers 
minimum risk.128  
These assumptions mean that, in the view of the MoS, there is no difference between 
biotechnology and other technologies, considering it as a safe innovation in principle. In 
addition, on 24 September 2007, after finishing the RC sessions and before sending the 
draft to the Parliament, the Minister of Science argued that the DoE was extremely 
suspicious about biotechnology, whereas the MoS had sound scientific reasons for its 
claim that biotechnology is safe and no different from other technologies.129  
7.3.1.3. The MoA 
In an interview on 27 July 2008, the representative of the MoA argued that over the time, 
trust in GM products and their safety has increased and will continue to do so. However, 
looking at the profile of commercialised GM products, more than 90 percent of them at 
the time were soya, canola (oil seed rape), cotton and corn, which mostly are not for 
direct human consumption. He argued that therefore the concerns for human health 
might be higher than the concerns for the environment. He added that the possibility of 
causing harm to the environment would be near to zero, as the process of gene transfer 
has always occurred in nature. In his view, because it is not possible to say that the risks 
are exactly zero there is therefore a need to consider some security measures for 
biotechnology.130  
The head of the Agricultural Biotechnology Research Institute of Iran (ABRII) compared 
biotechnology with aeroplanes to argue that, like the latter which need special safety 
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measures, the former also requires specific treatment to be used and applied.131 In this 
sense, the view of the MoA vis-à-vis biotechnology was that it was like other technologies 
in that it might impose some risks along with its benefits.  
7.3.1.4. The DoE 
In an interview on 22 July 2008, the representative of the DoE tried to highlight the basis 
of that department’s concern by interpreting the emergence of the CPB as a result of 
widespread similar concerns all around the world. He claimed that the warnings over 
increasing development of biotechnology led the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) to initiate the CPB, aiming at devising managerial and controlling mechanisms in 
relation to the risks of biotechnology. The root of those concerns, in his view, could be 
traced to the history of science that on one hand conferred substantial benefits and on the 
other hand generated risks and harm. Referring to the case of air pollution from cars, the 
DoE argued that it is necessary to exercise caution, as many negative effects of previous 
technologies were only recognised several years after their introduction. In this respect, 
there might be problems associated with the process of technological development, and 
this calls for the necessity that researchers should demonstrate that their products are 
safe.132  
These statements clearly show the overall concern of the DoE, not just about 
biotechnology, but over negative effects of many kinds of technological developments. 
The head of the office of the secretariat in the DoE, in a separate interview on 29 June 
2008, claimed that biotechnology is potentially worse, as the harm of this technology is 
generally irreversible.133 Therefore, it is different from other technologies, and calls for an 
entirely different safety approach.  
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7.3.2. Risk system 
Interviews confirmed the previous positions of the protagonists regarding whether or not 
to consider research as a source of potential risk, and also on the issue of whether a lack 
of a biosafety law was a source of political risk, as in the view of the MoA.  Hence, the 
interviews did not add new information in those respects. Regarding the scope of the risks 
and the bounds of causalities within the system, I obtained the views of the MoA and the 
MoS from interviews as follows.  
7.3.2.1. Scope of Risks 
With respect to the scope of risks, the MoS suggested that assessing the long-term, 
indirect impacts as well as the effects on non-target organisms by science might not 
always be possible. For this purpose, there are scientific means of extrapolation, for 
instance from short-term assessments, that could help to predict the long-term effects, but 
in principle there is no way to empirically address these types of concerns definitively. 
Therefore, the only way of dealing with this would be to accept scientific judgments, but 
not to wait a long time for these uncertainties to be diminished.  
The view of the MoA about the scope of risks and short/long-term and direct/indirect 
effects and effects on target/non-target organisms was concentrated on the idea that risks 
would vary case by case and therefore it was not possible to identify the scope of the risk 
as a general rule prior to having particular cases at hand. Nonetheless, an interpretation of 
this view is that for the MoA, there might be some instances in which there would be a 
need to consider long-term, indirect effects and those on non-target organisms, but 
perhaps not in all instances.  
7.3.3. The role of biotechnological experts in policy prescriptions 
In terms of the ways of addressing the problem and the proper role of different agents, 
especially biotechnological experts, the interviews revealed new information by reflecting 
on the experience of recent years and the process of negotiations when the DoE 
controlled the office.   
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The MoH provided more details in the interview about its technocratic view mainly by 
criticising the lack of expert knowledge in the DoE. The representative of the MoH 
defined biosafety as knowledge of how to control biotechnology, meaning that it was 
defined within the scope of biotechnology science to devise the proper control measures. 
Therefore, in his view, non-biotechnologists and non-experts should not be allowed to be 
involved in the subject. He argued that all the current difficulties with the biosafety law 
came from involving non-experts in the legislative process, especially the DoE which 
suffered from a lack of scientific knowledge. To him, that department could not tell 
wrong from right and therefore imposed too many problems on biosafety.  
The senior representative of the MoH argued that having non-scientific views had 
undermined the decisions on biosafety. In his words, it could not be valid to oppose 
biotechnology by drawing on imaginings or by highlighting non-scientific possibilities. 
Moving beyond scientific principles and considering non-scientific possibilities would 
lead to the illusion that, for instance, all humans are carrying a bomb in their stomachs 
because there are several microbes in the atmosphere, while everybody knows that this is 
not the case. Therefore, it would not be legitimate to deal with this issue according to 
political considerations or ideas, but only according to science.134 In a scientific system, 
decisions should be purely scientific. Therefore, the MoH stressed that biosafety could 
not be separated from biotechnology, as it concerns the measures that scientists need to 
address in their developmental activities, and those scientists are the best people to 
identify those measures.135   
For the MoS, biosafety was also framed within the borders of biotechnology science 
without including any contribution from politics. The representative of the MoS believed 
that the difficulties in the Iranian system of biosafety had arisen because the issue had 
been treated in a political way. He added that taking a political approach to biosafety 
entailed undermining the scientific approach. Referring to some instances during the 
negotiations, he noted that the head of the DoE several times asked the others to consider 
something without providing any scientific reasons, and that was not the right approach 
because biosafety needed a scientific and not a political approach. In his view, biosafety 
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was not like a political law, but was a professional field that needed a sophisticated, expert 
approach. Unfortunately, the head of the DoE was not an expert in that field, and as there 
were some biotechnological researchers who could not recognise the true nature of the 
field, how could it be possible for the head of the DoE to understand the issues? The 
fundamental approach to biosafety, in the view of MoS, should be scientific, with no 
interventions from the political side.136  
The MoA emphasised a clear distinction between science and politics, presuming science 
to act independently of values and vested interests. The representative of the MoA argued 
that there must be a clear separation between science and policy in that science would 
implement the law by undertaking risk assessments, deciding over authorisation and risk 
management, while people with political responsibilities as the members of NBC should 
contribute to setting general policies about biosafety according to the situation of the 
country, such as policies over imports and exports of GMOs.137  These ideas of the MoA 
were quite close to the provisions of the decisionist model. The MoA representative 
suggested that the prevailing difficulties had come from the lack of expertise within the 
DoE, which was supposed to uphold a scientific view but couldn’t. That department had 
neither enough knowledge and academic training nor the organisational infrastructure to 
deal with biosafety, according to the senior representative of the MoA.  
For the DoE, biosafety should be decided at a political level, and the representative of this 
department revealed a more negative view towards domestic biotechnological researchers 
and other organisations with promotional responsibilities. He stressed twice that it was 
not easy to understand the behaviour of Iranian biotechnological experts with regard to 
biosafety, because on the one hand there had been several reports indicating problems 
with biotechnology, and on the other hand the Iranian biotechnological experts insisted 
that there could be no risks from biotechnology. He argued that this paradox would lead 
to a conclusion that the Iranian biotechnological experts might prioritise their 
professional interests over considering the safety of the environment, particularly the 
protection of biodiversity.138  
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The head of the DoE stressed repeatedly the problems that might arise from 
incorporating biotechnological experts in regulating biotechnology in the sessions of the 
main Chamber.139 In addition, the head of the office of the secretariat claimed several 
times that those biotechnological experts that were representing the Ministries with 
promotional responsibilities would try to maximise their benefits rather than considering 
the safety of the environment or human health.140 This analysis complements the 
understanding of the approach of the DoE in excluding biotechnological experts as much 
as possible from biosafety regulation because of their participation in promoting 
biotechnology, and gaining benefits from developing this technology.141 Therefore, DoE 
suggested just a consulting role for biotechnological experts or other expert organizations, 
excluding them from any decisive roles in biosafety regulation. 
7.3.4. Summarising the findings 
Table 7-1 represents a more complete picture of the diverse framing assumptions of the 
Ministries and the DoE of the Iranian biosafety legislation system during and after the 
Parliamentary discussions based on two sets of interviews: before and after that last stage 
of negotiations. Regarding the dynamic of the overall process, the findings show the 
overall stability of the framing assumptions from the start of the CC to the passage of the 
law.  
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Table 7- 1 Divergent framing assumptions of Ministries and organisations in the 
Parliamentary process 
Elements of Framing Contested Issues MoH MoS MoA DoE 
Framing Assumptions 
Assumptions affecting 
understandings of the 
nature of the policy 
problem 
Presuming 
biotechnology safe or 
harmful? 
• Like other technologies, 
beneficial, with the 
potential of abuse  
• Biotechnology is like other 
technologies 
• So biotechnology is also 
beneficial and safe if there 
is no proof of harm  
• Like other technologies are 
beneficial, if their risks are 
controlled 
• Biotechnology is like other 
technologies 
• So biotechnology is also 
beneficial and safe if there is 
no proof of harm  
• Other technologies are 
beneficial, but might generate 
risks 
• Biotechnology is like other 
technologies 
• So biotechnology is also 
beneficial and should not be 
considered essentially harmful 
if it develops according to 
official safety measures 
• Other technologies generated 
problems while conferring some 
benefits 
• Biotechnology is worse, as its 
problems exceed its benefits 
• There is a need for proof of 
safety 
Research activities as a 
source of possible risk? 
No. Researchers are the best 
people to ensure the safety 
of their work. 
No. Research activities would 
not generate risk.  
Yes. Researchers might fail to 
adhere to safety measures and 
therefore pose substantial risks. 
Yes. Researchers might follow 
their interests and therefore 
cause harm.  
Lack of the law as a 
source of political risk? 
- - Yes - Assumptions regarding 
the risk system 
Scope of the risk and 
the causalities within 
the system? 
Physical.  
Short-term, direct effects on 
target organisms.  
Physical. Assessing long-term, 
indirect and non-target 
organisms according to 
scientific judgments 
Physical as well as political  
Scope of the physical 
assessment should be identified 
case by case 
Physical.  
Long-term, indirect effects and 
effects on non-target organisms 
should be assessed.  
Assumptions about the 
ways of dealing with 
Role of 
biotechnological experts • Only biotechnological • Biotechnological scientists • Biotechnological scientists 
Essentially political and 
managerial 
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in the process of 
regulation? 
scientists should draft the 
biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should set the 
safety standards 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should implement 
the law 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should play a decisive role 
in general biosafety policy 
contribute to drafting the 
biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should set the safety 
standards 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should implement 
the law before releasing 
products 
• Biotechnological scientists and 
policy should decide together 
over releases 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should be involved in the 
general biosafety policy 
contribute to drafting the 
biosafety law 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should set the safety 
standards 
• Only biotechnological 
scientists should implement 
the law 
• Biotechnology science should 
not be involved in the general 
biosafety policy 
 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should only advise their 
organisations in drafting the 
biosafety law 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should just advise in setting 
safety standards and risk 
assessments 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should not take part in 
decisions about implementation 
and enforcement 
• Biotechnological scientists 
should not be involved in 
general biosafety policy 
problems (e.g. models of 
risk assessment and risk 
management) 
Separation of 
promotion from 
regulation? 
No need for separation at all No need for separation at all 
• Separation between political 
goal-setting and other expert 
jobs 
• No separation in drafting 
• Separation in that there should 
be no decisive role for 
biotechnological scientists at 
different stages 
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The interviews revealed two new important findings about the framing assumptions of 
the organisations. First were the general views towards technology that help explain 
considerable differences in the approaches to regulating biotechnology. Moving from the 
MoH to the DoE along the horizontal axis of Table 7-1, it seems that emphasis on the 
downsides of the technology increases. For the MoH, problems of the technology might 
come from abusing it; for the MoS there could be possible risks; for the MoA technology 
might generate risks; and finally for the DoE technology has been envisaged as a source of 
many problems that need specific attention. The second finding is regarding the debate 
about conceiving biotechnology as being like other technologies or as something 
essentially different. In this respect, it was only the DoE that perceived biotechnology as 
an entirely different and more dangerous technology compared to other technologies.  
7.4. Policy Output 
The result of the sessions of the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament was an entirely 
different draft compared to the Government’s bill, although there was no change to the 
framing assumptions of the protagonists. For a better understanding of this policy output, 
and according to the hypotheses of the previous chapters, I will investigate the power 
relations in the sessions of the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament to find out 
whether there was a dominant power (certainly not the DoE) to impose its framing 
assumptions, or whether the draft was changed and produced in a different way. 
As part of the Parliamentary process, and because the Agricultural Committee of the 
Parliament was the main body to deal with the bill, those MPs who were members of this 
committee had the power to change the draft. However, as they were not experts in 
biotechnology or biosafety, MPs on the Agricultural Committee invited deputies and 
senior representatives of the Ministries involved in the former negotiations (i.e. the MoH, 
the MoS and the MoA) as well as the DoE and some other biotechnological experts, 
including the researcher who developed the Iranian GM rice.  
From the outset, there were indications that the MPs on the Agricultural Committee 
trusted the opinions of biotechnological experts, some of whom were the representatives 
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of the MoH, the MoS and the MoA. Their trust in the biotechnological experts became 
clear when, just a day after withdrawing the Government’s bill, representatives of the 
MoH, the MoA and the MoS along with some biotechnological experts gathered in the 
Pasteur Institute (PI) located in the MoH to discuss the decision of the Government and 
the future of biosafety. The head of the Agricultural Committee also joined them, and 
perhaps it was in that session that he was persuaded to submit the amended draft as a new 
biosafety bill in response to the Government’s withdrawal.142  
In that session, he stated that the Government’s decision to withdraw the bill had wasted 
over 100 hours of sophisticated work in the Agricultural Committee of the Parliament. 
He added something that showed his general view towards biotechnology was close to 
those of the MoH and the MoS: “some people argue that biotechnology is essentially 
dangerous, like a cake containing a bomb. This is not true; biotechnology is like other 
technologies that might confer some risks. In this sense, electronics also could generate 
some risks, but this is not a reason to ban that technology.”143 In a radio programme after 
the above meeting, and before submitting the new bill, the head of the Agricultural 
Committee of the Parliament indicated that this committee had modified the 
Government’s bill after getting advice from various biotechnological experts to clarify and 
improve it.144  
In the second round of interviews, representatives of the MoH and the MoS confirmed 
that they had participated in those sessions and put forward their views, while MPs were 
the final decision-makers who mainly adopted their judgments as sound and scientific.145  
Moreover, there are some official letters confirming that the MoS and the MoH 
supported the Parliament’s bill and its approach. On 23 February 2009, the MoH sent a 
letter to Parliament indicating that the current draft bill was satisfactory.146 On 13 April 
2009, the representative of the MoS, by emphasizing what he thought to be the positive 
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aspects of the Parliament’s bill, claimed that enacting the amended draft would be a 
tremendous help for the country as a whole.147  
7.4.1. Analysing the amended draft 
Hence, knowing that many of the opinions of the representatives of the MoH and MoS 
influenced MPs, as well as knowing the framing assumptions of those Ministries, it may 
not be difficult to predict that the amended draft would be radically different from the 
Government’s earlier bill.148  
While the Government’s initial bill, which was a reflection of the views of the DoE, was 
trying to control biotechnology through exerting political control over biotechnology 
developments, the amended draft became a version that considered biotechnology to be 
just like other technologies and therefore mostly beneficial, delegating authority to the 
Ministries involved in developmental activities as the relevant expert bodies, and letting 
research and development activities be conducted without tough regulations. The 
amended draft, which was turned into a new bill proposed by the Agricultural Committee 
of the Parliament after the withdrawal of the Government’s earlier bill, conformed to 
those characteristics.  
In comparison to the Government’s bill, which had devoted a great deal of effort to 
identifying infractions and penalties, the Parliament’s bill left the decision making vis-à-
vis violations to a three-member committee constituted of three biotechnological experts 
from the MoH, the MoS and the MoA, and if they could not resolve the problem, then 
to the judiciary. The new bill mainly tried to clarify the responsibilities of the 
organisations involved and the implementation structure, with an emphasis that those 
implementing authorities that opposed requests without any scientific proof of harm 
would be acting unlawfully and should be prosecuted.  
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The changes in more detail were as follows: 
• Eliminating the precautionary approach from the opening clauses  
• Allowing research activities to be conducted free of regulation before the stage of 
release (even field trials would be free of restrictions)  
• The NBC should be established and composed of the Ministers of the MoH, the 
MoS, the MoA and the DoE as well as two biotechnological experts, and chaired 
by a Deputy President (i.e. not the head of DoE and not necessarily the First 
Deputy)149  
• The office of the secretariat should be shifted to the office of President rather 
than the DoE  
• The MoA as the National Focal Point (NFP) for international communications  
• Failure to issue authorisations without scientific proof of harm was deemed to be 
a type of infraction that could lead to prosecution  
• There was to be no post-law CC. The responsibility for authorisation was 
delegated to the MoH, the MoA and the DoE, each within a specific domain. The 
remit of the DoE was confined to natural parks or wild areas, while farms and 
urban areas were considered under the authority of the MoA   
• The draft did not cover pharmaceuticals.  
This output from the Parliamentary negotiations confirms the suggestion and prediction 
that the dominant framing assumption would shape the policy output, and therefore 
knowing the power relations as well as the framing assumptions of the parties would 
facilitate explaining the policy output.  
7.4.2. Objections of the MoA and the DoE to the Parliament’s draft bill 
On the other side, both the DoE and the MoA prepared some documents to analyse the 
Parliament’s bill. In an extended analysis report on 26 January 2009, the MoA 
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highlighted the following issues, which, inter alia, indicate their assumptions towards the 
risk-generating system, as well as the policy prescriptions for dealing with the issue: 
- “The scope of the law should be extended to cover field trials.” This argument is 
in line with their view towards the risk-generating system and whether or not 
scientific research could be a source of risk.  
- “It is not reasonable to have biotechnological experts in the NBC.” This 
statement confirms again the view of the MoA that there should be a sharp 
separation of science from politics in a type of decisionist model.150  
In a document comparing the Government’s bill with the Parliament’s bill, the DoE 
criticised several features of the latter. Chief among them in relation to the framing 
assumptions were: 151  
- Unfortunately, biotechnology is labelled as a technology that is definitely safe and 
provides undeniable benefits that exceed any risks. This notion is not true.  
- A serious problem arises from overlooking the processes and activities of 
biotechnology including the intermediate products prior to release.  
- It is not reasonable to have two biotechnological experts as developers of 
biotechnology on the NBC.  
- The Parliament’s bill is seriously inadequate because it does not require the 
applicant to provide scientific proof of safety.  
- It overlooks the central monitoring and controlling dimensions of biosafety.  
Nevertheless, the main Chamber made few changes in the sessions debating the new bill, 
in spite of the speeches and efforts of the head of the DoE to insert considerable changes 
in those sessions. Therefore, the final law of Iran was very close to the views of the MoH 
and the MoS, which was reflected in the new bill. In the next section, I shall describe the 
main Chamber process.  
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7.5. Enacting the law in the Chamber 
Discussing the process and negotiations in the main Chamber may be worthwhile, given 
that the speeches of the head of the DoE as the representative of the Government152 at the 
final stage of debating the draft law reveal how the head of the DoE was unhappy with 
the eventual contents of the biosafety law and tried to change it as far as possible. 
Initially, she recommended that the Parliament should reject the entire bill. By calling the 
new draft a proposal for developing biotechnology rather than one for protecting 
biodiversity and human health, the head of the DoE stressed the following points, some 
of them several times: 
• “Scientific documents should prove that biotechnological products are safe, 
especially with respect to the human health.”153 “There is plenty of evidence 
suggesting that biotechnology could create allergies, gene transfer and so on.”154 
This is related to the previously mentioned framing assumption that influences 
the definition of the policy problem. Thus, for the DoE, biotechnology was still 
regarded as a thing that needed a proof of safety.  
• “There might be substantial problems arising from research activities, especially 
those conducting field trials. There should be adequate monitoring and control 
over these activities.”155 Concern over research is a part of the assumptions about 
the risk system and the sources of risks, and whether research activities could pose 
considerable risks or not. Again, the DoE portrayed research activities as an 
important source of possible risks.  
• “How can some biotechnological experts, who are involving in biotechnology 
development, contribute to the National Biosafety Committee, a committee that 
should essentially monitor and control biotechnological activities? It is not 
possible to expect the producers to perform a controlling role as well.”156 So far, 
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the concerns of the DoE over the benefits and interests of experts not only led 
this department to identify research activities as an important source of risks, but 
also to propose excluding them from any activity related to implementing the law, 
especially their presence on the NBC.  
• More generally, the head of the DoE complained about the Parliament’s bill by 
stressing that “the essence of biosafety is protecting biodiversity and the 
environment and human health, while the current draft does not meet this 
essential characteristic.”157 It is now clear that this definition of biosafety was 
rooted in a specific view of the safety and harm of biotechnology, as well as a 
suspicious view of domestic experts working on developing biotechnology.  
However, the DoE was successful only in inserting the following changes in the Chamber, 
while other parts remained unchanged in comparison to the new bill: 
1- Moving the suggested location of the office of the secretariat of the NBC from 
the office of the President to the DoE 
2- Removing the article stressing that refusing to authorise should only be based on 
proven scientific documents showing harm from the product  
3- Cancelling an article indicating that the bodies that rejected the production or 
commercialisation of a product without proven scientific evidence could be 
prosecuted and might face considerable penalties.  
However, one implication of the above changes was that the office of the secretariat for 
the NBC remained under the control of the DoE, which gave this department some 
power to contribute and possibly oppose the intentions of other Ministries to promote 
biotechnology.  
7.6. The future: controversies or convergence? 
The above narrative indicates that the biosafety law of the country was passed amid 
disagreements between the Ministries involved and the DoE. It was not only the DoE that 
was unhappy with the overall approach of the eventual law, and the MoA that was 
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concerned about some parts of it, but the MoH and the MoS were also disappointed by 
the changes that took place in the main Chamber as the result of the efforts of the head of 
the DoE. The MoH and the MoS were especially unhappy with the shift of the location 
of the office back to the DoE, which in their view had essentially been the source of many 
problems in the past.  
In a harsh criticism just after the second day of negotiations in the Chamber (13 May 
2009), when the location of the office was shifted back to the DoE, the representative of 
the MoS called that decision “unfair” and even “illegitimate” because, in his view, the 
head of the DoE had misled MPs by presenting incorrect information. He also argued 
that the decision of the Parliament to omit the article which obliged organisations and 
Ministries to provide proven scientific information for banning biotechnological products 
was also unacceptable.158  
In an interview on 20 May 2009, just three days after passing the law, the head of the 
office of the secretariat in the DoE argued that the final law suffered from 
shortcomings.159 He referred to the issue of labelling, which, according to the law, is only 
necessary for imported and exported products, excluding those used for domestic 
consumption. He also criticised the scope of the law according to which even field trials 
were considered as a type of research and therefore free from any specific regulation. He 
mentioned that by locating the office in the DoE, the office would concentrate on its 
monitoring and controlling role, while there were still some problems with regard to the 
MoA as the National Focal Point, as that Ministry could not perform the proper 
controlling role because of its engagement in developmental activities. In his view, this 
required revising the law.160  
After the end of the second session of the Chamber on 13 May 2009, and before starting 
the third and final session on 17 May, the head of the DoE in an interview on 15 May 
stressed that, according to the parts of the law that were currently approved by the main 
Chamber, the DoE would be able to not allow any type of genetic modification either on 
                                                 
158
 http://mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=877997  
159
 http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8802301083  
160
 According to the final law, the DoE was the office of the secretariat for the NBC and the MoA was the National Focal Point for 
international relations, especially with regard to the CPB.  
  
155 
animals or plants in its specific domains of responsibility, i.e. in wild nature and natural 
parks.161 She added that the DoE would ask the MoA and the MoH to make sure of the 
safety of biotechnological products, which is related to their duties under the law.  
The representative of the MoA on 7 June 2009, 20 days after passing the law, argued that 
although the biosafety law had positive aspects, it also suffered from some problems.162 
Among the main problems, he referred to the scope of the law according to which 
research activities, including field trials, were exempted from biosafety regulation. To 
resolve this problem, he proposed that the rules and regulations of the biosafety law, to be 
written very soon, could anticipate proper safety mechanisms for controlling field trials. 
However, the most important problem in his view was the shift of the office of the 
secretariat to the DoE, which might lead to substantial problems in the future. These 
interviews show that for the bodies involved, even passing the law could not be 
interpreted as a sign of their concerns having been met.  
In short, these interviews published in the media reflect the points of disagreement and 
the issues which had been the main topics of conflict from the outset; the matters that 
were not resolved even by the passage of the law. However, the missing point in all these 
controversies is considering the assumptions that framed the views of the protagonists in 
this way, the assumptions that had never been a subject of discussion and remained 
unresolved.  
While the law excluded research in order not to burden research activities, the office of 
the secretariat of the NBC is still in the DoE, which does not agree with the spirit of this 
law. As the office is responsible for coordinating several activities vis-à-vis biosafety, 
including the negotiations over finalising practical rules and instructions, it seems it has 
gained some power to advance its own view.   
Signs of problems emerged a year after the passage of the law when a senior representative 
of the MoS accused the office of the secretariat of what he called “the wrong approach to 
biosafety” and being “in opposition to the provisions of the biosafety law”. Referring to a 
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draft of rules and instructions for handling, transportation, import and export of GM 
products prepared by the DoE as the office of the secretariat, he argued that those 
instructions were absolutely unjustifiable because they presumed modified organisms were 
like untreatable diseases.163 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the answers to the empirical and theoretical research 
questions posed in Chapter 3 as well as the possible contribution of this research to 
suggesting useful ways for addressing the policy problem of Iran, followed by a discussion 
of the broader theoretical and empirical implications and other possible contributions of 
this research in more detail.  
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 Chapter 8. Conclusion and Discussion  
8.1. Introduction 
This research has provided a detailed empirical study based on a theoretical framework 
that was built on two broad streams of literature. The topic of this chapter is to identify 
what are the implications of these findings. This question can be considered from 
different perspectives, such as:  
1. What do these empirical findings suggest as the answers to the empirical research 
questions?  
2. What does this research suggest as the answer to the theoretical question? 
3. How might the answers to the research questions help in resolving the policy 
controversies in the case of biosafety regulation in Iran?  
4. How might those findings help broaden or enrich current theoretical 
understandings?  
5. How might the results of this research help in understanding the experiences of 
other similar countries, such as many developing countries that are members of the 
CPB?  
6. Do the results suggest anything about the many different countries, such as 
industrialised countries? 
7. Is there any implication for technology regulation and policy making in general? 
 I will discuss these questions in the remaining parts of this chapter.  
8.2. Answers to the Empirical Research Questions 
The main question of this research concerned the applicability of the concept of framing 
assumptions to explaining the controversies and changes in the case of biosafety 
regulation in Iran. I will restate the research questions posed in Chapter 3 and will discuss 
the answers to those questions.  
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• What types of different frames or framing assumptions can be identified and 
elicited from the participatory organisations in the system of biosafety regulation 
in Iran?  
Summary answers to this question can be found in Table 7-1. A summarised version of 
this table, characterising the types of framing assumptions, is represented in Table 8-1. As 
the table suggests, several types of framing assumptions were elicited that largely affected 
the perceptions of the protagonists in defining the three main aspects of the policy, i.e. 
policy problems, the risk system and policy prescriptions.  
Table 8- 1 Types of the identified framing 
assumptions 
 
Regarding the policy problem, the empirical findings suggest that different assumptions 
about technologies, along with assumptions regarding the degree of difference between 
biotechnology and other technologies, largely affected the understandings and negotiating 
positions of the protagonists.  
The risk-generating system as a part of the risk system is also understood differently by 
the antagonists according to their different framing assumptions. The degree to which the 
biosafety law could assume trustworthy researchers and organisations with promotional 
responsibilities is a distinguishing framing assumption. Scope of the risk in terms of 
whether or not it should include political dimensions as well as the scope of the physical 
risks and causalities within the system are two other pivotal types of framing assumptions.   
Definitions of the policy 
aspects 
Framing assumptions 
Understandings of the 
nature of the policy 
problems 
• Are technologies essentially beneficial or not? 
• Is biotechnology like other technologies or not? 
Comprehension of the 
risk system 
• Should the regulatory system trust the researchers and other bodies with 
promotional responsibilities? (Are they the best people to ensure the safety of 
their work, are they impartial, or is there a lack of facilities and equipment?) 
• Are the risks just physical (human health and the environment) or political? 
• What is the scope of physical risks? 
Policy prescriptions  
• Are biotechnological experts able to answer all the risk policy problems? 
• Are biotechnologists neutral or partisan? 
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Policy prescriptions were also different because of different framing assumptions 
regarding the sufficiency of biotechnology expertise to answer several risk policy 
problems, as well as different framing assumptions about the neutrality of biotechnology 
experts.  
I am not claiming that these are all the framing assumptions in the system, but they are 
some different framing assumptions that I was able to identify by applying my 
framework, and I argue that to a considerable degree the differences between them could 
help explain the controversies in the system.  
• To what extent are they different and even contradictory?  
The answer to this question can also be found in Table 7-1, but I have reshaped that 
table in Table 8-2 in a way that reflects the differences. Table 8-2 does not include the 
detail of the framing assumptions as does Table 7-1, but instead the cells are coloured in 
a way that shows the contrasts between organisations and Ministries. As the table 
suggests, it would be possible to distinguish between three overall perspectives, the MoH 
and the MoS as extreme promotional approaches, the MoA as a perspective paying 
attention to both risks and benefits of biotechnology, and the DoE primarily concerned 
about the risks of biotechnology.  
Regarding the safety or harm of biotechnology, the MoH and the MoS shared very 
similar assumptions as in their view, technology is generally safe, biotechnology is like 
other technologies and therefore biotechnology would not pose serious risks and should 
be considered safe, unless the opposite case was demonstrated. As a consequence, risk 
assessment studies should look for signs of harm rather than seeking to demonstrate that 
the technology is safe. On this basis, the policy problem for these two Ministries was not 
making the criteria for monitoring biotechnology development processes and products 
more stringent, but providing the means for exploiting the benefits of this technology as a 
type of technology development strategy.  
The MoA had a different approach in that it appreciated the possible risks of 
biotechnology, assuming that risk is a general issue for all technologies. In this sense, a 
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GM product as an output of biotechnological research is similar to an aeroplane: using 
each requires considering their specific safety measures. Consequently, in the view of the 
MoA, the problem with biotechnology was just applying the routine procedures of risk 
assessment and risk management.  
The view of the DoE with respect to the risks of biotechnology was conspicuously 
different from that of the other organisations, as this department adopted radically 
different framing assumptions. For the DoE, even other technologies could not be 
considered safe and beneficial, as for instance cars cause air pollution. Further, this 
department adopted another distinct assumption about biotechnology, perceiving it as 
essentially different from other technologies, and perhaps as a manipulation of nature that 
in turn might cause irreversible harm. Therefore, biotechnology could not be seen as safe 
at all, but as a problematic human activity, just some of which might not ultimately be 
hazardous. Thus, a main problem for the DoE was confronting and preventing the risks 
of biotechnology.  
  
161 
Table 8- 2 Summary of the overall findings of the research about the contrasts between 
framing assumptions in the biosafety regulation experience of Iran 
Elements of framing Contested issues MoH MoS MoA DoE 
Framing assumptions Assumptions affecting 
understandings of the 
nature of the policy 
Problem 
Presuming 
biotechnology safe or 
harmful? Safe Safe Almost Safe Harmful 
Research activities as a 
source of possible risk? No No Yes Yes 
Lack of the law as a 
source of political risk? No No Yes No 
Assumptions regarding 
risk system 
Scope of the risk and 
the causalities within 
the system? 
Narrow 
physical 
approach 
Narrow 
physical 
approach 
Physical and 
political 
Broad physical 
approach 
Role of 
biotechnological experts 
in the process of 
regulation? 
Scientists 
almost 
should 
regulate 
Scientists  
should have a 
decisive role 
in all stages of 
regulation 
Science and 
politics do the 
regulation 
Only policy-
makers should 
regulate 
Assumptions regarding 
ways of dealing with the 
problem (models of risk 
assessment and risk 
management) 
Separation of 
promotion from 
regulation? 
No No Partly Yes 
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The above sets of assumptions about biotechnology were in conflict with each other. 
There was a particularly sharp contrast between the assumptions of the MoH and the 
MoS on the one hand and the DoE on the other hand. The first group was seeking a law 
to be written on the assumption that biotechnology is essentially beneficial, while the 
DoE was trying to draft a law to avoid serious risks from biotechnology.  
In terms of the risk-generating system as a part of the risk system, a contested issue was 
about the potential risks of research activities. In this regard, the MoS and the MoH 
shared a view that research would not impose any serious risks, mainly because the 
researchers are assumed to be the best placed people to ensure the safety of their work, 
and partly because of their former assumption that biotechnology itself would not impose 
serious risks. By actively rejecting any idea to consider research activities as a potential 
source of risk, those Ministries argued for a law to be drafted based on a high degree of 
trust of research activities.  
For the MoA, research activities might be a source of potential risk not because of the 
partiality of the researchers as a burden of safety, but mainly because of the shortages of 
facilities in some locations in the country. Hence, the MoA supported the idea that 
research activities should be covered by the provisions of the biosafety law to ensure that 
they are being conducted under sufficient safety measures.  
The DoE took a pessimistic view in this respect: for this department research should be 
covered by the law because researchers might choose not to meet the safety conditions due 
to their vested interests in developing biotechnology. In the view of this department, there 
was no basis for designing the law according to an assumption of trust in biotechnology 
researchers. On the contrary, the law should be drafted on a basis to include the activities 
of researchers and all other sources of potential risk, especially from the bodies that might 
benefit from biotechnology promotion.  
There was another assumption about the risk system that distinguished the approach of 
the MoA from other Ministries and departments. The MoA frequently emphasised the 
necessity of having a law, arguing that the lack of a law would impose a type of political 
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risk for the country in its interactions with other countries concerning imports and 
exports; however, this Ministry sometimes compromised its opinions with the aim of 
approving the law as soon as possible. For instance, according to the data in previous 
chapters, this Ministry completely disagreed with locating the office of the secretariat in 
the DoE; however, it did not halt the processes of negotiation on this issue as the DoE 
had done in the two-day gathering.  
Finally, the scope of the law was another aspect of the risk system and the perceived 
border of causalities within it that was perceived differently. For the MoH and the MoS, 
the scope of the law should be limited to the physical aspects of biotechnology, 
considering short-term, direct effects and effects on target organisms, mainly because 
assessing other types of impacts goes beyond reliable scientific judgments and therefore 
becomes invalid.  
For the MoA, the scope of risk should also cover the political risks arising from the lack 
of the law. However, for the scope of physical risks, this Ministry suggested a case-by-case 
approach, meaning that the scope of assessing the risks should be individually determined 
in each case. This suggests that this Ministry did not reject the possibility of broader 
types of physical risks.  
The view of the DoE about the scope of risk was more sceptical, as this department 
suggested considering a very broad scope for risks, covering long-term, indirect effects and 
also effects on non-target organisms.  
Policy prescriptions or the ways of addressing problems were reflected in the proposals of 
the members about the proper mechanisms of risk assessment and risk management, and 
the responsibilities within this mechanism. However, antagonists adopted different views 
on how this mechanism should be established and how the responsibilities should be 
allocated and divided.  
In this sense, the MoS and the MoH adhered to the idea that biotechnology regulation is 
essentially a scientific activity, while for the MoA it was a combination of science and 
politics, and for the DoE it was perceived as an entirely political and managerial job. 
  
164 
Therefore, while for the MoA there were some opportunities for separating science from 
politics, this idea remained meaningless for the other members as the MoS and the MoH 
considered science necessary at each stage, even in the NBC in cooperation with the policy 
authorities; the DoE, on the contrary, perceived no role for biotechnology scientists at any 
stage and it therefore assumed the separation of biotechnology scientists and organisations 
with promotional responsibilities from all regulatory activities. 
By locating the assumptions of organisations such as in Figure 3-6 in Chapter 3 and 
modifying this to consider biotechnological scientists, it might be possible to characterise 
their prescriptions as is shown in Figure 8-1. However, as Figure 8-1 denotes, these are 
not general assumptions about the neutrality or sufficiency of science, but assumptions 
about biotechnological experts in the context of biosafety policy making in Iran. The 
horizontal line represents the sufficiency of biotechnological experts to answer the 
questions of biosafety regulation while the vertical line represents the extent to which 
those experts are supposed to be neutral in their judgements.  
As Figure 8-1 shows, the MoH approached the legislation based on a view very close to 
the technocratic view, presuming that biotechnology expertise would be sufficient for 
biosafety policy making (excepting the NBC that essentially should have policy-makers in 
its compositions) while conceiving biotechnology experts as a type of unbiased group. For 
the MoS, although biotechnology scientists might not be sufficient for the purpose of 
deciding biosafety regulations, they should have a decisive role in all stages and at all levels 
of decision making to make sure that a scientific approach is present in all decisions. The 
view of the MoA was very close to the decisionist approach in which, although the 
biotechnology experts were considered neutral, their expertise was not seen as sufficient to 
respond to all aspects of biosafety policy making, and the task of goal setting should be 
allocated to politicians rather than scientists. The view of the DoE is one that believed the 
bodies with promotional responsibilities should not be given any decisive role, instead 
merely advising policy makers for specific purposes, as they might be driven by their 
organisational and individual interests. I characterised the view of this department as a co-
evolutionary view; however it is not the one suggested by Millstone (2009), which also 
considered the framing assumptions and the reciprocal links between science and policy, 
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but is co-evolutionary in a sense that accepted scientific experts could be partisan and 
should therefore not have decisive roles, only advisory roles.  
Figure 8-1 Assumptions about the sufficiency and 
neutrality of biotechnology scientists in the process 
of regulation 
 
Overall, the findings of this research suggest that the framing assumptions of the 
organisations and Ministries were different and could provide an explanatory account for 
the long-lasting controversies, especially considering the fact that the members did not 
discuss these assumptions in the three stages of negotiation.  
• How did those framing assumptions change over time and why?  
Comparing Tables 5-1, 6-1 and 7-1 for the three rounds of negotiations reveals that there 
was no significant change in the framing assumptions of the protagonists, which in turn 
confirms the idea that the framing assumptions had a persistent characteristic over time 
and did not change, mainly because those assumptions were rarely explicitly addressed 
during the negotiations.  
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• Can the changes in the framing assumptions help explain changes in the policy 
outputs of each stage? 
As the framing assumptions did not change, there could be no links between the changes 
to the policy output and the changes of the framing assumptions. In other words, the 
persistent character of the framing assumptions could provide an explanation for the 
long-standing controversies, but could not explain the changes in the policy outputs of 
the three processes of negotiation.  
• If the framing assumptions remained unchanged, is it possible to understand the 
changes in the output of each policy stage in the light of changes to the dominant 
power? 
The empirical investigation has shown that the policy outputs of each stage can be closely 
linked to the power relations and the dominant power structure, and on this basis, the 
policy changes could be explained in the light of the changing of the dominant power at 
each stage. In this sense, the results of this research endorse the approach of Murphy and 
Levidow (2006) in combining the notions of power and framing to argue that the policy 
output would reflect the frame of the dominant power and a change of the dominant 
power would therefore change the policy output.  
However, the difference between the case of Iran and the experience of the EU is in the 
way power relations changes, at least for the transition from the first (CC) to the second 
stage (RC) of negotiations. For the EU, the dominant power could not resist public 
disputes and criticisms that questioned the legitimacy of their frames (Murphy and 
Levidow 2006). In the case of Iran, the dominant power changed through leveraging the 
organisational authorities, as happened in the transition from the first to the second 
round of negotiations, when the DoE used its authority as the office of the secretariat.  
However, the final parliamentary stage of negotiations was different in terms of how 
framings and power played role in the policy output. Although the transition from the 
RC to the agricultural committee of the parliament was associated with the change of 
decision-making power from the DoE to MPs, the members of the parliamentary 
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agricultural committee were not familiar with the issue and therefore they did not initially 
impose a specific set of framing assumptions. Instead, the process was for them to listen 
to the arguments of the antagonists in the agricultural committee sessions and decide 
about the eventual content of the Biosafety draft to be presented to the main Chamber for 
final decision.  
In this sense, the contending ministries found a new opportunity to present their views 
about the Biosafety law and they tried to convince the members of the agricultural 
committee that the underlying approach of the government’s bill (as a result of RC 
sessions heavily influenced by the DoE) was not on the right track; in particular by 
emphasizing that it was not supported by the chief biotechnological organizations in the 
MoH and the MoS. In this way, they partly used their scientific reputations as a means to 
convince the MPs that those ministries better understand the issues and so could 
formulate more appropriate policies.  
In addition, those ministries also used their framing assumptions, such as emphasizing the 
importance of biotechnology for economic progress and welfare, as another tool to 
convince the MPs that their approach would better suit the conditions of the country; 
thus they gained greater power in the final stages of the negotiations. While some sorts of 
framing assumptions were about who would better take the responsibility of 
implementing the law, those ministries were also successful to diminish the power of the 
DoE by emphasizing their framing assumption on the necessity of upholding expertise in 
implementing the law that in turn led to change of the office of the secretariat.164   
The first stage of negotiations could not yield any draft policy because different 
organisations were on a par in terms of their decision-making powers and their 
contradictory views prevented them reaching an agreed conclusion. The second round of 
negotiations ended with a draft very close to the views of the DoE, as the head of this 
department largely leveraged its organisational authority to affect decisions in line with its 
own approach. Finally, the output of the Parliamentary process was a draft very close to 
the views of the MoS and the MoH, mainly because they could gain a more influential 
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position compared to the DoE by convincing MPs that only their approach was 
scientifically sound and by using different tools including their framing assumptions.  
However, while the differences of power can contribute to explaining the change in the 
policy outputs, merely understanding the power relations alone could not help in 
identifying or predicting the output. This means that knowing which organisation was 
dominant would not alone be helpful in knowing what the policy output would be, but 
by knowing the dominant power as well as the framing assumptions of each institution, it 
would become possible to predict what the policy output would be.  
In summary, the research has concluded that the differences between the framing 
assumptions of the protagonists within the system persisted in a way that caused each of 
them to adopt a different approach, which then could not coherently come together in a 
draft biosafety law. In addition, as those framing assumptions did not change over the 
three rounds of negotiations, the changes in the power relations, which occurred partly 
because of the utilisation of those framing assumptions to gain influence in the last stage 
of negotiations, can account for the changes in the policy output. The policy output itself 
could be understood and perhaps predicted by knowing both the framing assumptions as 
well as the power relations.  
8.3. Theoretical Contributions 
A theoretical goal and aspiration of this research was concerned with making a link 
between two broad and separately developed streams of literature (public policy analysis 
and technological risk regulation) in order to develop a theoretical framework applicable 
for analysing the case of Iran. In this part, I will discuss the theoretical insights that could 
be inferred from this research, in terms of the unit of analysis it adopted and with respect 
to its theoretical framework as well as other possible contributions.  
8.3.1. Framing Assumptions and Narratives 
A prime concern in developing a framework for this research was the difference between 
two units of analysis applied in the literature. The public policy analysis approach tends 
to use the notion of narratives, as a type of generic stories, to analyse the controversies 
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between Governmental agencies or interests groups within a country, while the literature 
on risk regulation applies both notions of framing assumptions and narratives as sources 
of disparities among countries.   
As a result of the present research, it seems that applying the concept of framing 
assumptions can provide more explanatory power than the concept of narratives. For 
instance, considering the definitions of the policy problem, the general view regarding 
whether or not technologies could be seen as useful or as a source of risk is a type of 
generic narrative that not only implies what the problem is (i.e. technology itself), but also 
what the solution might be (i.e. constraining or monitoring the process of technological 
development). However, the narrative alone cannot provide as rich an explanation of 
controversies as the concept of framing assumptions, for two reasons.  
Firstly, the differences between organisations’ and Ministries’ views were not based on the 
general narratives they had, i.e. technology development is risky, therefore we should 
restrict or control it, but about the prime assumptions of these narratives, i.e. whether or 
not technology development is risky in this context. In this sense, organisations and 
Ministries held different assumptions but not different narratives. Secondly, this narrative 
could not capture another important assumption, i.e. the extent to which biotechnology is 
seen as being like other technologies. Therefore, even if organisations and Ministries had 
adopted similar narratives about the risks of technology development, differences in this 
assumption could lead to substantially different approaches to GM safety regulation.  
Nevertheless, there are also many other framing assumptions, like the assumptions of 
organisations towards each other, which might not be captured by the notion of 
narratives, which in turn would undermine the explanatory power of the research. 
Generally, narratives are broad stories that might underlie some differences, but they may 
not capture many relevant ideas and assumptions, especially because a variety of 
assumptions would be involved in each case (i.e. context-specific assumptions), which 
might not be articulated in the general narratives. 
Thus, the current research borrowed the notion of framing assumption from the works on 
analysing biotechnology regulation and experiences of risk assessment and risk 
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management at the level of country cases to examine the policy controversies at the level 
of organisations, which had previously been analysed mainly in the literature of public 
policy using the concept of narratives.  
8.3.2. Relations between the assumptions 
The above findings also suggest that the framing assumptions are interrelated and could 
affect the distinguishing characteristics of protagonists regarding different aspects of the 
policy, i.e. policy problems, risk system and prescriptions. For instance, the negative 
assumption of the DoE about the neutrality of experts not only led that organisation to 
consider the process of research as a source of risk, but also to propose leaving the experts 
out of several stages of policy implementation. As another example, the importance of 
political factors in defining the risks of biotechnology affected the view of the MoA in a 
way to both consider the political risks and the importance of compromising for the sake 
of the law, as well as conceiving a very important role for political authorities in the 
decision making process.  
8.3.3. Contributing to Public Policy Analysis 
These findings might also have theoretical implications for the literature on public policy 
analysis. In the context of public policy analysis, and the primary approach known as the 
idea-based view, which for discussing controversies has mainly used the notion of 
narratives, it seems that the concept of framing assumptions might provide a greater 
explanatory power in comparison to only applying the concept of narratives. In other 
words, while narratives are necessary to capture different features and controversial issues 
within cases, it might be possible to deepen the analysis by considering the framing 
assumptions underlying those narratives.  
However, there is another important aspect of the literature of public policy analysis. In 
Chapter 3 and the discussion over the approaches to public policy, I argued that there are 
two main views on explaining the controversies: firstly, the instrumental rationality 
version of rational-choice theory, suggesting that the institutional actions are the function 
of their objective interests, and secondly, emphasising framing assumptions that also 
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reflect the interests of protagonists. The findings of this study regarding framing 
assumptions might help more in investigating the relations between the interests of 
organisations and their framing assumptions.  
As far as considering the DoE and the MoS, interest-based theories might suggest that the 
objective interests of those organisations were the main factor causing controversies, as the 
DoE is an organisation that is supposed to protect the environment and it therefore could 
be expected to oppose biotechnology development, while the MoS is a Ministry 
responsible for developing science and technology through research, and therefore could 
be expected to be concerned with promoting biotechnology science rather than protecting 
the environment.  
The rational-choice or interest-based approach could not, however, provide a satisfactory 
account of the approach of the MoH and the MoA. This is because the former is 
primarily responsible for human health in the country, not science and technology 
development, and therefore could be expected to be concerned with potential risks of 
biotechnology for human health. However, as the findings of this research suggest, the 
Iranian MoH had no concerns about biotechnology development. On the contrary, the 
MoA is the body responsible for ensuring that there is enough food in the market for the 
population. In this sense, the interests of this organisation could be expected to support 
the promotion of GM crops which in turn could lead to increased productivity. However, 
I found in this research that this Ministry did not conform to those expectations.  
In this way, the view proposing that framing assumptions are important in shaping the 
understandings of protagonists of their interests could provide a more satisfactory 
explanation than the one referring only to interests. The approach of the MoH could be 
better understood in the light of considering its framing assumptions about biotechnology 
as a technology similar to other technologies without imposing substantial risks for 
human health or the environment. Based on that assumption, this Ministry strongly 
rejected any criticism of biotechnology and defined the policy problem as facilitating 
biotechnology development. To the MoH, scientists, and in this case biotechnological 
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experts, are best qualified to decide about the safety of biotechnology, without any 
intervention from political authorities.  
The view of the MoA could also be understood in the light of its framing assumptions. 
To this Ministry, the risks of biotechnology were not just physical risks, but also political 
risks arising from the international commitments of Iran that could impinge on 
international transactions such as imports and exports. Therefore, this Ministry refused to 
accept the political risks of cultivating Iranian GM rice without first having a biosafety 
law. The MoA believed that scientific judgments are neutral; however, it was concerned 
about a lack of sufficient knowledge and facilities in Iran’s GM laboratories and research 
centres that might affect the process of research and lead to imposing further risks on 
domestic agriculture.  
Moreover, the interest-based approach could not provide an account for why the DoE 
rejected any idea for incorporating biotechnological experts into the implementation of 
the biosafety law, while the framing assumptions approach could also help explain the 
perspectives of the DoE in this respect by pointing to the negative assumption of the 
DoE towards the benefits of bodies with promotional responsibilities.  
In short, while the interest-based approach assumes that objective interests can conflict, it 
cannot capture the hidden assumptions that largely influence the understandings of actors 
and their consequent interests. If an organisational interest is protecting the environment, 
presuming something to be harmful will lead that organisation to prevent that harm, 
while presuming something to be safe could lead it to ignore potential harm.  
8.3.4. Framing Assumptions and Power 
The relationship between policy change and policy controversies is another topic about 
which this research might provide new insights. As the controversies have been analysed 
and explained in the light of the persistent framing assumptions of the protagonists, the 
question of why there were so many changes in the policy can be better understood by 
considering the power relations and the dominant power that was able to impose its own 
view. Nonetheless, framing assumptions could also be used as a means to gain power. 
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When there was no dominant power, there could be no agreement and no policy output. 
Moreover, knowing the framing assumptions of the protagonists and the power relations 
might enable the researcher to predict the policy output, which would likely reflect the 
views of the dominant power.  
8.4. Contributing to resolving policy controversies 
In the introduction of this thesis, I stated that a main practical problem in the system of 
biosafety regulation in Iran is the long-standing controversy within the system and among 
the protagonists involved in the process of drafting the biosafety law and, later, 
implementing it. The theoretical approaches applied to the research suggested that the 
differences and contradictions between the framing assumptions of the organisations 
could explain why those controversies remained unresolved for so long. Thereby, the 
question is how could the findings about the framing assumptions contribute to 
suggesting useful ways of resolving the problem. 
Resolving the problem conveys two different senses. On one hand, it might refer to the 
issue of truth and the ways of finding and identifying the correct assumptions in 
comparison to the false assumptions. However, as I have discussed throughout this 
research, framing assumptions are a kind of general worldviews containing many 
normative aspects that cannot easily be checked against a reality ‘out there’. On the other 
hand, the resolution of the problem could refer to the pragmatic resolution of the policy 
controversies. The following discussion presupposes the second understanding of 
resolution.  
At first glance, the solution might look simple: as the framing assumptions are different, 
the changing of those assumptions could therefore be a solution. However, the point is 
that it is hard to estimate how framing assumptions would change considering that they 
were not a subject of discussion during the process of negotiation. A closer view of the 
topics of discussion in the sessions reveals that the main topics of discussion were not 
those different framing assumptions, but reading a previously-written draft of a biosafety 
law (at least for the two stages of the CC and the RC). The chair of the sessions of the 
CC, who was the head of the office of the secretariat located in the DoE, deliberately did 
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not allow the members to discuss their framing assumptions deeply, and the head of the 
DoE as the chair of the RC sessions used her authority to end various discussions and 
finalise the draft as soon as possible.  
As the empirical chapters have shown, the protagonists in the system used different 
strategies to try to exercise power and overcome opposing views. While the head of the 
DoE leveraged her political authority to influence the decisions in the sessions of the RC, 
the MoS and the MoH used their scientific reputation to discredit the DoE as a non-
expert organisation and almost entirely irrelevant to biosafety and biotechnology 
regulation, a tactic that eventually worked in the Parliamentary discussions to convince 
MPs that the view of those Ministries (i.e. the MoH and the MoS) were scientifically 
sound, disparaging other views as non-scientific and unsound.   
One conclusion could be that the topics of many discussions were not the framing 
assumptions, but efforts concentrated to gain power and make particular opinions 
dominant. Putting this understanding beside another fact that protagonists did not 
explicitly acknowledge that a barrier to progress and resolution of the conflicts was the 
persistence of their divergent framing assumptions, the following suggestions could be 
made for helping the policy making experience and possibly resolving such controversies: 
1. If the protagonists are informed about the role and the importance of framing 
assumptions in shaping their views and the resulting controversies; and  
2. If the protagonists are asked to reflect on their own assumptions; and  
3. If the protagonists are informed about the variety of other framing assumptions 
that were held by other Ministries and organisations and the differences between 
those assumptions held by other organisations and their own assumptions; and  
4. If different types of sessions are organised specifically to discuss the framing 
assumptions without any specific concerns about a proper biosafety law;  
Then the controversies might be resolved, or it might lead to a partial resolution by 
achieving agreement on some assumptions but not on others; it may lead to no agreement 
at all, or it might even exacerbate the conflicts. These four steps are in line with the 
suggestions of the Schon and Rein (1994) as they argue that the process of frame 
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reflection might lead to resolving policy controversies. Nevertheless, whatever the result of 
such a dialogue, a benefit would be making the framing assumptions explicit in a way that 
every organisation would know that its perspective and approach was based on specific 
types of framing assumptions.  
In more practical terms, those steps could still be followed as protagonists are continuing 
to discuss the practical rules and procedures of risk assessments and risk management in 
order to implement the law. There may be an opportunity to ask them in their sessions to 
pause their discussions about those practical rules and reflect rather on their framing 
assumptions and the framing assumptions of others, and how those assumptions had 
influenced their approaches to setting those practical rules. If they could reach some 
agreements concerning their framing assumptions, then this pause might not only lead to 
clearer and more explicit rules and procedures, but also it might encourage them to revise 
the law and prepare a new Biosafety bill to replace the previous one with another based on 
more harmonized framing assumptions.  
As a further practical step, there might be other opportunities to raise these issues, such as 
raising them at the annual biotechnology congress, at which different protagonists 
involved in biotechnology, including those participated in the Biosafety regulation 
process, could take part. Those initiatives in turn might lead to taking new steps in 
changing the Biosafety law.  
By reflecting on framing assumptions and making them more explicit, if protagonists 
could not reach an agreement, a further step could be discussing the criteria that might 
help in choosing between those assumptions, i.e. if a resolution could not be achieved. On 
this basis, the protagonists could discuss the variety of criteria according to which they 
need to choose between the framing assumptions. 
If this step failed, then it would be possible to apply political authority and power as the 
final resolution to impose a dominant frame. In one way, this is like the second and third 
stages of negotiations in which the dominant power imposed its view, but with a sharp 
difference. While in the process of negotiations protagonists exercised power without 
acknowledging the diversity of framing assumptions, in this formulation the highest 
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political body in charge of decision making should consider those assumptions and make 
a choice between them.165 Therefore, the question would not be one of policy design, but 
a choice between current and explicit framing assumptions as the foundations of the 
biosafety law.  
8.5. Applicability of the Framework to Similar Countries 
Another contribution of this research might include the application of its developed 
framework categorising different types of framing assumptions. This framework was 
developed by synthesising two broad and different literature streams: on one hand the 
literature of public policy analysis with specific attention to the policy controversies to 
consider the policy narratives and discourses as a prime source of conflicts and on the 
other hand, the literature of technological risk regulation deploying the concept of 
framing assumptions to analyse differences and controversies, which is largely less 
concerned about disputes within countries.  
The framework I used for this research was based on a general classification of the aspects 
involved in the Iranian experience of policy making (i.e. policy problems, risk system and 
prescriptions) that might be perceived differently because of the different framing 
assumptions protagonists adopted. On this basis, it might be possible to develop a cube 
including three axes, each of which characterises one aspect of my framework. Figure 8-2 
represents this model.  
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Figure 8- 2 Characterising the extent and dimensions 
of controversies 
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Similar to the case of biosafety regulation in Iran, there are many other countries which 
are dealing with setting their biosafety laws because of their commitments to the CPB, 
and are struggling to develop such a law. A prime issue for them, similar to Iran, might be 
a lack of agreement about policy problems, the risk system and the prescriptions for 
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For instance, as Gupta and Falkner (2006, 2009) discuss in the context of Mexico, in the 
early days of starting the negotiations in 2003, the Department of Environment in that 
country succeeded in demonstrating the importance of the CPB. However, opposition of 
different groups emphasising a desire to join the free trade agreements (like NAFTA) was 
finally able to overcome the restrictive views of the Department of Environment and 
eventually two chief experts in the Academy of Science drafted a new version of the 
biosafety law emphasising both the risks and benefits of biotechnology. Although the 
information about the case of Mexico is limited, it seems that the evolution of that 
country’s controversies around the biosafety law were similar to those in Iran, consisting 
of controversies about policy problems, the risk system and the prescriptions.  
While the controversies over the biosafety law in other countries might be very similar to 
the case of Iran, policy changes do not necessarily only take place because of changes in 
power relations, as in the case of Iran. In fact, policy changes need to be analysed with a 
detailed consideration of the structures and the involved actors in those countries such as 
the public, the media, the private sector, international agencies and so on, assuming that 
the framing assumptions are persistent for a long period of time. However, it is always 
possible that policy changes come from changes in the framing assumptions.  
8.6. Discussing Implications for industrialised countries 
The model presented in Figure 8-2 might also be able to characterise policy controversies 
in the cases of the USA and Europe as is shown in Figure 8-3. For instance, the 
experience of the USA in regulating biotechnology risk was an experience in which there 
were no disagreements about the risk-generating system, presuming products to be a 
source of risk and a limited physical scope for that perceived risk. Moreover, there were 
few contentions over the policy problem, as protagonists adopted biotechnology risk as 
the major problem to be addressed. Finally, there were limited disputes about the policy 
prescriptions and the roles and responsibilities of organisations. Therefore, the 
controversies were mainly confined to some scientific disagreements about the proper 
ways of calculating risks.  
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Conversely, although the EU generally accepted the policy problem as the risk of 
biotechnology, there were several disagreements about the risk system especially after 
1997 either in terms of the risk-generating system or the scope of the risks. While public 
and the media insisted on a system including both products and processes as a source of 
risk-generation and a wider scope for assessing those risks, large GM companies suggested 
a narrower system either in terms of the sources of risk-generation or in terms of the 
scopes of those risks. There were also some disagreements about the roles and 
responsibilities, not between organisations, but about the proper role of the EU 
authorities and member states’ organisations.  
Directive 90/220 on the contained use of GMOs was the beginning of the European 
effort to build a harmonised territory in terms of biotechnology regulation by considering 
the importance of fighting the adverse effects of biotechnology. This Directive was 
replaced around a decade later by Directive 2001/18, as result of public debates, on the 
deliberate release into the environment of GMOs that broadened the scope of assessment 
of possible risks to cover long-term and indirect effects as well as the effects on non-
target organisms. A complementary EC regulation in 2003 on GM food and feed 
provided the pre-marketing authorisation of GMOs.166 Both aimed to set science-based 
standards for human and animal health and environmental risk assessment, while 
Regulation 1830/2003 also provided rules on the traceability and labelling of GMOs 
and the traceability of GMO-derived food and feed.  
Therefore, this framework could also be used for tracing the dynamics of disagreements. 
In this sense, the controversies in the EU before 1997 were largely not about the risk 
system. But the involvement of the public and the media led to raising new controversies 
about the risk-generating system as well as the scope of those risks. In this sense, while the 
EU was experiencing disagreements about the policy prescriptions for addressing risks, it 
moved on to higher-level disagreements arising from public debates on the risk-generating 
system as well as the scope of risks, as two parts of the risk system.  
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Figure 8- 3 Characterising disagreements within 
other territories 
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discussed that the case of some countries that had prohibited or restricted cultivation on 
their territories where the EU scientific assessments had concluded that those measures 
were not justified. On this basis, the communication report proposed a new system under 
which the member states have the freedom to decide on the cultivation of GMOs in their 
territories (EC COM 2010).   
8.7. Extending the application of the concept of framing assumptions 
I began my theoretical discussions by discussing the models of risk regulation and the 
differences between the four models of regulation. I argued that the co-evolutionary 
model of regulation could provide a better explanation of the controversies than three 
other models (i.e. technocracy, decisionism and inverted decisionism) because it highlights 
the effects of socio-political factors that could provide some prior framing assumptions to 
the scientific risk assessments. However, as the case of Iran was not contentious regarding 
experiences of risk assessment, but with regard to a general level of identifying the goals 
of biosafety and the means of implementing those goals, I have referred to the literature 
of public policy which could develop a theoretical framework suitable for the case of Iran.  
This research was based on a case different from cases of risk assessment, and has shown 
that it might be possible to apply the concept of framing assumption to issues wider than 
just framing of risk assessment. In this sense, framing assumptions could be used to 
analyse controversies in the process of legislation. It might also be possible to extend the 
application of framing assumptions to issues other than risk, for instance to cover framing 
assumptions concerning benefits. In addition, as I have applied the notion of framing 
assumptions at an organisational level, it might be possible to apply the concept to other 
levels of analysis (e.g. individuals, groups or firms).  
8.8. Proposals for further research  
There could be several suggestions for further research following the results of the current 
study. Firstly, it would be possible to define a type of action research to test how much a 
process of a few mediated sessions of negotiations explicitly to discuss the framing 
assumptions between organisations might help in resolving controversies. For this 
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purpose, the researcher could implement the suggested steps in section 8.4. It would be 
interesting to see how protagonists might reflect on their own framing assumptions and 
the framing assumptions of each other, and how they might react to those conflicting 
assumptions in a session that was directly designed for this purpose. The results of 
holding such sessions might provide further insights for inquiries into the resolution of 
framing conflicts.  
Secondly, as the developed framework might be used for wider areas of decision making 
and in various contexts, it may be possible to define a similar research programme in other 
countries experiencing a high degree of controversy in their biosafety regulation. For 
instance, as Karembu et al (2010) described the process of biosafety policy making in 
Kenya, deploying fewer theoretical tools to analyse the controversies, they pointed out 
that policy controversies were alive throughout the process, although a group emphasising 
a precautionary approach could not seize power in any stage of the decision making. 
Keeley (2006) reported a similar level of controversy in China where legislation has been 
taking place behind closed doors with minimal outside access to the minutes of the 
debates, let alone voice recordings.   
Further, it might be possible to examine the applicability of the framework and approach 
of this research to other cases of controversial regulation, either in Iran or in other 
countries. Policy making is a controversial activity and disputes could happen in several 
cases of policy making other than just risk regulation. In this vein, it might even be 
possible to apply the framework of this study to the cases that have previously been 
analysed in the literature, using the concepts of narratives or discourses (such as the three 
cases discussed by Shon and Rein 1994). The question would then be whether or not 
considering framing assumptions could provide a better explanation in comparison to the 
explanation suggested by Shon and Rein (1994). 
Another possibility would be examining the degree to which the concept of framing 
assumptions could be extended to analyse the assumptions underlying different views on 
benefits. For instance, a question might be: do the persons discussing the risks and 
benefits of biotechnology, or even other technologies, consider the same scope of risks 
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and benefits, or do they consider a wider scope for risks (i.e. long-term, indirect effects 
and effects on non-target organisms) while suggesting a narrower scope for benefits? 
Further, the issue of comparing risks and benefits also could be considered as another 
topic of investigation because if arguments about risks and benefits depend on different 
sets of framing assumptions, then the question would be: how might it be possible to 
suggest a way to balance the framing assumptions and then compare risks and benefits?  
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